20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

| 1 | David S. Gingras, #021097 | | | | | | | | |
|----|--|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | Gingras Law Office, PLLC 4802 E. Ray Road, #23-271 | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | Phoenix, AZ 85044 Tel.: (480) 264-1400 | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | Fax: (480) 248-3196 David@GingrasLaw.com | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | Attorney for Plaintiffs Kyle Grant, Mariel Grant and Travis Grant | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | UNITED STATES DIS | STRICT COURT | | | | | | | |
| 9 | DISTRICT OF ARIZONA | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | | | | | | | | | |
| 11 | Travis Grant and Mariel Grant, | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | Husband and Wife; and Kyle Grant, | Case No | | | | | | | |
| 13 | Plaintiffs, | | | | | | | | |
| 14 | V. | VERIFIED COMPLAINT | | | | | | | |
| 15 | Andrew Ivchenko and Renee Ivchenko, | | | | | | | | |
| 16 | Husband and Wife, | | | | | | | | |
| 17 | Defendants. | | | | | | | | |
| 18 | For their Verified Complaint, Plaintiff | s Travis Grant, Mariel Grant, and K | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

Cyle Grant, allege the following:

- The court system is a powerful tool for resolving disputes in an organized and hopefully somewhat civilized manner. But like any powerful tool, the court system is subject to abuse.
- 2. This case arises from, and seeks compensation for, an extreme example of such abuse.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiffs Travis Grant ("Travis") and Mariel Grant ("Mariel") are a married couple. At all times relevant to this matter, Travis and Mariel resided in, and were citizens of, the State of Florida.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4. Kyle Grant ("Kyle") is Travis's brother. At all times relevant to this matter, Kyle resided in, and was a citizen of, the State of Florida.
- 5. Defendants Andrew Ivchenko ("Mr. Ivchenko") and Renee Ivchenko ("Mrs. Ivchenko") are a married couple who reside in Scottsdale, Arizona.
- 6. As explained further herein, during all times relevant to this matter Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko were each acting for the benefit of their marital community within the meaning of A.R.S. § 25–215(D).

JURISDICTION/VENUE

- 7. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000 and the parties are citizens of different states.
- 8. The transactions and occurrences involved in this matter took place in Maricopa County and all Defendants reside in Maricopa County; therefore, venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

SUMMARY OF TRAVIS'S WEBSITES

- 9. During the times relevant to this action, and presently, Travis has owned and operated several websites including www.Rapsheetz.com, www.Rapsheets.org, www.BailBondSearch.com, www.BailBonsdsHQ.com and www.PublicPoliceRecord.com. For the purposes of this matter, these sites are collectively referred to as "Travis's websites".
- 10. In general, Travis's websites are involved in "content aggregation". As used herein, "content aggregation" means that Travis's websites gather, index, and display or "republish" existing online information created by third party sources.
- 11. In general, the information republished on Travis's websites was first published on other publicly accessible websites operated by third parties.
- 12. The information aggregated and republished by Travis's websites includes previously published arrest records and mugshots from state and local law enforcement.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 13. In general, the arrest records and mugshots aggregated by Travis's websites were initially created and published on the Internet by various law enforcement agencies across the United States including the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office ("MCSO").
- 14. Currently, the database of records displayed on Travis's websites contains tens of millions of entries from 45 different U.S. states; the only states not represented in the index are Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts and Vermont.
- 15. Travis's websites do not publish, and have never republished, mugshots or arrest records created by federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI or United States Marshall's Service.
- 16. After arrest records and mugshots are first published on the Internet by the arresting agency, Travis's websites use automated software to gather or "aggregate" the records which are then republished *verbatim* on one or more of Travis's websites.
 - 17. Kyle works for Travis.
- 18. Kyle does not have, and has never had, any ownership interest in Travis's websites.
- 19. Among other things, Kyle's job duties include administrative tasks such as reviewing and researching removal requests submitted by individuals appearing on one or more of Travis's sites.
- 20. As a matter of policy and subject to his own final editorial discretion, Travis does not ordinarily remove records upon request.
- 21. Although he is not legally obligated to do so, as a matter of policy, Travis regularly considers requests to remove or update content for various reasons.
- 22. As a matter of policy, Travis has always been willing to consider requests to update pages appearing on his websites if the requesting party submits information showing the records in question have been sealed, expunged, or dismissed. Travis may also consider updating and/or removing records for any other reason he deems proper.
- 23. As a matter of policy, Travis has also routinely agreed to remove records from his website, even when he was under no legal or other obligation to do so.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 24. Travis's websites earn money from Google's AdSense program ("AdSense"). As participants in the AdSense program, Travis's websites display advertisements from the program ("AdSense ads").
- 25. The contents of each AdSense ad appearing on Travis's websites are created solely by Google's AdSense customers, not by Plaintiffs.
- 26. Every AdSense ad appearing on Travis's websites contains a blue triangle and/or a blue "x" in the upper right-hand corner, similar to the example shown below:



- 27. The blue "X" and/or blue triangle (or both) shown in the example above appear in all Google AdSense ads.
- 28. Beyond simply allowing any AdSense ads to appear, Plaintiffs cannot and do not control which specific AdSense ads appear on any of Travis's websites.
- 29. The decision regarding which (if any) AdSense ads to display on Travis's websites is made solely by Google, not by Plaintiffs.
- 30. Plaintiffs have never displayed the name, address, telephone number, mugshot, or any other information contained in a criminal justice record in any advertisement for a product or service appearing on any of Travis's websites.
- 31. Since August 27, 2019, Plaintiffs have not used a name, address, telephone number, mugshot, or any other information contained in a criminal justice record to solicit business for pecuniary gain within the meaning of A.R.S. § 44–7902(B).

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

| RENEE | IVCHENKO'S | ARREST |
|--|------------|--------|
| TO I VI V | | ANNESI |

- According to her husband, Defendant Renee Ivchenko is a severe alcoholic. 32.
- 33. Due to problems related to her alcoholism, Mrs. Ivchenko has had numerous contacts with law enforcement including the City of Scottsdale Police.
- 34. On April 21, 2018, Mrs. Ivchenko called Scottsdale Police and told them she had just been assaulted by her husband, Andrew.
 - 35. Mrs. Ivchenko's allegation of assault was completely false.
- 36. Mrs. Ivchenko falsely accused Mr. Ivchenko of assault because she was angry that Mr. Ivchenko had taken away alcohol from her and poured it down the drain.
- 37. On or about April 21, 2018, Mr. Ivchenko told Scottsdale Police that Mrs. Ivchenko fabricated the story about being assaulted because she was angry that he had poured a bottle of her vodka down the sink, or words to that effect.
- 38. Based on Mrs. Ivchenko's allegation of domestic violence, Scottsdale Police went to the Ivchenko residence to investigate.
- 39. After the police arrived at his residence, Mr. Ivchenko told the police that he did not assault Mrs. Ivchenko.
- 40. Upon further investigation, which included speaking to both Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko and inspecting Mrs. Ivchenko for any injuries, the police were unable to find any evidence showing that Mr. Ivchenko assaulted Mrs. Ivchenko.
- 41. Under A.R.S. § 13–2907.01, it is a crime for any person to knowingly make to a law enforcement agency of either this state or a political subdivision of this state a false, fraudulent or unfounded report or statement or to knowingly misrepresent a fact for the purpose of interfering with the orderly operation of a law enforcement agency or misleading a peace officer.
- 42. When Mrs. Ivchenko falsely told Scottsdale Police that Mr. Ivchenko assaulted her on April 21, 2018, she committed a crime.
- 43. Based on his personal involvement in the events, Mr. Ivchenko knew that Mrs. Ivchenko committed a crime on April 21, 2018.

- 44. While talking with police officers, Mrs. Ivchenko became combative, argumentative, and refused to follow instructions from the officers.
- 45. Attached hereto as <u>Exhibit A</u> is a true and correct redacted copy of Scottsdale Police Report #18–08959 relating to the arrest of Renee Ivchenko on April 21, 2018. In this report, one of the police officers provided the following narrative description of the events which he witnessed at the Ivchenko residence:

We informed Andrew that Renee and he needed to stay separated for the night until she could sober up. While Andrew was packing, I stoodby with Renee in the kitchen. I gave several verbal commands for Renee to remain seated in a separate room. Renee initially ignored my verbal commands to take a seat and insisted on speaking with Andrew, which I did not allow. Renee eventually went to the living room to lay on the couch for a few seconds before getting back up and trying to walk past me to speak with Andrew. I informed Renee several times that she was not going to speak Andrew in person anymore that night due to her intoxication and behavior. Renee insisted on continuing to disobey my commands and became very agitated with FTO Ryan, Ofc. Dearing, and myself. Renee began yelling aggressively, swinging her arms, and pointing at the other officer and me while I told her to calm down. Renee then pushed me in the chest with open palms, causing herself to fall backwards against the living room couch. I then grabbed Renee's right arm, FTO Ryan grabbed Renee's left arm, and we placed both of her arms behind her back into handcuff position.

- 46. The events described in Scottsdale Police Report #18–08959 were captured on video by bodycams worn by officers present at the scene.
- 47. The events described in the police report are substantially consistent with what is shown in the bodycam footage.
 - 48. Scottsdale Police arrested Renee Ivchenko on April 21, 2018.
- 49. At the time of her arrest on April 21, 2018, Scottsdale Police alleged probable cause existed to charge Mrs. Ivchenko with three criminal offenses: 1.) aggravated assault on a police officer, a felony, 2.) disorderly conduct-touched to injure, a misdemeanor, and 3.) disorderly conduct-fighting, a misdemeanor.
- 50. After her arrest in Scottsdale on April 21, 2018, Mrs. Ivchenko was transferred to the custody of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) who, in turn, took Mrs. Ivchenko's booking photo or "mugshot".
- 51. Shortly thereafter (within a day or two), MCSO published Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot and other details regarding her arrest on its website located at https://www.mcso.org/Mugshot/.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

52. At the time MCSO published Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot on the Internet, it did not place any technical or legal restrictions on the republication of that information.

On or around April 21-23, 2018, MCSO published all of the following 53. information about Mrs. Ivchenko on its publicly accessible website:

T452814 RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO **Booking Number: T452814** Booking Date: 04/21/2018 Sex: FEMALE Height: 5'07 Weight: 125 Eye Color: HAZEL Hair Color: BLONDE OR STRAWBERRY D.O.B: 2/17/1972 (1) Count of ASSAULT-TOUCHED TO INJURE (1) Count of DISORDERLY CONDUCT-FIGHTING

- 54. Within three days of the time MCSO first published this information on its website, the same information was aggregated and republished verbatim on one or more of Travis's websites.
- 55. The mugshot and arrest information relating to Mrs. Ivchenko was republished on Travis's websites without any substantive changes to the information.
- 56. From the time of Mrs. Ivchenko's arrest continuously to the present day, Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot, arrest details, and other information relating to her arrest (including the Scottsdale Police report, bodycam footage, and direct Complaint) are all matters of public record and are accessible to any member of the public upon request.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

| 57. | Under Ar | rizona law, | including | but not | limited to | A.R.S. | § 39–121, | public |
|----------------|-----------|--------------|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-------------|--------|
| records in the | custody o | of any publi | c agency o | r officer | are open | to public | inspection. | |


- 58. On April 24, 2018, Mrs. Ivchenko was charged by direct complaint with one felony count of aggravated assault in Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CR2018-119949.
- 59. On May 11, 2018, Mrs. Ivchenko agreed to participate in a deferred prosecution program to resolve the criminal charge against her.
- 60. As part of her participation in the deferred prosecution program, Mrs. Ivchenko made a written representation to the Court avowing that she was, in fact, guilty of the crime she was charged with – felony aggravated assault. A true and correct copy of the Complaint and Mrs. Ivchenko's admission of guilt are attached hereto as Exhibit B.

As part of my consent to participate in the Felony Pretrial Intervention Program, I acknowledge that I am guilty of the offenses charged in the complaint. I acknowledge that this admission and the statements in this document may be used against me if I fail to successfully complete the program and my case proceeds to trial. I understand that I have the right to remain silent and I make the following statements voluntarily after consultation with my attorney. On April 21, 2018 in Scottsdale, Arizona - Maricopa County Date of Offense Location and Jurisdiction On April 21, 2018, I, Renee Ivchenko, knowingly touched Brandon Treglown in the chest area with the intent to provoke him. Brandon Treglown is a a Scottsdale Police Officer and at the time of this incident he was in full uniform and I knew he was a police officer acting in his official capacity.

- 61. By no later than May 15, 2018, Mr. Ivchenko knew Renee had been charged with a crime in CR2018-119949, and he knew she agreed to participate in a deferred prosecution program to resolve the criminal charge against her.
- 62. By no later than May 15, 2018, Mr. Ivchenko knew Renee had signed a document containing a statement: "I acknowledge that I am guilty of the offenses charged in the complaint", meaning the direct Complaint filed in CR2018-119949.

63. Upon discovering that Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot had been republished on one or more of Travis's websites, in October 2018 Mr. and/or Mrs. Ivchenko used an online form to submit a request that Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot be removed on the grounds that the criminal case against her had been "dismissed".

64. Upon receiving this request, the page featuring Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot was updated to prominently include the word "DISMISSED" in all capital letters in a yellow box as shown below.



65. Other than adding the word "DISMISSED" to the page in October 2018 in response to a request submitted by either Mr. and/or Mrs. Ivchenko, Defendants made no other changes of any kind to the page after that date.

THE COPYRIGHT APPLICATION

66. On or about March 23, 2019, Mr. Ivchenko submitted an application to the United States Copyright Office for an "Untitled" visual work.

| | 67. | The "work" that was the subject of this application was either solely, or it |
|-------|----------|--|
| inclu | ded in p | part or in whole, the mugshot of Mrs. Ivchenko created by MCSO at the time |
| of Mı | s. Ivche | enko's arrest on April 21, 2018. |

- 68. In this application, Mr. Ivchenko stated the "work" in question was authored by Renee Rachelle Ivchenko.
- 69. Based on Mr. Ivchenko's representation in the application, the Copyright Office registered the "work" and assigned it Registration Number VA0002154452.
- 70. Details of the issued copyright registration obtained by Mr. Ivchenko are available at copyright.gov and are shown below:

Type of Work: Visual Material

Registration Number / Date: VA0002154452 / 2019-03-23

Application Title: Untitled.

Title: Untitled.

Description: Electronic file (eService)

Copyright Claimant: Renee Rachelle Ivchenko. Address: 4960 S Gilbert Rd Ste 1-226, CHANDLER, AZ, 85249, United States.

Date of Creation: 2018

Date of Publication: 2018-03-10

Nation of First Publication: United States

Authorship on Application: Renee Rachelle Ivchenko; Domicile: United States; Citizenship: United States, Authorship: photograph.

Names: Ivchenko, Rence Rachelle

- 71. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) provides: "Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work."
- 72. As a matter of law, the "author" of a copyrighted work is either the person who originally created the work (e.g., the photographer who took the photo), or the employer or other hiring party who commissioned the creation of the work as a work for hire within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
- 73. As a matter of law, Renee Ivchenko was not the "author" of the work registered as VA0002154452.
- 74. At the time Mr. Ivchenko submitted the copyright application relating to Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot to the United States Copyright Office in March 2019, he knew or reasonably should have known that Mrs. Ivchenko was not the "author" of the work for which registration was sought.

Since receiving the Certificate of Registration for VA0002154452, Mr.

Ivchenko and/or Mrs. Ivchenko have sent at least five (5) takedown demands to Twitter

75.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 77. Each of the DMCA takedown demands shown above relate to Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot taken at the time of her arrest on April 21, 2018.
- 78. Each of the DMCA takedown demands shown above contained an affirmative representation that Mrs. Ivchenko owned the copyright to her mugshot.
- 79. Each of the DMCA takedown demands shown above was signed by Mr. and/or Mrs. Ivchenko under penalty of perjury.
- Mrs. Ivchenko does not now, nor has she ever, lawfully owned the 80. copyright or any other exclusive rights to her mugshot.
- 81. Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot was created by an employee of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office acting within the scope of his/her employment.
- 82. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), the copyright in Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot is owned by Maricopa County, Arizona.
- 83. At no time did Maricopa County execute a signed written agreement transferring copyright ownership of Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot to her, or to anyone else.
- 84. At no time did Mrs. Ivchenko have a written work for hire agreement with the MCSO employee who took her mugshot.
- 85. Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko have, on multiple occasions, made knowingly false statements to third parties for the purpose of attempting to remove Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot from the Internet.
- 86. A person who performed a reasonable investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Certificate of Registration for VA0002154452 obtained by Mr. Ivchenko would know the Certificate of Registration was obtained by fraud; specifically Mr. Ivchenko falsely represented to the U.S. Copyright Office that Mrs. Ivchenko was the "author" of her mugshot when, in fact, he knew she was not.
- 87. Knowingly making a false statement of material fact to the U.S. Copyright Office is a federal crime in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506(e).
- 88. Knowingly making a false sworn statement on a DMCA notice is a federal crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

| T | ITI | GA | TIC | N | RE | CINS | S—C | ASE. | 1 |
|---|--------|---------------------------|-----|-------|----|------|-----|------|---|
| _ | /I I I | $\mathbf{Q}_{\mathbf{Q}}$ | | 7 T T | DE | | - | | |

- On May 9, 2019, Mr. Ivchenko filed a Complaint against Plaintiffs in 89. Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CV2019-090493 ("Case 1"). A true and correct copy of the Complaint from that matter is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
- 90. Among other things, the Complaint in Case 1 alleged that Kyle David Grant, Travis Paul Grant, and Mariel Lizette Grant violated Mrs. Ivchenko's rights by republishing her name, mugshot, and arrest information on the Internet.
- 91. Among other things, the Complaint in Case 1 alleged that Defendants (Plaintiffs here) defamed Mrs. Ivchenko by "publish[ing] Plaintiff's image on various Websites" and by implying *falsely* that Mrs. Ivchenko was guilty of a crime.
- 92. At the time Mr. Ivchenko filed Case 1, he knew that Mrs. Ivchenko did, in fact, commit one or more criminal acts on April 21, 2018 and/or on other dates.
- 93. At the time Mr. Ivchenko filed Case 1, he knew that Mrs. Ivchenko had previously signed a written statement admitting that she was guilty of felony aggravated assault on a police officer.
- 94. At the time Mr. Ivchenko filed Case 1, he knew that a statement implying that Mrs. Ivchenko was guilty of criminal conduct was not false.
- 95. The Complaint in Case 1 alleged that Mrs. Ivchenko suffered damages in excess of \$1 million from the events alleged in the Complaint.
- 96. At the time Mr. Ivchenko filed Case 1, he knew that Mrs. Ivchenko had not suffered any damages whatsoever as a result of the events alleged in the Complaint.
- 97. Shortly after Travis was served with the Complaint in Case 1 in May 2019, he retained counsel to defend the matter.
- 98. On May 28, 2019, Travis's counsel sent an email to Mr. Ivchenko, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
- 99. Among other things, the May 28, 2019 email to Mr. Ivchenko explained that Case 1 was groundless because to the extent Travis published any statement alleging or implying that Mrs. Ivchenko was guilty of a crime, that implication was entirely true.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- Among other things, the May 28, 2019 email to Mr. Ivchenko explained 100. that Case 1 was groundless because it was based on the republication of existing online content which Arizona courts have previously determined to be protected by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
- Although not specifically referenced in the May 28, 2019 email, one or 101. more claims in Case 1 (including, but not limited to, the cause of action for defamation) were untimely as a matter of law pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–541 because they were based on information published more than one year prior to the filing of Case 1.
- 102. Although not specifically referenced in the May 28, 2019 email, one or more claims in Case 1 (including, but not limited to, the cause of action for defamation) were groundless because they were based on statements published on a "bogus Twitter account" which were not statements made or published by Plaintiffs.
- 103. On May 31, 2019, after the case was removed to federal court, Mr. Ivchenko dismissed Case 1 without prejudice by filing a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
- 104. After Case 1 was dismissed, Plaintiffs removed Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot and arrest information from all of Travis's websites until at least September 2020.

LITIGATION CONTINUES—CASE 2

- On December 17, 2019, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko, now represented by 105. counsel (David Ferrucci, Esq.; "Mr. Ferrucci"), filed a Complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CV2019-153355 ("Case 2"). A true and correct copy of the Complaint filed in Case 2 is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
- Among other things, the Complaint in Case 2 alleged in ¶ 4 that Plaintiffs "extort payment of fees for removal of the arrest information from the victims who [sic] identities and likenesses have been misappropriated." This allegation was made by Defendants without probable cause and with malice. The allegation lacked probable cause because Defendants knew the statement was false and knew that no reasonable basis existed to believe that the statement was true.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

107. Among other things, the Complaint in Case 2 alleged that Plaintiffs defamed Mrs. Ivchenko by publishing statements on Travis's websites accusing Mrs. Ivchenko of committing a crime or implying that she had committed a crime. This allegation was made by Defendants without probable cause and with malice. The allegation lacked probable cause because Defendants knew that any statement implying Mrs. Ivchenko committed a crime was true.

108. Among other things, the Complaint in Case 2 alleged that Plaintiffs defamed Mr. Ivchenko by publishing statements on Twitter falsely accusing him of engaging in a "fraud" on the U.S. Copyright Office. This allegation was made by Defendants without probable cause and with malice. The allegation lacked probable cause because Defendants knew the statement accusing Mr. Ivchenko of engaging in "fraud" was true. The allegation further lacked probable cause because Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew that Plaintiffs did not publish any such statement and knew that no reasonable basis existed to believe that Plaintiffs had published any such statement.

- 109. At the time the Complaint in Case 2 was filed, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew, or should reasonably have known, that any statement published by Plaintiffs accusing Mrs. Ivchenko of committing a crime or implying that she had committed a crime was true.
- 110. At the time the Complaint in Case 2 was filed, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew, or should reasonably have known, that any statement published by Plaintiffs implying that Mr. Ivchenko had committed "fraud" on the U.S. Copyright Office was true.
- At the time the Complaint in Case 2 was filed, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew, or should reasonably have known, that Plaintiffs had not published any false statements about Mr. or Mrs. Ivchenko on Twitter.
- At the time the Complaint in Case 2 was filed, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew that Plaintiffs had not asked for money or anything else of value for the removal of Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot and/or arrest information from any of Travis's websites.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- At the time the Complaint in Case 2 was filed, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko 113. knew, or should reasonably have known, that Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot had previously been removed from all of Travis's websites without any request for, or payment of, money or anything else of value.
- 114. Each and every claim asserted in the Complaint in Case 2 lacked probable cause, either factually, legally, or both.
- Each and every claim asserted in the Complaint in Case 2 was asserted solely for malicious purposes and not for the purpose of resolving any legitimate dispute.
- One or more claims in Case 2 (including, but not limited to, the cause of action for defamation) were untimely as a matter of law pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–541 because they were based on statements published more than one year prior to the filing of Case 2.
- Prior to the filing of Case 2, Mr. Ivchenko knew the statute of limitations for defamation claims in Arizona was one year pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–541.
- Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko intentionally decided to include false factual 118. allegations in the Complaint in Case 2 to ensure that Plaintiffs could not quickly resolve the matter by moving to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
- Specifically, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew that any claims based on the publication of Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot would be untimely as a matter of law because that information was published on Travis's websites beginning in April 2018; more than one year before the Complaint in Case 2 was filed on December 17, 2019.
- 120. In an effort to make it appear (falsely) that the Complaint in Case 2 stated timely claims for relief, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko falsely accused Plaintiffs of posting defamatory statements about Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko on Twitter within one year prior to the filing of the Complaint in Case 2.
- The decision to include claims based on the statements published on Twitter was done solely to make it appear the Complaint's defamation claims were not time-barred even though such claims were, in fact, untimely as a matter of law.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- At the time Case 2 was filed, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew there was no 122. probable cause to support the allegation that Plaintiffs had posted defamatory statements about Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko on Twitter within the one year period prior to the filing of the Complaint in Case 2. This allegation was made by Defendants without probable cause, with knowledge that it was false, and with malice.
- In a series of emails beginning on January 10, 2020, Defendants were informed that one or more of the claims in Case 2 were groundless for numerous reasons.
- Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of an email sent to Mr. Ferrucci on January 10, 2020. This email explained that, among other things, one or more claims in Case 2 were groundless because they were untimely and because they were based on statements which were literally and substantially true (i.e., the alleged statement implying that Mrs. Ivchenko had engaged in criminal conduct).
- Mr. Ferrucci read the January 10th email shortly after it was sent and shared it with Mr. and/or Mrs. Ivchenko shortly thereafter.
- 126. A reasonable lawyer knows that after the applicable statute of limitations for a claim has expired, that claim cannot be pursued in court.
- The statute of limitations in Arizona for injuries done to the character or reputation of another by libel or slander is one year pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–541.
- The one year limitation period of A.R.S. § 12–541 begins to run on the date 128. the defamatory information is first published, not when it is discovered. See Larue v. *Brown*, 235 Ariz. 440, 443 (App. 2014) ("Arizona provides that the statute of limitations for a defamation action begins to run upon publication of the defamatory statement.")
- 129. Among other things, the Complaint in Case 2 asserted claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy based on statements published more than one year prior to the commencement of the action.
- At the time Case 2 was filed, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew such claims were asserted without probable cause and with malice.
 - 131. Despite numerous demands from Plaintiffs to dismiss all claims in Case 2

which were not supported by probable cause, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko initially refused to dismiss any claims from the case and indicated that all claims were tenable and well-grounded in fact.

132. Based on that refusal, on February 7, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an Answer in Case 2 and on February 21, 2020, they filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

LITIGATION CONTINUES—CASE 2(b)

- 133. Six days later on February 27, 2020, while the Motion for Summary Judgment remained pending, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko filed an Amended Complaint in Case 2, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit G ("Case 2(b)").
- 134. The Amended Complaint in Case 2(b) substantially changed the nature of the proceeding. Among other things, the Amended Complaint in Case 2(b) added a total of 20 new anonymous "John Doe" and "Jane Doe" Plaintiffs each asserting new claims not present in the original Complaint.
- 135. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require all litigants to use their real names. Specifically, Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) requires, among other things: "An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Other court rules include the same mandate. *See*, *e.g.*, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) ("The title of the complaint must name all the parties")
- 136. Prior to amending the Complaint in Case 2(b) to add anonymous parties to the proceeding, Defendants did not request nor receive leave of Court to proceed via pseudonym.
- 137. Defendants' inclusion of anonymous parties in the Complaint in Case 2(b) without leave of court violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This violation was intentional and malicious in that Defendants believed the use of anonymous parties would make it easier for them to needlessly prolong the litigation and to needlessly increase the cost of the litigation by forcing Plaintiffs to challenge this improper conduct in various motions before Defendants simply abandoned the case.
 - 138. Defendants' actions in willfully disregarding and violating court rules for

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the purpose of increasing the financial harm suffered by Plaintiffs was malicious and not proper in the regular course of the proceedings.

- 139. On May 19, 2020, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko (acting through counsel) filed a Motion to Dismiss Case 2(b) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). This motion asked the Court to dismiss the claims of all parties, including both Mrs. Ivchenko and the 20 anonymous plaintiffs, without prejudice.
- 140. In response, Plaintiffs indicated that they did not object to the 20 anonymous plaintiffs' request for dismissal without prejudice, but they objected to the request as it related to Mrs. Ivchenko. As to Mrs. Ivchenko, Plaintiffs noted that she had filed and dismissed one prior action asserting the same claims based on the same facts, and that any dismissal of Case 2(b) should be with prejudice as to Mrs. Ivchenko.
- 141. On June 26, 2020, the District Court issued an order in which it dismissed all of Mrs. Ivchenko's claims in Case 2(b) with prejudice. This order of dismissal represents a final, on the merits, adjudication of Mrs. Ivchenko's claims.
- 142. Case 2(b) was resolved in favor of Plaintiffs as it relates to Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko's claims.

LITIGATION CONTINUES—CASE 3

- 143. On May 1, 2020, Mr. Ivchenko filed a new action against Plaintiffs in Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CV2020-093006 ("Case 3"). A true and correct copy of the Complaint in Case 3 is attached hereto as Exhibit H.
- Similarly to Case 2(b), the Complaint in Case 3 included claims on behalf 144. of 20 anonymous Plaintiffs identified as "John Doe" and "Jane Does".
- 145. Prior to filing Case 3, Mr. Ivchenko neither requested nor received leave of Court to permit the plaintiffs to proceed via pseudonym.
- Mr. Ivchenko's inclusion of anonymous parties in the Complaint in Case 3 violated the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. This violation was intentional and malicious in that Mr. Ivchenko believed the use of anonymous parties would make it easier for him to needlessly prolong the litigation and to needlessly increase the cost of

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the litigation by forcing Plaintiffs to challenge this improper conduct in various motions.

- 147. Mr. Ivchenko's actions in willfully disregarding and violating court rules for the purpose of increasing the financial harm suffered by Plaintiffs was not proper in the regular course of the proceedings.
- 148. The Complaint in Case 3 included three parties, identified as John Does 8, 9 & 10, who were allegedly residents of the State of Florida.
- The Complaint in Case 3 asserted claims on behalf of John Does 8, 9 & 10 149. for violations of A.R.S. § 44–7902(B), unlawful appropriation under Arizona common law, and invasion of privacy/false light under Arizona common law.
- The Complaint in Case 3 specifically omitted any reference to the location where John Does 8, 9 & 10 were arrested. The decision to omit such reference was made by Mr. Ivchenko.
 - John Does 8, 9 & 10 were arrested in Florida, not Arizona. 151.
- 152. Before Case 3 was filed, Mr. Ivchenko knew, or reasonably should have known, John Does 8, 9 & 10 were arrested in Florida, not Arizona.
- 153. Following their arrests in Florida, the names and mugshots of John Does 8, 9 & 10 were published on the Internet by the arresting law enforcement agencies in Florida. After this information was published on the Internet, it was aggregated and republished on one or more of Travis's websites without any substantive changes or additions.
- No part of the claims of John Does 8, 9 & 10 arose in Arizona, nor were their claims based on conduct which occurred in Arizona. Mr. Ivchenko knew, or reasonably should have known, this before Case 3 was filed.
- 155. Under the facts of Case 3, no reasonable lawyer would have believed that Arizona substantive law applied to John Does 8, 9 & 10.
- As a matter of law, Arizona law does not apply to a person who is arrested in another state, and whose mugshot or other arrest information is published on the Internet by a person located in another state.

- 157. Because the Complaint in Case 3 did not appear to contain any facts showing that Arizona law applied to John Does 8, 9 & 10, on May 12, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss which alternatively requested an order requiring John Does 8, 9 & 10 to provide a more definite statement explaining why Arizona law applied to them.
- 158. Even though he knew there was no reasonable basis for arguing that Arizona law applied to them, Mr. Ivchenko made a tactical decision to include John Does 8, 9 & 10 as parties in Case 3 for the sole purpose of attempting to avoid federal diversity jurisdiction over the case. Mr. Ivchenko made this decision because he believed that Plaintiffs were more likely to prevail in federal court as than in state court.
- 159. Mr. Ivchenko intentionally and wrongfully joined John Does 8, 9 & 10 as parties in an attempt to defraud the federal Court into believing that it did not have diversity jurisdiction over Case 3.
- 160. Notwithstanding Mr. Ivchenko's fraudulent conduct, Case 3 was removed to the United States District Court on June 9, 2020.
- 161. At the time the case was removed, the federal court properly had diversity jurisdiction over the matter.
- 162. Despite knowing there was no reasonable factual or legal basis to challenge federal jurisdiction, on July 9, 2020, Mr. Ivchenko filed a Motion to Remand Case 3. The motion was filed in bad faith and with knowledge that it was groundless.
- 163. While Mr. Ivchenko's Motion to Remand was pending, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking jurisdictional discovery. Specifically, Plaintiffs asked the Court to allow discovery into the location(s) where John Does 8, 9 & 10 were arrested.
- 164. On November 12, 2020, the U.S. District Court issued an order in Case 3 granting Plaintiffs' request for jurisdictional discovery.
- 165. Immediately following the Court's order, on November 12, 2020, Plaintiffs' counsel sent an email to Mr. Ivchenko asking him for his position regarding the best way to proceed with jurisdictional discovery.
 - 166. Mr. Ivchenko responded via email later that same day. A true and correct

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

copy of Mr. Ivchenko's email response is attached hereto as Exhibit I.

- 167. In his November 12th email, rather than permitting the case to proceed in federal court, Mr. Ivchenko threatened to dismiss Case 3 and to file more individual lawsuits against Plaintiffs in state court.
- In his November 12th email, Mr. Ivchenko further threatened to bring legal action against Plaintiffs (and against Plaintiff's counsel) simply because Plaintiffs published truthful, factual public records regarding Mrs. Ivchenko on Travis's websites (including bodycam footage taken at the time of Mrs. Ivchenko's arrest).
- The next day, on November 13, 2020, Mr. Ivchenko followed through on his threat by filing a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Case 3.
- 170. Mr. Ivchenko dismissed Case 3 because he believed that based on the Court's order allowing jurisdictional discovery, it was likely remand would be denied and that as a result, the District Court would consider the merits of the case.
- Mr. Ivchenko believed that if the federal Court considered the merits of the case, the case would be dismissed and/or otherwise resolved in favor of Plaintiffs.
- Mr. Ivchenko voluntarily dismissed Case 3 solely for the purpose of preventing the Court from considering the merits of the case and for the purpose of avoiding a loss on the merits.
- 173. Voluntarily dismissing a meritless action solely to *prevent* the court from considering and ruling on the merits of the dispute is not proper in the regular course of the proceedings.
- 174. At least one or more of the plaintiffs in Case 3 were also plaintiffs in Case 2(b). As such, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B), the dismissal of Case 3 operated as an adjudication on the merits in favor of Plaintiffs.
- Since dismissing Case 3, Mr. Ivchenko has continued to file additional lawsuits against Plaintiffs based on their aggregation and republication of arrest records.
- Mr. Ivchenko has engaged in a pattern of filing, dismissing, and refiling successive identical lawsuits for the purpose of harassment.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

| FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION |
|----------------------------------|
| (Malicious Prosecution — Case 2) |
| (Against All Defendants) |

- Arizona recognizes the tort of "malicious prosecution" which is also 177. sometimes referred to as a "wrongful use of civil proceedings".
- 178. The elements of the tort are set forth in the REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL), 6TH, INTENTIONAL TORTS 19—Malicious Prosecution.
- By commencing Case 2, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko, initiated or took active part in the prosecution of a civil proceeding against Plaintiffs.
- As it relates to the claims initially brought by Mrs. Ivchenko, Case 2 was terminated in favor of Plaintiffs on June 26, 2020 when the case was dismissed with prejudice.
- As it relates to the claims initially brought by Mr. Ivchenko in Case 2, the action was terminated in favor of Plaintiffs on June 26, 2020 when the case was dismissed with prejudice.
- 182. In both commencing and continuing to pursue Case 2, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko acted without probable cause.
- Specifically, at the time Case 2 was commenced, Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew one or more claims lacked probable cause for the following reasons:
 - a. The applicable statute of limitations expired before the action was filed;
 - b. The claims were based on the publication of information that was factually true;
 - c. The claims were based on the publication of information involving matters of public interest/concern (specifically, the arrest and criminal charges filed against Renee Ivchenko, and the resolution of same);
 - d. The claims were based on speech previously determined by the United States Supreme Court to be entitled to First Amendment protection;
 - e. The claims were based on the aggregation and republication of existing

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- online content which is protected under federal law, specifically by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1);
- f. The claims were based on the publication of privileged information including matters of public record and information that was a fair and accurate summary of information contained in public records;
- g. The claims were based on factual allegations which Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew to be completely false at the time the allegations were made—to wit: the allegation that Plaintiffs extorted, or attempted to extort, the payment of money or anything else of value from Mrs. Ivchenko for the purpose of removing her mugshot and/or arrest information from Travis's websites:
- h. The claims were based on factual allegations which Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko knew to be completely false at the time they were made—to wit: that Plaintiffs published defamatory statements on Twitter about Mr. and/or Mrs. Ivchenko.
- 184. Defendants commenced and continued to prosecute Case 2 with malice.
- Among other things, Defendants' malice may be properly inferred from the 185. complete lack of probable cause both at the time Case 2 was filed, and during its continuation. See Daniels v. Robbins, 182 Cal. App. 4th 204, 226, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 700 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 2010) (holding in a malicious prosecution action, "malice can be inferred when a party continues to prosecute an action after becoming aware that the action lacks probable cause.")
- 186. Defendants did not commence or continue to prosecute Case 2 for any legitimate reason or to resolve any legitimate claims.
- Instead, Defendants intended to use the lawsuit as a form of harassment and to hopefully cause so much financial harm to Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs would either be unable to continue defending the action or they would be forced to resolve the case in a manner that would allow Defendants to effectively seize control of Travis's websites.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- Defendants further used Case 2 as form of economic extortion wherein they 188. hoped to force Plaintiffs to settle the groundless claims by agreeing to give Defendants "removal credits" which would have allowed them to obtain the removal of pages from Travis's website upon demand.
- In turn, Defendants planned to profit by selling these "removal credits" by charging money to third parties appearing on Travis's websites who wanted to remove their mugshots from those sites.
- 190. Prior to commencing Case 2, Mr. Ivchenko's counsel, David Ferrucci, previously represented an individual named SAHAR SARID ("Mr. Sarid") and an entity called Mugshots.com, LLC, among others, in a lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entitled *Peter Gabiola v. Sahar Sarid*, et al., Case No. 16-cv-02076 (the "Gabiola litigation").
 - 191. Mr. Sarid was the founder and operator of a website called Mugshots.com.
- 192. Similarly to Travis's websites, Mugshots.com aggregated mugshots and arrest records from various sources.
- 193. Among other things, the plaintiff in the Gabiola litigation alleged that Mr. Sarid used Mugshots.com to extort money by demanding payments to remove mugshots.
- 194. This allegation was true – for at least some period of time, Mr. Sarid (either directly or indirectly) charged and/or accepted fees to remove mugshots from Mugshots.com.
- 195. Based on his prior experience representing Mr. Sarid and Mugshots.com, LLC, Mr. Ferrucci knew that charging money to remove mugshots from such a website could be extremely profitable.
- Based on his prior experience representing Mr. Sarid and Mugshots.com, LLC, Mr. Ferrucci knew that aggregating and publishing mugshots without demanding or accepting money to remove them was not unlawful.
- Based on his prior experience representing Mr. Sarid and Mugshots.com, LLC, Mr. Ferrucci knew that aggregating and publishing mugshots without demanding or

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

accepting money to remove them was protected speech under the First Amendment.

- In 2018, Sahar Sarid was arrested and indicted in the State of California. Among other things, Mr. Sarid charged with multiple counts of criminal extortion relating to his operation of Mugshots.com and his demand for money to remove mugshots from that site.
- Following his arrest in California, Mr. Sarid no longer charged money to remove mugshots from Mugshots.com.
- Following his arrest in California, Mr. Sarid ended his relationship with Mr. Ferrucci.
- Mr. Ivchenko knew about the relationship between Mr. Ferrucci and Mr. Sarid prior to the commencement of Case 2.
- Prior to commencing Case 2, Mr. Ivchenko knew that Mr. Sarid had earned 202. a substantial amount of money from charging fees to remove mugshots from his website.
- Based on that knowledge, Mr. Ivchenko decided to file Case 2 against 203. Plaintiffs for the purpose of attempting to force Plaintiffs to grant Defendants "removal credits" which could be sold to third parties for money, similar to the practices used by Mr. Sarid prior to his arrest.
- 204. Defendants, and each of them, believed that if Plaintiffs would agree to give them the ability to remove content upon demand, the sale of "removal credits" relating to Travis's websites could be potentially worth millions of dollars.
- 205. Prior to the commencement of this action, Mr. Ivchenko demanded that Plaintiffs provide him with 2,400 "removal credits" which he could use to obtain the removal of 2,400 mugshots from Travis's websites. Assuming each credit could be sold for \$1,000 each, the value of this demand was at least \$2,400,000.00.
- The filing of groundless litigation for the purposes of economic extortion is not a proper or legitimate use of the court system.
- 207. The intentional continuation of groundless litigation for the purposes of economic extortion is not a proper or legitimate use of the court system.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

| 208. The conduct of Defendants in commencing and continuing Case 2 without |
|---|
| probable cause and with malice was a cause of injury, damage, loss or harm to Plaintiffs. |
| Such harm includes all attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of Case 2, |
| emotional distress, and damage to Plaintiffs' reputation. |

- 209. Defendants, and each of them, through the commencement and continuation of Case 2, intended to cause injury to Plaintiffs and did, in fact, cause substantial injury to Plaintiffs in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 210. Defendants' wrongful conduct was motivated by spite, ill will, and a desire to unlawfully profit from their actions.
- 211. Defendants, and each of them, through the commencement and continuation of Case 2, consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.
- Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive damages against each 212. Defendant in an amount sufficient to punish their unlawful conduct and to deter others from acting in a similar manner.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Abuse of Process—Case 2) (Against All Defendants)

- 213. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations of \P 164–212.
- 214. Arizona recognizes the tort of Abuse of Process.
- The elements of the tort are set forth in the REVISED ARIZONA JURY 215. INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL), 6TH, INTENTIONAL TORTS 18.1—Abuse of Process.
- 216. Defendants, and each of them, willfully used Case 2 against Plaintiffs in the manner set forth above.
- Defendants, and each of them, used Case 2 in a wrongful manner that was not proper in the normal course of the proceedings.
 - 218. Specifically, Defendants, and each of them, commenced and continued

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Case 2 knowing that the entire action was groundless.

- 219. Furthermore, Defendants, and each of them, sought to use Case 2 as a form of harassment and to exert economic pressure to induce Plaintiffs into a settlement in which Defendants would receive "removal credits" which Defendants had no legal right to obtain.
- Defendants engaged in an abuse of process by seeking to delay and avoid a 220. disposition on the merits of Case 2 for as long as possible and for the improper purpose of making the case as expensive as possible, thereby increasing the odds that Plaintiffs would be unable to bear the cost of defense. By doing so, Defendants hoped to force Plaintiffs to settle in a manner which allowed Defendants to unlawfully profit from their actions by selling "removal credits" relating to Travis's websites.
 - Defendants engaged in abuse of process by, among other things: 221.
 - a. Including factual allegations in the Complaint which they knew to be false;
 - b. Asserting claims they knew were untimely;
 - Asserting claims they knew were legally groundless;
 - d. Refusing to dismiss claims they knew to be groundless;
 - e. Amending the Complaint to add new claims from new anonymous parties in violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure and for the sole purpose of needlessly expanding the litigation and making it more costly to resolve;
 - f. Amending the Complaint to improperly add new claims from new anonymous parties which did not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the claims of the other parties for the sole purpose of needless expanding the litigation and making it more expensive to resolve;
 - g. Amending the Complaint while dispositive motions were pending despite previously refusing to withdraw or modify any claims in the

to avoid a loss on the merits.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

| | case; |
|----|---|
| h. | Dismissing the action while dispositive motions were pending in order |
| | to prevent the court from considering the merits of the case; |
| i. | Dismissing the action while dispositive motions were pending in order |

- In this manner, Defendants unlawfully engaged in an abuse of process by 222. using Case 2 primarily for an improper purpose or ulterior motive.
- 223. Defendants' wrongful use of the court's process in Case 2 caused injury, damage, loss or harm to Plaintiffs in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 224. Defendants' wrongful conduct was motivated by spite, ill will, and a desire to unlawfully profit from their actions.
- 225. Defendants, and each of them, through the commencement and continuation of Case 2, consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.
- 226. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive damages against each Defendant in an amount sufficient to punish their unlawful conduct and to deter others from acting in a similar manner.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Malicious Prosecution—Case 3) (Against Andrew Ivchenko)

- 227. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations of \P 164–212.
- 228. Mr. Ivchenko filed Case 3 on May 1, 2020.
- Case 3 was resolved in favor of Plaintiffs on November 13, 2020 when Mr. 229. Ivchenko voluntarily dismissed the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). This dismissal was on the merits as to at least one or more of the plaintiffs in Case 3 who were also plaintiffs in Case 2(b).
 - 230. Furthermore, the voluntarily dismissal of Case 3 reflects a favorable

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

| termination | because | Mr. | Ivchenko's | decision | to | dismiss | that | action | was | based | solely | on |
|---------------|---------|------|-------------|----------|----|---------|------|--------|-----|-------|--------|----|
| his desire to | avoid a | loss | on the meri | ts. | | | | | | | | |

- Mr. Ivchenko initiated and continued Case 3 without probable cause and 231. with malice as alleged in \P 164–212.
- Mr. Ivchenko's conduct in commencing and continuing Case 3 without probable cause and with malice was a cause of injury, damage, loss or harm to Plaintiffs. Such harm includes all attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of Case 3, emotional distress, and damage to Plaintiffs' reputation.
- Mr. Ivchenko, through the commencement and continuation of Case 3, intended to cause injury to Plaintiffs and did, in fact, cause substantial injury to Plaintiffs in an amount to be proven at trial.
- Mr. Ivchenko's wrongful conduct was motivated by spite, ill will, and a desire to unlawfully profit from their actions.
- Mr. Ivchenko, through the commencement and continuation of Case 3, consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.
- 236. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive damages against Mr. Ivchenko in an amount sufficient to punish their unlawful conduct and to deter others from acting in a similar manner.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Abuse of Process—Case 3) (Against Andrew Ivchenko)

- 237. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations of \P 164–212.
- Mr. Ivchenko used Case 3 in a wrongful manner that was not proper in the 238. course of the proceedings.
- 239. In addition to the wrongful conduct alleged above, Mr. Ivchenko specifically engaged in an abuse of process as to Case 3 by filing that action knowing it was groundless for the purpose of continuing his unlawful attempt to use the litigation to

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exert financial pressure on Plaintiffs in the hopes of obtaining "removal credits" which Mr. Ivchenko planned to sell to third parties at a profit.

- In short, by engaging in the serial filing-dismissal-refiling-dismissal-refiling of substantially identical groundless cases, including Case 3, Mr. Ivchenko engaged in an abuse of process by using groundless litigation primarily to harass Plaintiffs, and to inflict financial pressure and damage in the hopes that Plaintiffs would agree to settle the action by giving Mr. Ivchenko "removal credits" potentially worth millions of dollars.
- 241. Mr. Ivchenko engaged in an abuse of process by including anonymous parties in the Complaint in Case 3 in direct violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This violation was intentional and malicious in that Mr. Ivchenko believed the use of anonymous parties would make it easier for him to needlessly prolong the litigation, to avoid a disposition on the merits, and to needlessly increase the cost of the litigation by forcing Plaintiffs to challenge this improper conduct in various motions.
- 242. Mr. Ivchenko's actions in willfully disregarding and violating court rules for the purpose of increasing the financial harm suffered by Plaintiffs was not proper in the regular course of the proceedings.
- 243. Mr. Ivchenko's abuse of process committed in Case 3 was a cause of injury, damage, loss or harm to Plaintiffs. Such harm includes all attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of Case 3, emotional distress, and damage to Plaintiffs' reputation.
- Mr. Ivchenko, through the commencement and continuation of Case 3, 244. intended to cause injury to Plaintiffs and did, in fact, cause substantial injury to Plaintiffs in an amount to be proven at trial.
- Mr. Ivchenko's wrongful conduct was motivated by spite, ill will, and a desire to unlawfully profit from their actions.
- Mr. Ivchenko, through the commencement and continuation of Case 3, consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive damages against Mr. Ivchenko 247. in an amount sufficient to punish their unlawful conduct and to deter others from acting in a similar manner.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Declaratory Relief) (Against Andrew and Renee Ivchenko)

- A current dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants Andrew and 248. Renee Ivchenko regarding their respective legal rights and duties.
- 249. As noted herein, Mr. Ivchenko has repeatedly alleged that Travis's websites are engaged in unlawful conduct based on the following common facts:
 - a. Travis's websites aggregate mugshots and other criminal records from existing online sources;
 - b. Travis's websites display mugshots and other criminal records aggregated from existing online sources;
 - c. Travis's websites earn money by displaying Google AdSense ads on pages which also contain mugshots and criminal records.
- 250. Among other things, Mr. Ivchenko has alleged the common facts set forth in ¶ 249 above violate Arizona statutory and common law including, but not limited to, the Arizona Mugshot Operator's Act, A.R.S. § 44–7902(B).
- Mr. Ivchenko has further alleged that the common facts set forth in ¶ 249 violate the common law rights of any person whose mugshot or criminal records appear on Travis's websites under the theories of misappropriation of name/likeness and/or false light.
- 252. Mr. Ivchenko has further alleged that the common facts set forth in ¶ 249 are not subject to the immunity provisions of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
- 253. Mr. Ivchenko has further alleged that the republication of arrest records is not protected by either the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or the Arizona Constitution.

| 254. | Despite being asked to do so, Mr. Ivchenko has refused to provide any legal | .1 |
|---------------|---|----|
| authority sup | porting his positions. | |

- 255. Mr. Ivchenko has threatened to continue filing more lawsuits against Plaintiffs unless they agree to, among other things, give him "removal credits" allowing him to obtain the removal of pages from Travis's websites.
- 256. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), A.R.S. § 12–1831, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief as follows:
 - a. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory judgment finding that the manner of operation of Travis's websites, including the aggregation and display of content copied from existing online websites, is fully protected under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
 - b. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory judgment finding that the Arizona Mugshot Operator's Act, A.R.S. § 44–7902(B) does not apply to the operation of Travis's websites or to Plaintiffs to the extent the site simply aggregates and republishes mugshots and arrest records which have been previously published on the Internet by third parties;
 - c. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory judgment finding that the manner of operation of Travis's websites, including the aggregation and display of content copied from existing online websites, is protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Arizona law;
 - d. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory judgment finding the display of mugshots and criminal records in the manner employed by Travis's websites is not unlawful under any legal theory recognized in the State of Arizona.
- 257. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration finding that their publication of public records relating to Renee Ivchenko, including but not limited to, bodycam footage, police reports, and other public records, is protected speech under the First Amendment and is not unlawful under any legal theory recognized in the State of Arizona.

GINGRAS LAW OFFICE, PLLC 4802 E. RAY ROAD, #23-271 PHOENIX, AZ 85044

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

| SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION |
|-------------------------------------|
| (Vexatious Litigant Designation) |
| (Against Andrew and Renee Ivchenko) |

- To the extent they have acted as pro se litigants, Defendants Andrew and 258. Renee Ivchenko are vexatious litigants within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12–3201.
- 259. Even while represented by counsel, Defendants Andrew and Renee Ivchenko have engaged in seriously vexatious conduct which has resulted in a substantial waste of the Court's time and resources and which has caused substantial harm to Plaintiffs.
- Specifically, as noted above, Andrew and Renee Ivchenko have engaged in 260. the following vexatious conduct:
 - a. Repeated filing, dismissal, and refiling of groundless court actions solely or primarily for the purpose of harassment;
 - b. Unreasonably expanding or delaying court proceedings; and
 - c. Bringing court actions without substantial justification.
- Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–3201 and the inherent authority of the Court, 261. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order declaring that Defendants Andrew and Renee Ivchenko are vexatious litigants and ordering that they may not file any new lawsuits against Plaintiffs in the State of Arizona or the United States District Court for the District of Arizona without prior written leave of Court.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs demand trial by jury as to all issues so triable.

/// ///

| 1 | WHE | EREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for j | udgment against Defendants as follows: | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | A. | For compensatory damages | of no less than \$75,000 and in an amount | | | | | | | |
| 3 | according to | o proof at trial; | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | B. | For punitive damages in an amount according to proof at trial; | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | C. | C. For a judgment declaring the rights and legal relations of the parties as set | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | forth above; | • | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | D. | For an order finding Andrew | w and Renee Ivchenko are vexatious litigants, | | | | | | | |
| 8 | and ordering | g that they may not file any ne | w actions against Plaintiffs without prior leave | | | | | | | |
| 9 | of Court; | | | | | | | | | |
| 0 | E. | For an award of all costs of s | suit incurred herein; | | | | | | | |
| 1 | F. | For such other and further re | lief as the Court deems just and proper. | | | | | | | |
| 2 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | DATE | ED: January 21, 2021 | GINGRAS LAW OFFICE, PLLC | | | | | | | |
| 4 | | | I me (Mg_ | | | | | | | |
| 5 | | | David S. Gingras, Esq. | | | | | | | |
| 6 | | | Attorney for Plaintiffs | | | | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 0. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | | | | | | | | | | |

VERIFICATION Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United State of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 21, 2021. /s/ Travis Grant Travis Grant

Exhibit A

Case 2 2 2 Contact ANE DEPARTMENTINE of the original purpose requested. Contact the originating agency for any questions regarding this material.

☐ Homicide ☐ Hate Crime ☐ Elderly ☐ Gang Related ☐ Liquor Est. ☑ On-Body Camera ✓ DV ☐ Child Abuse ☐ Arson Agency: SPD Case Number: 18-08959 **Incident / Investigation Report** AGG ASSAULT-OFFICER -- MINOR OR NO INJURY Reported 04/21/2018 18:10 Found 04/21/2018 18:10 Occurred 04/21/2018 18:10 Location 102 E Mountain View Rd Scottsdale, AZ Original Officer (1505) TREGLOWN, B **Original Information** Original Page:

| Date Added: 04/21/2018 Added | | | | | | | ed By: (1505) TR | EGLOW | /N, B | | | |
|--|--|------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|------------------|----------|-----------|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | Cha | rg | ges | | | | |
| 1 | Charge Type | Desc | cription | | | | | | | Statute | UCR | ☐ Att |
| 1 | State AGG ASSAULT-OFFICER MINOR OR NO INJURY | | | | | | 13-1204A8A | 13B | ☑ Com | | | |
| | ol, Drugs or Com | - | | | Location Ty | | | Premises Entered | Forced Entry | Weapons | | |
| ☑ Ale | cohol Drug | s 🗆 |] Comput | ers | RESIDENC | E/HOME | | | ☐ Yes ☑ No | 1. Personal Weap | ons (han | ds, Etc.) |
| Entry | | | Exit | | | Criminal Activity | | | | 2. | | |
| | | | | | | NONE / OTHER | | | | 3. | | |
| Bias M | lotivation | | | Bia | is Target | | Bi | ias Circumstances | | Bias Group | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Charge Type | | cription | | | | | | Statute | UCR | ☐ Att | |
| 2 | State | | | OU | CHED TO IN | | | | | 13-1203A3 | 999 | ☑ Com |
| | ol, Drugs or Com | - | | | Location Ty | | | | Weapons | | | |
| | cohol Drug | | | ers | RESIDENC | | | | | | | |
| Entry | | | Exit | | | | | | | 2. | | |
| | | | | | | NONE / OTHER | | | 3. | | | |
| Bias M | lotivation | | | Bia | is Target | | Bias Circumstances Bias Group | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | Charge Type | | cription | | | | | | | Statute | UCR | ☐ Att |
| State DISORDERLY CONDUCT-DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR | | | | | 13-2904A1 | 90C | ☑ Com | | | | | |
| Alcohol, Drugs or Computers Used Location Type | | | | | Premises Entered | Forced Entry | Weapons | | | | | |
| ☑ Alcohol □ Drugs □ Computers RESIDENCE/HOME | | | | ☐ Yes ☑ No | | | | | | | | |
| Entry Exit | | | Criminal Activity | | | 2. | | | | | | |
| | | | NONE / OTHER | | | | 3. | | | | | |
| Bias Motivation Bias Targe | | | is Target | Bias Circumstances | | | Bias Group | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| DV Child Abuse Arson Homicide Hate Crime Gang Related Liquor Est. 🗹 On-Body Camera | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--------------|-------|--------|----------|----|--------------|--------|--------------------|
| Agency: SPD Incident / Investigation Report Case Number: 18-08959 | | | | | | | | | |
| | AGG ASSAULT-OFFICER MINOR OR NO INJURY | | | | | | | | |
| Reported 04/21/2018 18:10 | Reported 04/21/2018 18:10 Found 04/21/2018 18:10 Occurred 04/21/2018 18:10 | | | | | | | | |
| Location 102 E Mountain V | riew Rd , So | ottsdale, AZ | Z | | | | Original Off | icer (| (1505) TREGLOWN, B |
| | | Origina | al In | forma | ation | | Original P | age: | 2 |
| Date Added: 04/21/2018 | | 8 | | | | | Added | Ву: (| (1505) TREGLOWN, B |
| | | | Vict | tim | | | | | |
| | t, First, M) | | | | | | AKA | | |
| 1 I VI IVCHEN | KO, ANDREW | | | | | | | | |
| SSN DOB | Age Race | Ethnicity | Sex | Height | Weight | Ha | " | | im of Crimes |
| | 58 W | N | М | 604 | 195 | BR | O HAZ | 2,3 | |
| License: DL DL Per | Number: | Sta | ate: | | Marital: | M | Resident: I | 2 | Citizen: US |
| Address | Address Hm ph: | | | | | | Hm ph: | | |
| Occupation | Employer Name/A | ddross | | | | | | | Cell ph: |
| оссирации | / | uui ess | | | | | | | Wk ph: |
| Scars, Marks, Tatoos or Other Dist | inguishing Features: | | | | | | | | |
| Physical Characteristics: | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | Vict | tim | | | | | |
| 2 | t, First, M) WN, 1505 | | | | | | AKA | | |
| SSN DOB | Age Race | Ethnicity | Sex | Height | Weight | Ha | ir Eyes | Victi | im of Crimes |
| | 37 W | U | М | | 0 | | | 1 | |
| License: DL ID Per | Number: | Sta | ate: | | Marital: | | Resident: I | 2 | Citizen: US |
| Address | | _ | | | | | | | Hm ph: |
| | T 1 27 /4 | ,, | | | | | | | Cell ph: |
| Occupation | Employer Name/A | aaress | | | | | | | Wk ph: |
| Scars, Marks, Tatoos or Other Dist | inguishing Features: | | | | | | | | |
| Physical Characteristics: | | | | | | | | | |

Case 2 2 2 2 Contained Department of the desired land of 40 OFFICIAL USE ONLY, for the original purpose requested. Contact the originating agency for any questions regarding this material ✓ DV ☐ Child Abuse ☐ Arson ☐ Homicide ☐ Hate Crime ☐ Elderly ☐ Gang Related ☐ Liquor Est. ☑ On-Body Camera Agency: SPD Case Number: 18-08959 **Incident / Investigation Report** AGG ASSAULT-OFFICER -- MINOR OR NO INJURY Reported 04/21/2018 18:10 Found 04/21/2018 18:10 Occurred 04/21/2018 18:10 102 E Mountain View Rd Scottsdale, AZ Location Original Officer (1505) TREGLOWN, B **Original Information** Original Page: 3 Added By: (1505) TREGLOWN, B Date Added: 04/21/2018 Offender Name(Last, First, M) Code AKA Type 1 IVCHENKO, RENEE Renee Rachelle Sandlin OF SSN DOB Age Race Ethnicity Sex Height Weight Hair W Ν F 507 125 BLN HAZ 46 License: DL DD Per Number: State: AZ Marital: M Resident: Citizen: US Address Hm ph: Cell ph: Occupation Employer Name/Address Wk ph: Scars, Marks, Tatoos or Other Distinguishing Features: Physical Characteristics:

Related Name Relationships IVCHENKO, ANDREW is SPOUSE to IVCHENKO, RENEE TREGLOWN, 1505 is STRANGER to IVCHENKO, RENEE

Assisting Officers

(1361) MICHAEL, P

(1380) RYAN, S

(1488) DEARING, T

(1505) TREGLOWN, B

Case 2 3 doctor Del 93-del Department of the original purpose requested. Contact the originating agency for any questions regarding this material.

| ✓ DV ☐ Child Abuse ☐ Arson ☐ | Homicide | ang Related 🔲 Liquor Est. 🗹 On-Body Camera |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| Agency: SPD | Incident / Investigation I | Report Case Number: 18-08959 |
| AGG | ASSAULT-OFFICER MINOR OR | R NO INJURY |
| Reported 04/21/2018 18:10 | Found 04/21/2018 18:10 | Occurred 04/21/2018 18:10 |
| Location 102 E Mountain View Rd | Scottsdale, AZ | Original Officer (1505) TREGLOWN, B |
| | Original Information | Original Page: 4 |
| Date Added: 04/21/2018 | | Added By: (1505) TREGLOWN, B |
| | | |

Notes / Narratives

On 04/21/18, around 1814 hours, I was operating as Patrol Officer (with OBC) when I was dispatched to
in reference to a domestic violence call. Upon arriving on scene, I met with both involved parties, Andrew and Renee
Ivchenko. Renee had called in the domestic violence to police. Comments on the call stated that Renee was assaulted by Andrew and

that he grabbed her and threw her around.

Andrew informed me that his wife Renee has a serious alcohol abuse problem. Andrew said that tonight Renee was heavily intoxicated. Andrew said he tried to stop her from drinking so he poured her alcoholic beverage down the sink. Andrew said this upset Renee, so she went behind Andrew in the kitchen, and she grabbed him by his upper arms and pushed him to make him stop. Andrew said he did not retaliate or push Renee away. Andrew said he locked himself in the bedroom until the police arrived. Andrew had visible scratches on the insides of both of his biceps. Andrew did not show any signs of intoxication. Andrew did not want Renee arrested for anything, but did want her excessive drinking to stop. Nothing further from Andrew.

Renee spoke with Ofc. T. Dearing (1488) for the majority of the incident, see Ofc. Dearing's supplement for further. While I briefly spoke with Renee, she showed strong signs of intoxication (heavily slurred speech, imbalance/stumbling, mood swings). Renee continuously reiterated that she called the police for help because she was assaulted. Renee had no apparent signs of injury. When I asked if she had any injuries, Renee removed her shirt for no reason. I instructed Renee to put her shirt back on but she ignored me and went to the bathroom. Renee came out of the bathroom a short time later and stood in the hallway with me and FTO S. Ryan (1380).

We informed Andrew that Renee and he needed to stay separated for the night until she could sober up. While Andrew was packing, I stoodby with Renee in the kitchen. I gave several verbal commands for Renee to remain seated in a separate room. Renee initially ignored my verbal commands to take a seat and insisted on speaking with Andrew, which I did not allow. Renee eventually went to the living room to lay on the couch for a few seconds before getting back up and trying to walk past me to speak with Andrew. I informed Renee several times that she was not going to speak Andrew in person anymore that night due to her intoxication and behavior. Renee insisted on continuing to disobey my commands and became very agitated with FTO Ryan, Ofc. Dearing, and myself. Renee began yelling aggressively, swinging her arms, and pointing at the other officer and me while I told her to calm down. Renee then pushed me in the chest with open palms, causing herself to fall backwards against the living room couch. I then grabbed Renee's right arm, FTO Ryan grabbed Renee's left arm, and we placed both of her arms behind her back into handcuff position.

While I was handcuffing Renee, she was pulling away from me and tightening up her muscles. I was able to finally place Renee under arrest, checked for proper tightness, and double locked both cuffs before securing Renee in the backseat of my patrol car. While in the backseat, Renee began kicking the driver's side backseat window with her feet. Renee was instucted to stop by Sgt. P. Michael (1361) and she did. On the way to Scottsdale City Jail, Renee removed her handcuffs. I pulled my patrol vehicle over at 9708 E Via Linda to reapply handcuffs to Renee. Renee was noncompliant again and attempted to pull away from me, tightened up her muscles, and curled her arms to her chest. FTO Ryan and I were able to place Renee's arms behind her back again into handcuff position while she was still in the backseat of my patrol vehicle. FTO Ryan placed handcuffs on Renee, checked for proper tightness, and double locked both cuffs before resecuring Renee in the backseat once again before continuing to Scottsdale City Jail.

Renee was turned over to detention officers at Scottsdale City Jail and held in custody. Renee was placed under arrest for

| ☑ DV ☐ Child Abuse ☐ Arson ☐ Homic | ide | iang Related 🔲 Liquor Est. 🗹 On-Body Camera | | |
|---|------------------------|---|--|--|
| Agency: SPD In | cident / Investigation | Report Case Number: 18-08959 | | |
| AGG ASSA | AULT-OFFICER MINOR OF | R NO INJURY | | |
| Reported 04/21/2018 18:10 | Found 04/21/2018 18:10 | Occurred 04/21/2018 18:10 | | |
| Location 102 E Mountain View Rd | , Scottsdale, AZ | Original Officer (1505) TREGLOWN, B | | |
| | Original Information | Original Page: 5 | | |
| Date Added: 04/21/2018 | | Added By: (1505) TREGLOWN, B | | |
| | | | | |
| | Notes / Narratives | | | |
| 13-1204.A8 Aggravated Assault on a Police OfficerNo injury, 13-1203.A3 AssaultTouched to Injure, and 13-2904.A1 Disorderly ConductFighting. | | | | |
| While at the Scottsdale City Jail, I read Renee her Miranda Rights from my Scottsdale Miranda Rights card around 1945 hours. Renee did not wish to speak to me and requested her husband Andrew as her attorney. This concluded my investigation with Renee. | | | | |
| No further information. | | | | |
| Notes / Continuation | | | | |

| ✓ DV ☐ Child Abuse ☐ Arson ☐ | Homicide | Related 🔲 Liquor Est. 🗹 On-Body Camera | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Agency: SPD | Incident / Investigation Re | port Case Number: 18-08959 | | |
| AGG | ASSAULT-OFFICER MINOR OR NO | O INJURY | | |
| Reported 04/21/2018 18:10 | Found 04/21/2018 18:10 | Occurred 04/21/2018 18:10 | | |
| Location 102 E Mountain View Rd | , Scottsdale, AZ | Original Officer (1505) TREGLOWN, B | | |
| | Supplement Information | Supplement Page: 1 | | |
| Date Added: 04/21/2018 19:00:54 | | Added By: (1488) DEARING, T | | |
| | | | | |
| | Supplement Notes | | | |
| On 04-21-2018 at approximately 1843 h | hours, Renee Ivchenko was arrested for Aggrava | ated Assault and Disorderly Conduct at | | |

Call comments stated the following:

The 911 caller identified as Renee Ivchenko stated that her husband (Andrew Ivchenko) assaulted her. Renee stated that she was cooking dinner and Andrew did not like the fact she was microwaving part of the dinner. Renee locked herself in her room.

I arrived on scene in a fully marked Scottsdale Police patrol vehicle wearing a full regulation SPD uniform. I was also equipped with my department issued AXON On-body camera throughout the investigation.

Upon my arrival at the above listed location, a blonde female opened the door later identified as Renee Ivchenko. Renee and her husband Andrew were standing at the front door. I immediately had Andrew step outside onto the porch and told Renee to stand next to her sofa located in the living room.

As I was speaking with Andrew on the porch of the second story condo, I could visually see Renee inside the residence approximately 15 feet away. Andrew stated the following:

Andrew stated that his wife is an alcoholic. Andrew stated that he found a bottle of liquor that Renee was hiding and he poured it out. Andrew stated that when he got the kitchen to dump out the alcohol, Renee attempted to pull him away from the sink and prevent him from pouring the liquor out. Andrew stated that he had scrapes on the inside of both his left and right biceps. Andrew then showed me the scrapes. I observed one scrape on the inside of Andrews left bicep approximately one inch in length. Andrew stated that all she was doing was trying to prevent him from dumping out her liquor.

Andrew stated Renee threated to call the police to which he immediately went and locked himself in the bathroom.

I asked Andrew if anything else occurred in regards to the verbal altercation or physical altercation to which Andrew stated no. Andrew stated that it was as simple as him finding the liquor and attempting to pour it down the drain as Renee attempted to stop him. Andrew stated that at no time did he touch Renee nor did he get involved in a serious verbal altercation.

I then asked Andrew to step inside his residence and stand where Renee was standing (The backside of the sofa in the living room). I asked Renee to step out onto the front porch. I again had a clear line of sight of both Renee and Andrew. It should be noted that soon after the arrival of Officer Treglown #1505, Renee and I stepped into the residence and continued the conversation in the guest room located directly right after entering the residence. Renee stated the following:

Renee stated that she was cooking dinner. Renee stated that at some point she attempted to microwave part of their dinner and Andrew did not like that. Renee stated that Andrew wanted everything to be cooked on the stove. It was at this time that Renee stated Andrew grabbed her by both shoulders and pushed her. Renee stated that she fell backwards as Andrew continued to approach her and push her. Renee stated that she was pushed through the hallway and into the bathroom door. It should be noted that while speaking with Renee, she was extremely intoxicated. Renee showed me her arms and I did not see any red marks or bruises.

Case 2 3 doctor DEPAROMENTIONS of 40 OFFICIAL USE ONLY, for the original purpose requested. Contact the originating agency for any questions regarding this material.

| ☑ DV ☐ Child Abuse ☐ Arson ☐ H | fomicide | Related 🔲 Liquor Est. 🗹 On-Body Camera |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| Agency: SPD | Incident / Investigation Re | port Case Number: 18-08959 |
| AGG A | SSAULT-OFFICER MINOR OR N | O INJURY |
| Reported 04/21/2018 18:10 | Found 04/21/2018 18:10 | Occurred 04/21/2018 18:10 |
| Location 102 E Mountain View Rd | , Scottsdale, AZ | Original Officer (1505) TREGLOWN, B |
| | Supplement Information | Supplement Page: 2 |
| Date Added: 04/21/2018 19:00:54 | | Added By: (1488) DEARING, T |

I then told Renee that I wanted to speak with other officers to which she stopped talking to me and began just staring at me. Renee then began demanding to speak with Andrew to which she was denied.

While Andrew was outside speaking with Officers, Renee made her way into the kitchen area. See all additional supplements for further information.

At some point, Renee began to scream about her husband being in the military and began approaching the door from the living room. Renee was asked multiple times to not approach the door by Officer Treglown. Renee was then screaming at Officer Treglown, Officer Ryan and I. At some point, Officer Treglown put Renee's hands behind her back and placed Renee under arrest for Aggravated Assault against a Police Officer. See all additional supplements for further information.

It should be noted that from where I was standing I could not view any altercation between Renee and Officer Treglown as I was also paying attention to the front door and Renee at once. See all additional supplements for further information.

I did however assist Officer Treglown by holding Renee's right arm while he placed handcuffs on Renee.

Upon Officer Ryan and Officer Treglown taking Renee out of the residence, I asked Andrew if he was willing to have our Crime Scene Specialists take photographs of his injuries. Andrew stated that he was not willing to allow photographs taken of him. Andrew was notified that he would be receiving Victim Rights in the mail.

This concluded my involvement in this matter. See all additional supplements in this matter. NFI.

Case 2 Science ANE DEPARTMENT CUSE of this abulment like regular collection of 40 OFFICIAL USE ONLY, for the original purpose requested. Contact the originating agency for any questions regarding this material.

JMS internal Booking # Alert/VP DNA previous DNA taken Photo Fingerprinted **CITY OF SCOTTSDALE** 2018003139 VP9, VP3, 1 Yes 1 Yes X Yes X Yes AZAFIS PCN number SUIC ARREST REPORT **▼**No **▼** No 2 **No** 2 **No IDENTIFICATION** 3b DR # 1 ORI# 2 AGENCY NAME Scottsdale Police Department 2018004864 18-08959 AZ0072500 5d.Language 13 SKIN ^{5a.}LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE NAME 5b. Citizenship 5c. Interpreter ¹⁰ WGT. 11 EYE 12 HAIR 9 HGT. Yes No IVCHENKO, RENEE US 125 HAZEL BLN ¹⁸ AGE 19 AFIS ARN 15 PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTY, STATE) 17 DATE OF BIRTH 46 21a. Relative/Emergency Contact 21c. Address/Phone 22 DL# 20 SID# 23 ST Ph: Andrew Ivchenko Husband ²⁴ FBI # 25 IDENTIFICATION COMMENTS 26 X RESIDENT 27 HOME ADDRESS (STREET, CITY, STATE, ZIP) 28 RESIDENCE PHONE ²⁹ OCCUPATION (BE SPECIFIC) 2 NON-RESIDENT 30 EMPLOYER (NAME OF COMPANY/SCHOOL) 31 BUSINESS ADDRESS (STREET, CITY, STATE, ZIP) 32 BUSINESS PHONE ARREST 33 LOCATION OF ARREST (STREET, CITY, STATE, ZIP) 34 DIST/BEAT 39 ARMED? 10 DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON 10250 E MOUNTAIN VIEW RD SCOTTSDALE, AZ D3/13 1 Y X N ⁴¹ DATE OF ARREST 42 TIME OF ARREST 43 DAY OF ARREST 44 TYPE ARREST 1 1. AM MIL 2 2. PM S M T W T F S **BOOKED** 04/21/2018 18:43 CHARGE# State/Local Citation/Warrant # F/M Cnt Charge 13-1203A3 ASSAULT-TOUCHED TO INJURE DR# **Violation Date Prep Offense** Release Date Disposition Bond Court ORI D۷ 1808959 0.00 04/21/2018 04/21/2018 HELD IN CUSTODY CHARGE# Citation/Warrant # F/M Cnt Charge State/Local AGG ASSAULT-OFFICER -- MINOR OR NO INJURY 13-1204A8A DR# Bond Prep Offense Release Date Violation Date Court ORI D۷ Disposition 0.00 04/21/2018 04/21/2018 7510 HELD IN CUSTODY 1808959 Ν CHARGE # F/M Cnt Charge State/Local Citation/Warrant # DISORDERLY CONDUCT-DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR 13-2904A1 DR# **Release Date** Violation Date Prep Offense Disposition **Bond** Court ORI D۷ 0.00 04/21/2018 04/21/2018 HELD IN CUSTODY 1808959 7510 66 ARREST DISPOSITION ⁶⁸ ACCOMPLICE ARRESTED WITH DOB: BOOKING#: ALIAS AKA ID: 21803382 NAME: SANDLIN, RENEE RACHELLE DOB: SSN:

| | Casa | -2-04-04-001-09 | , the best of | peumont.1.2 | TIAN-01/21/21 | Dago 10 of 40 | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| | Case | OFFICIAL USE Of for any questions re | NLY, for the o | riginal purpose requeste | ed. Contact the origina | by Pacparting agency 1-0 of 40 | |
| Date of Booking: | Booking Time: | Day of Booking: C | ell: | | Booking Detention Officer: | | |
| 04/21/2018 | 19:7 | Saturday | | | (B1600) SCHULZ, C | | |
| Property Locker: | | | | | Property Received From: | | |
| District 2 Jail Are | a Locker 45 | | | | Ivchenko, Renee | | |
| Property Taken: | | | | | • | | |
| Date Taken: | Taken By: | | | Date Returned: | Returned By: | | |
| 04/21/2018 | (B1561) GRO | VER, K | | 04/21/2018 | (B892) GARLAND, K | | |
| | RELEASE INFORMATION | | | | | | |
| Date of Release: | Release Time: | Release Notes: | | | | | |
| 04/21/2018 | 20:40 | | | | | | |
| Release To: | Release Reason: | | | Release Detention Officer: | | | |
| тот | TURNED OV | ER TO | | (B892) GARLAND, K | | | |
| Related Cases | | | | | | | |
| ARRESTING OFFICER (Badge#) TRANSPORT | | | TING OFFICER (Badge#) | | SUPERVISOR (Badge#) | | |
| (1505) TREGLOWN, B | | | | | (1170) JOHNSON, T | | |
| Booking Notes: | looking Notes: | | | | | | |
| MCSO | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |

Exhibit B

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

CR2018-119949-001

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN DEFERRED

PROSECUTION PROGRAM AND

VS.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO.

Defendant.

I, RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO, the Defendant in this case, agree to participate in the Felony Pretrial Intervention Program, a deferred prosecution program, and I give my consent to the Maricopa County Attorney's Office to apply to the Court for suspension of prosecution of this matter. I understand that my participation in the program is contingent upon my acceptance. If accepted, I will adhere to the regulations of the program and the directives of my case manager. Successful completion of the program will be determined by Sage Counseling, Inc. and the Maricopa County Attorney's Office. If I successfully complete this program, I acknowledge that the criminal case currently pending against me in the above referenced cause number will be dismissed with prejudice.

By agreeing to participate in this deferred prosecution program, I acknowledge that:

1. I have been given a description of the program that I am agreeing to enter and I understand that it will consist of counseling and treatment as directed by the program provider, Sage Counseling. I understand that successful completion of this program will require me to follow all of the steps that will be outlined in my treatment plan that will be developed specifically for me following my initial intake session. In addition to restitution, I understand that I will be responsible for paying for the counseling and treatment program. These fees and costs will be fully explained to me when the treatment program is developed as well as any

financial assistance or reduced fees that may be available to me based on my economic status. I understand that if I decide not to pay the costs necessary to complete the program, I may voluntarily end my participation in the program and the criminal prosecution in this matter will be resumed.

 $\cancel{\text{KV}}_2$. I must report to Sage Counseling at <u>1616 East Indian School Road</u>, #150, Phoenix, Arizona for an initial assessment within two weeks of today's date. Today, I will contact Sage at (602) 761-4900 to schedule an appointment date and time. I understand that a

failure to contact Sage or to complete my assessment on the date scheduled will be considered unsuccessful completion of the

program and the criminal prosecution will be resumed.

 $2\sqrt{3}$. I understand that this consent will, by necessity, cause a delay in the prosecution of this case, and I waive my right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Rule 8 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prosecution may be suspended for up to two years.

 $\bigcirc \boxed{\chi}$ 4. I promise to appear at any and all future court dates. If the prosecutor seeks to resume prosecution against me, I will be notified of my next court date by mail. Because the Court will issue a warrant for my arrest if I fail to appear at future court dates, I agree to notify Sage Counseling, my attorney, the prosecutor and the Court of my current address until this case is completely resolved. My current correct best contact information is as follows:

| Address: 4960 S. GILBERT PA. \$ 1226 | | | | |
|--|---------|-------|--|--|
| Street Address including Apt. Number as applicable | | | | |
| CHANDLER | A2 | ४५८५१ | | |
| City | State | Zip | | |
| Email Address: AZANNY Ø | 18 cox. | NET | | |
| Phone Number(s): 480 - 62 | 5-7709 | | | |
| I do not contest my guilt in this matter. I admit that I committed | | | | |

the charged offenses as further explained in the attached factual basis. I acknowledge that this admission of guilt and factual basis may be used against me if I do not successfully complete the deferred prosecution program and I decide to have a trial in this matter.



I understand that participation in this program requires me to pay full restitution to any and all victims in this matter in a total amount of \$0.00 and that I am required to pay 50% of the total restitution within one month of my intake appointment to remain in the program. I also understand that if I do not successfully complete the program that any restitution paid belongs to the victim(s) and will not be returned to me, but any amounts paid will be credited against any future restitution orders in this case.



- 17. I have reviewed the following statements with my attorney and the each of the following statements are true. I understand that if any of these statements are not true, I am not eligible for this deferred prosecution program and the prosecution against me will be resumed:
 - a. I have no prior conviction for a serious offense as defined in A.R.S. § 13-706.
 - b. I have no prior conviction for any offenses under A.R.S. Title 13, Chapter 14.
 - c. I have no prior conviction for any dangerous offense as defined in A.R.S. §13-105.
 - d. I have no prior conviction for any dangerous crime against children as defined in A.R.S. § 13-705.
 - e. I have no felony convictions within the last five years, and I have no historical prior felony convictions as defined in A.R.S. § 13-105
 - f. I do not have any other felony charges pending against me in any jurisdiction.
 - g. I have not been convicted three or more times of possession of a controlled substance as defined in A.R.S. § 36-2501.
 - I have not been convicted three or more times of possession of drug paraphernalia as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3415.
 - i. I was not on felony probation or any type of release for any felony matter at the time of the offense(s) charged in this case.

- I am not a member of any criminal street gang.
- k. I have not completed any deferred prosecution or diversion program for any felony offense within the last five years.

8. I understand that while the prosecution is suspended in this matter I will be released on my own recognizance under the conditions set by the court. I further understand that should I commit a new felony offense while released on my own recognizance that I may be held without bond on the new offense.

9. I will / will not need the services of an interpreter. I understand that there may be additional fees associated with interpreter services and any such fees will be fully explained during my intake session with Sage. Language:

10. By signing below, I authorize SAGE Counseling Inc. to share confidential information with the Maricopa County Attorney's Office including but not limited to: information related to my assessment, treatment recommendations, participation and compliance in the SAGE Treatment Program. I further authorize and acknowledge that this confidential information may contain information related to alcohol and/or drug abuse (Federal Law references 42 U.S.C. 290 dd-3 –Federal Regulation reference CFR, Part 2).

My attorney has reviewed this entire agreement with me and has fully explained each and every paragraph of this agreement including each statement in paragraph 7. I understand that I am under no obligation to agree to this program. I freely and voluntarily agree to participate in this deferred prosecution program.

RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO

I have explained this Consent to Participate in Deferred Prosecution Program & Acknowledgement to the Defendant.

Date

David J Kephart, #024136

Defense Counsel

ATTACHMENT A FACTUAL BASIS

| Program, complaint documen program a | I acknowledge that t. I acknowledge that t may be used agair and my case procee | ticipate in the Felony Pretrial Intervention I am guilty of the offenses charged in the at this admission and the statements in this ast me if I fail to successfully complete the eds to trial. I understand that I have the right |
|---|--|---|
| | | he following statements voluntarily after |
| | ion with my attorne | in <u>Scottsdale, Arizona - Maricopa County</u> |
| Da: | te of Offense | Location and Jurisdiction |
| | | vchenko, knowingly touched Brandon Treglown tent to provoke him. Brandon Treglown is a |
| a Scottsd | ale Police Officer a | nd at the time of this incident he was in full |
| uniform a | and I knew he was a | a police officer acting in his official capacity. |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| - | | |
| | | |
| - | | |
| - | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| 01= | | |
| 2/15/ | 18 10 | nee Kadelle Inhetes |
| DAIL | VENCE K | ACHELLE IVCHENKU |

WILLIAM G MONTGOMERY
MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY

Loren D Hubbell
Deputy County Attorney
Bar ID #: 033284
CBPE-East Phoenix/Scottsdale

301 West Jefferson, 8th Floor

Phoenix, AZ 85003

Telephone: (602) 506-1145

mcaocbpeasteastphxsc@mcao.maricopa.gov

MCAO Firm #: 00032000 Attorney for Plaintiff APR 2 4 2018 FILED U.S. CIERK

DR 1808959 - Scottsdale Police Department

McDowell Mtn. Justice Court

0131711723

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA COUNTY OF MARICOPA, RCC-DOWNTOWN

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO,

CR2018-119949-001

Defendant.

DIRECT COMPLAINT

COUNT 1: AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT, A CLASS 5 FELONY
(Renee Rachelle Ivchenko)

IN CUSTODY

The complainant herein personally appears and, being duly sworn, complains on information and belief against RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO, charging that in Maricopa County, Arizona:

COUNT 1:

RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO, on or about April 21, 2018, knowing, or having reason to know, that Brandon Treglown was a peace officer, knowingly did touch Brandon Treglown, a peace officer, with the intent to injure, insult or provoke him, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, 13-1204, 13-701, 13-702, and 13-801.

/s/ Loren D Hubbell
Deputy County Attorney

IN CUSTODY

Complainant

Agency: Scottsdale Police

Department

Subscribed and sworn upon information and belief this 24day of April, 2018.

If

IN THE

MCDOWELL MOUNTAIN JP (SCOTTSDL) COURT

STATE OF ARIZONA, COUNTY OF MARICOPA

PAGE 1 OF 3

****DRAFT***

RELEASE QUESTIONNAIRE

| Notice: Unless a specific Form IV is sealed or ordered redacted Court or Clerk at the time they are provided to the Court and | will be released in their entirety upon request. | | | |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| DEFENDANT'S NAME RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO | DOB 1972-02-17 BOOKING NO. | | | |
| ALIAS(ES) | CASE NO. DR1808959 | | | |
| A. GENERAL INFORMATION | C. OTHER INFORMATION (Check if applicable) | | | |
| Charges 1 Cts. 13-1204A8A AGG ASLT-OFFICER F 1 Cts. 13-1203A3 ASSAULT-TOUCHED TO INJURE M 1 Cts. 13-2904A1 DISORDERLY CONDUCT-FIGHTING M | Defendant is presently on probation, parole or any other form of release involving other charges or convictions: Explain: | | | |
| Pursuant to A.R.S. §41-1750 ten-print fingerprints were taken of the arrested person? ☑ Yes ☐ No If yes, PCN = | 2. List any prior: Arrests? Convictions? | | | |
| Pursuant to A.R.S. §13-610 one or more of the above | F.T.A.'s? | | | |
| charges requires the arresting agency to secure a DNA sample from the arrested person? ☑ Yes ☐ No | Is there any indication the defendant is: | | | |
| If yes, does the defendant have a valid DNA sample on file with AZDPS? ☐ Yes ☒ No | ☑ An Alcoholic? ☐ An Addict? | | | |
| If no, Arresting Agency has taken required sample? ☐ Yes ☑ No Offense Location: 10250 E MOUNTAIN VIEW APT 216 Offense Date: 2018-04-21 Arrest Location: 10250 E MOUNTAIN VIEW RD, 216 Date: 2018-04-21 Time: 18:43 B. PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT | ☐ Mentally disturbed? ☐ Physically III? 4. ☐ Defendant is currently employed With whom How long: 5. Where does the defendant currently reside? 10250 EAST MOUNTAIN VIEW ROAD 216 SCOTTSDALE, AZ 85258 With whom HUSBAND / VICTIM | | | |
| 1. Please summarize and include the facts which establish probable cause for the arrest: THE DEFENDANT WAS CONTACTED AT 10250 E MOUNTAIN VIEW UNIT 216 ON A DV COMPLAINT TRAT SEE MADE. THE DEFENDANT ASSAULTED HER HUSBAND BECAUSE HE HAD POURED OUT HER ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE. THE DEFENDANT GRABBED HER HUSBAND BY HIS UPPER ARMS, LEAVING SCRATCHES ON THE INSIDE OF HIS BICEPS. THE DEFENDANT WAS HEAVILY INTOXICATED AND HAS AN EXTENSIVE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL ABUSE. | With whom HUSBAND / VICTIM How long:3yearsmonthsdays 6. What facts indicate the defendant will flee if released? Explain: 7. What facts does the state have to oppose an unsecured release? Explain: | | | |
| WHILE I, OFFICER B. TREGLOWN (1505), WAS SPEAKING WITH THE DEFENDANT, I GAVE SEVERAL VERBAL COMMANDS FOR THE DEFENDANT TO REMAIN SEATED IN A SEPARATE ROOM FROM HER HUSEAND WHILE HE PACKED TO LEAVE THE RESIDENCE. THE DEFENDANT INSISTED ON DISOBEYING MY COMMANDS AND BECAME VERY AGITATED WITH OTHER OFFICERS AND MYSELF. THE DEFENDANT BEGAN YELLING AGGRESSIVELY, SWINGING HER ARMS AND POINTING AT OTHER OFFICERS AND MYSELF WHILE I TOLD HER TO CALM DOWN. THE DEFENDANT THEN PUSHED ME IN THE CHEST WITH BOTH OF HER ARMS. WHILE I WAS PLACING THE DEFENDANT UDDER ARREST SHE WAS PULLING AWAY FROM ME, TIGHTENING UP HER MUSLCES, AND CURLING HER ARMS TO HER CHEST. | D. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE(Check if applicable) 1. ☐ Firearm or other weapon was used Type: ☑ Someone was injured by the defendant ☐ Medical attention was necessary Nature of injuries: N/A | | | |
| THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST WITHOUT INCIDENT. | , | | | |
| | 2. | | | |
| | 3. Did the offense involve a child victim? ☐ Yes ☒ No If yes, was DCS notified? ☐ Yes ☒ No If property offense, value of property taken or damaged: | | | |

| DEFENDANT'S NAMERENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO | DOB 1972-02-17 BOOKING NO | · |
|---|---|-------------|
| ****DRAFT*** | CASE NO. DR1808959 | Page 2 of 3 |
| | ☐ Property was recovered | |
| | Name(s) of co-defendant(s): | |

| ****DRAFT**** | |
|--|---|
| | CASE NO. DR1808959 Page 3 of 3 |
| E. CRIMES OF VIOLENCE 1. Relationship of defendant to victim: HUSBAND | Evidence of the offense was found in the defendant's possession Explain: |
| ☑ Victim(s) and defendant reside together | |
| 2. How was the situation brought to the attention of the police? Victim | 4. Was the defendant under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense? ☑ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unk |
| Explain: | H. DRUG OFFENSES 1. If the defendant is considered to be a drug dealer, please state the supporting facts: |
| 4. Is defendant currently the subject of: An order of protection Any other court order | |
| ☐ Injunction against harassment | |
| Explain: | 2. What quantities and types of illegal drugs are directly involved in the offense? |
| F. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ISSUES (Check if applicable) Defendant's actions | ☐ Drug field test completed |
| ☐ Threats of homicide/suicide/bodily harm | ☐ Defendant admission of drug type |
| ☐ Control/ownership/jealousy issues ☐ Crime occurs in public | Approximate monetary value: \$ |
| ☐ Prior history of DV ☐ Kidnapping | 3. Was any money seized? |
| ☐ Frequency/intensity of DV increasing ☐ Depression | ☐ Yes ☐ No Amount: \$ |
| ☐ Access to or use of weapons ☐ Stalking behavior | I. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION |
| ☐ Violence against children/animals | 1. Military Service: |
| ☐ Multiple violations of court orders | Has the defendant served in the military services of the United States? ☐ Yes ☑ No ☐ Unknown |
| G. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ARREST (Check if applicable) | If yes, currenlty on active duty? ☐ Yes ☐ No |
| Did the defendant attempt to: | Branches Served In: (AF - Air Force AR - Army CG - Coast Guard MC - Marine Corp MM - Merchant Marines NG - National Guard NV - Navy |
| | RS - Reserves) |
| Explain: DEFENDANT HAD MUSCLE LOCK UP AND CURLED ARMS IN FRONT OF HER | 2. Is the defendant homeless? ☐ Yes ☑ No ☐ Unknown |
| 2. Defendant was armed when arrested Type: | 3. Do you need the court to provide an interpreter to help communicate and to understand what is being said? Yearn Yearn |
| الله الله الله الله الله الله الله الله | Procedures 1946, the Oath he |
| **If a fugitive arrest, a Form IV | A willst also be completed. |
| I certify that the information presented is | true to the best of my knowledge. |
| B. TREGLOWN/1505 | AZ0072500/480-312-5000 2018-04-21 |
| ARRESTING OFFICER/SERIAL NUMBER ARREST | AGENCY/DUTY PHONE NUMBER DATE |
| DEPARTMENTAL REPORT NO. DEPARTMENTAL RE | EPORT NO. DEPARTMENTAL REPORT NO. |

IN THE

MCDOWELL MOUNTAIN JP (SCOTTSDL)

COURT

STATE OF ARIZONA, COUNTY OF MARICOPA

PAGE 1 OF 3

RELEASE OUESTIONNAIRE

| Notice: Unless a specific Form IV is scaled or ordered reducte Court or Clerk at the time they are provided to the Court and | d by the Court, all Form IVs are public records of the will be released in their entirety upon request. | | | |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| DEFENDANT'S NAME RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO | DOB 1972-02-17 BOOKING NO. | | | |
| ALIAS(ES) | · · | | | |
| A. GENERAL INFORMATION | C. OTHER INFORMATION (Check if applicable) | | | |
| Charges 1 Cts. 13-1204ABA AGG ASLT-OFFICER F 1 Cts. 13-1203A3 ASSAULT-TOUCHED TO INJURE M 1 Cts. 13-2904A1 DISORDERLY CONDUCT-FIGHTING M | Defendant is presently on probation, parote or any other form of release involving other charges or convictions: Explain: | | | |
| Pursuant to A.R.S. §41-1750 ten-print fingerprints were taken of the arrested person? ☑ Yes ☐ No If yes, PCN = | 2. List any prior: Arrests? Convictions? | | | |
| Pursuant to A.R.S. §13-610 one or more of the above charges requires the arresting agency to secure a DNA sample from the arrested person? ☑ Yes ☐ No | F.T.A.'s? | | | |
| If yes, does the defendant have a valid DNA sample on file with AZDPS? ☐ Yes ☒ No | 3. Is there any indication the defendant is: ☑ An Alcoholic? ☐ An Addict? ☐ Districtly III2 | | | |
| If no, Arresting Agency has taken required sample? ☐ Yes ☒ No | ☐ Mentally disturbed? ☐ Defendant is currently employed With whom | | | |
| Offense Location: 10250 E MOUNTAIN VIEW APT 216 Offense Date: 2018-04-21 Arrest Location: 10250 B MOUNTAIN VIEW RD, 216 Date: 2018-04-21 Time: 18:43 B. PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT 1. Please summarize and include the facts which establish probable cause for the arrest: THE DEFENDANT WAS CONTACTED AT 10250 B MOUNTAIN VIEW UNIT 216 ON A DV COMPLAINT THAT SHE MADE. THE DEFENDANT ASSAULTED HER HUSBAND BECAUSE HE HAD POURED OUT HER ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE. THE DEFENDANT GRABBED HER HUSBAND BY HIS UPPER ARMS, LEAVING SCRATCHES ON THE INSIDE OF HIS BICEPS. THE DEFENDANT WAS HEAVILY INTOXICATED AND HAS AN EXTENSIVE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL | How long: 5. Where does the defendant currently reside? 10250 EAST MOUNTAIN VIEW ROAD 216 SCOTTSDALE, AZ 85258 With whom HUSBAND / VICTIM How long: 3 years months days 6. What facts indicate the defendant will flee if released? Explain: 7. What facts does the state have to oppose an unsecured | | | |
| WHILE I, OFFICER B. TREGLOWN (1505), WAS SPEAKING WITH THE DEFENDANT, I GAVE SEVERAL VERBAL COMMANDS FOR THE DEFENDANT TO REMAIN SEATED IN A SEPARATE ROOM FROM HER HUSBAND WHILE HE PACKED TO LEAVE THE RESIDENCE. THE DEFENDANT INSISTED ON DISOBEYING MY COMMANDS AND BECAME VERY AGITATED WITH OTHER OFFICERS AND MYSELF. THE DEFENDANT BEGAN YELLING AGGREGATIVELY, SWINGING HER ARMS AND POINTING AT OTHER OFFICERS AND MYSELF WHILE I TOLD HER TO CALM DOWN. THE DEFENDANT THEN PUSHED ME IN THE CREST WITH BOTH OF HER ARMS. WHILE I WAS PLACING THE DEPENDANT UNDER ARREST SHE WAS PULLING AWAY FROM ME, TIGHTENING UP HER MUSLCES, AND CURLING HER ARMS TO HER CHEST. THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST WITHOUT INCIDENT. | Prelease? Explain: D. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE(Check if applicable) 1. ☐ Firearm or other weapon was used Type: Someone was injured by the defendant ☐ Medical attention was necessary Nature of injuries: N/A 2. ☐ Someone was threatened by the defendant Nature and extent of threats: 3. Did the offense involve a child victim? ☐ Yes ☑ No | | | |
| | 3. Did the offense involve a child victim? ☐ Yes ☒ No If yes, was DCS notified? ☐ Yes ☒ No 4. If property offense, value of property taken or damaged: | | | |

| DEFENDANT'S NAME RENEE RACHELLE IVCHENKO | DOB 1972-02-17 BOOKING NO | |
|--|---|--|
| ***DRAFT*** | CASE NO. DR1808959 Page 2 of 3 | |
| | ☐ Property was recovered | |
| | Name(s) of co-defendant(s): | |

| DEFENDANT'S NAME RENEE RACHELLE | E IVCHENKO | DOB | 1972-02-17 BOOKING NO. | |
|---|-----------------------------------|---|---|--|
| ****DRAFT*** | | CASE NO. DR1808959 Page 3 of 3 | | |
| E. CRIMES OF VIOLENCE 1. Relationship of defendant to victim: HUSBAND | | Evidence of the offense was found in the defendant's possession Explain: | | |
| ☑ Victim(s) and defendant reside t | together | | | |
| How was the situation brought to the attention of the police? Victim | | Was the defendant under the influence of alcohol or | | |
| | | drugs at the time of the offense? ☑ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unk | | |
| | | H. DRUG O 1. If sta | FFENSES the defendant is considered to be a drug dealer, please ate the supporting facts: | |
| Is defendant currently the subjection An order of protection | ct of: other court order | | | |
| ☐ Injunction against harassment | | | | |
| Explain: | | | hat quantities and types of illegal drugs are directly volved in the offense? | |
| F. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ISSUES (Chec Defendant's actions | k if applicable) | ☐ Dru | g field test completed | |
| ☐ Threats of homicide/suicide/bodily ham | m | ☐ Def | endant admission of drug type | |
| ☐ Control/ownership/jealousy issues | ☐ Crime occurs in public | | dmate monetary value: \$ s any money seized? | |
| ☐ Prior history of DV | ☐ Kidnapping | | | |
| ☐ Frequency/intensity of DV increasing | ☐ Depression | Amou | Yes □ No nt: ş | |
| ☐ Access to or use of weapons | ☐ Stalking behavior | I. ADDITION | AL INFORMATION | |
| ☐ Violence against children/animals | | 1. Milit | ary Service: | |
| ☐ Multiple violations of court orders | | H | las the defendant served in the military services of the inited States? ☐ Yes ☑ No ☐ Unknown | |
| G. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ARREST 1. Did the defendant attempt to: | (Check if applicable) | If yes, currenity on active duty? ☐ Yes ☐ No Branches Served In: | | |
| ☐ Avoid arrest | ☐ Self Surrender | (A | NF - Air Force AR - Army CG - Coast Guard MC - Marino Corp MM - Merchant Marines NG - National Guard NV - Navy RS - Reserves) | |
| Explain: | | | e defendant homeless? | |
| DEFENDANT HAD MUSCLE LOCK UP AN | D CURLED ARMS IN FRONT | | Yes 🖾 No 🗌 Unknown | |
| Defendant was armed when arrested Type: | | Do you need the court to provide an interpreter to help communicate and to understand what is being said? Yes ☒ No | | |
| | | If so | imunicate and to understand what is being said? Yes No o, what language: | |
| l. | | | A Continuity | |
| | **If a fugilive arrest, a Form IV | A must also be co | William Accompany Carl | |
| I a - diff. at | and the information | Elimin Elim | N. S. C. | |
| 7/2 Profit Control (1/2) | at the information presented is | | | |
| ARRESTING OFFICER/SERIA | | AZ0072500/480 AGENCY/DUTY | -312-5000 2018-04-21 Y PHONE NUMBER DATE | |
| 1808959/AZ0072500 DEPARTMENTAL REPORT NO | . DEPARTMENTAL RI | PORT NO. | DEPARTMENTAL REPORT NO. | |
| | | | | |

Exhibit C

| 1 | Case 2:21-cv-00108-JJT Documer | nt 1-2 Filed 01/ | 21/21 Page 28 of 40 | | | | |
|----|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| ; | | | JEFF FINE Clerk of the Superior Court By Michelle Messmer, Deputy Date 05/09/2019 Time 15:20:40 | | | | |
| 1 | LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW IVCHENKO | | Description Amount | | | | |
| 2 | Andrew Ivchenko, Esq., SBN 021145 4960 S. Gilbert Rd., Suite 1-226 | | CASE# CV2019-090493 | | | | |
| 3 | Chandler, AZ 85249 | | TOTAL AMOUNT 333.00 | | | | |
| 4 | Phone: (480) 250-4514 Email: aivchenkopllc@gmail.com | | Receipt# 27206056 | | | | |
| 5 | Attorney for Plaintiff | | | | | | |
| 6 | IN THE SUPERIOR COURT F | FOR THE STATE | OF ARIZONA | | | | |
| 7 | IN AND FOR THE CO | OUNTY OF MARIO | COPA | | | | |
| 8 | | 0 N | 21/004 2 005 105 | | | | |
| 9 | RENEE IVCHENKO, a married woman, | Case No.: (| CV 2019-090493 | | | | |
| 10 | Plaintiff | | | | | | |
| 11 | vs. | (Right of | INT for DAMAGES Publicity, Invasion of | | | | |
| 12 | KYLE DAVID GRANT; TRAVIS PAUL | Emotional Distre | tion, Intentional Infliction of ess, and Prayer for Legal and | | | | |
| 13 | GRANT; and MARIEL LIZETTE GRANT, | Equitable Relief) (Jury Trial Demanded) | | | | | |
| 14 | d/b/a Rapsheets.org and Bailbondcity.com; JOHN DOES and JANE DOES I-X; BLACK | | | | | | |
| 15 | CORPORATIONS I-X; and WHITE COMPANIES I-X, | | | | | | |
| 16 | 2 | | | | | | |
| 17 | Defendants. | | | | | | |
| 18 | | • | | | | | |
| 19 | | | | | | | |
| 20 | Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko (hereinafte | r Plaintiff or "M | rs. Ivchenko"), through her | | | | |
| 21 | undersigned counsel, for her Complaint against | the Defendants, all | eges the following: | | | | |
| 22 | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT | | | | | | |
| 23 | This is an action for violation of Plaintiff's right of publicity, invasion of privacy, libel, | | | | | | |
| 24 | and intentional infliction of emotional distra | ss under annlicabl | e decisional law in Arizona | | | | |
| 25 | and intentional infliction of emotional distress, under applicable decisional law in Arizona. | | | | | | |
| 26 | Plaintiff seeks redress for injuries caused by the unlawful conduct of the Defendants, Kyle David | | | | | | |
| 27 | Grant, his brother Travis Paul Grant, and Travis Paul Grant's wife, Mariel Lizette Grant, all d/b/a | | | | | | |
| 28 | Rapsheets.org and Bailbondcity.com. These Defendants have acted individually and collectively | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |

and such actions have injured Plaintiff. The Defendants' conduct that is the subject of this civil action entails their wrongful appropriation, without consent, of the name, photograph, image, and likeness of Plaintiff for a commercial purpose that benefits only the Defendants.

The Defendants, acting individually and in concert, publish on various websites (the "Websites") the names and photographs (commonly called "mugshots") of individuals who have had some involvement with the state's criminal judicial process, along with information purporting to be a statement of the allegations or charges brought against the individual. The Defendants own the websites "rapsheets.org" and "bailbondcity.com," on which they post arrest records, complete with pictures of arrestees, to www.rapsheets.org and www.bailbondcity.com. The Defendants uses software to "scrape" that information from the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office's website for all or substantially all inmates and arrestees. Although the mugshots are only kept online by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office for three days, that is sufficient time for the Defendants to capture the images and data using spiders and bot programs. The Defendants then use analytics and search optimization to ensure that each record is among the first search results found when the arrestee's name is entered into a search engine such as Google, Bing or Yahoo.

However, rapsheets.org and bailbondcity.com are not a public safety service or media outlet. Instead, the Defendants post these mugshots online solely in order to profit by generating advertising review through Google Ads, Google's paid advertising product and its main source of revenue. Companies pay for Google Ads so that people will notice their business whenever they are searching Google. These companies only have to pay a website owner whenever someone clicks on the ad. This is known as cost-per-click advertising (CPC). The Defendants generate substantial revenue through the use of Google Ads on their websites.

 The Defendants refuse to remove someone's mugshot from the Websites even if they have been found innocent of any crime, or have otherwise had their charges dropped, not filed, expunged, or dismissed, as in Plaintiff's case. Prospective employers (or anyone else) conducting a web search finds, in many cases, intentional misinformation indicating that people are still charged, incarcerated, or on parole years even after release or an adjudication of not guilty. The Defendants intentionally and maliciously set up the Websites to give the false impression people are still incarcerated or have been adjudged guilty of a crime. The end result for many arrestees is job loss, broken families, and homelessness. The end result for the Defendants is substantial profits.

The Defendants' scheme proceeds serially through websites operated by or in conjunction with one another. Individuals who attempt to apply legal pressure on the Defendants in an effort to have their mugshot removed from the Websites are retaliated against and further harmed by the Defendants by having their mugshots placed on two other websites owned and operated by them, including "www.thiswebsiterocks.com," which is devoid of advertisements. Plaintiff's mugshot (one of only two involving an Arizona resident) was placed on this website immediately after Plaintiff's attorney demanded the removal of her mugshot from the Websites. In a further effort to intimidate Plaintiff and damage her reputation, the Defendants also set up a Twitter account featuring Plaintiff's mugshot and that of the second Arizona resident, at Twitter.com/zim_rogers_fans?lang=en. Plaintiff and the second Arizona resident are the only people displayed in the Twitter account, which is set up under a fake name. These websites were established to retaliate against Plaintiff, and act as a deterrent against anyone contemplating legal action against the Defendants. These actions by the Defendants constitute libel and false light, and also have caused Plaintiff significant emotional distress.

The Defendants purport to operate "The World's Largest Arrest Record Database" on their rapsheets.org website. This includes mugshots of approximately 300,000 Arizona residents. This action seeks to put an end to the Defendants' profiteering at the expense of vulnerable people such as Plaintiff. The Defendants will continue to cause Plaintiff harm until they are enjoined from their intentional and malicious violation of her rights, both directly and indirectly through Google, Google Ads, GoDaddy, and others Internet providers that host the Websites.

JURISDICTION AND PARTIES

- 1. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona.
- 2. The Defendants Kyle David Grant, Travis Paul Grant, and Mariel Lizette Grant, are residents of the state of Florida. They are the owners and operators of the following websites (a) Rapsheets.org, and (b) Bailbondcity.com, and based on information and belief, (c) thiswebsiterocks.com, and (d) Twitter.com/zim_rogers_fans?lang=en. The Defendants are being sued in their individual capacities. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants under Arizona's long-arm rule and applicable decisional law, which allows for assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident consistent with federal constitutional due process. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a).
- 3. At all material times, the Defendants (i) committed a tortious act within this state, and (ii) are engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state. Sufficient minimum contacts exist between the Defendants and the state of Arizona to satisfy the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. These include directly targeting their Websites to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via their Websites, or through sufficient other related contacts.

- 4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court because Plaintiff resides in and has suffered injury in Arizona as a result of the Defendants' tortious act of publishing defamatory statements about Plaintiff on the Internet. In addition, jurisdiction is proper because the defamatory statements were published to millions of people in the United States including persons in the state of Arizona.
- 5. The Defendants solicit customers in the state of Arizona. Upon information and belief, the Defendants have many paying customers who reside in the state of Arizona who each use the Defendants' respective services in the state of Arizona. Upon information and belief, the Defendants conduct continuous and systematic business in the state of Arizona.
- 6. Defendants JOHN and JANE DOES I-X; BLACK CORPORATIONS I-X; and WHITE COMPANIES I-X, are persons, partnerships, corporations or unincorporated associates subject to suit in a common name whose names are unknown to Plaintiff and who are wholly or partially responsible for the acts complained of, including those who have participated in managing, organizing, marketing, facilitating, and profiting from the operations of the Websites owned and controlled by the Defendants, and therefore, designated by fictitious names pursuant to Rule 10(d), Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff will ask leave of the Court to substitute the true names of the said parties prior to the entry of judgment herein.
- 7. Maricopa County is a proper venue, pursuant to A.R.S. §12-401(1). The acts and conduct of the Defendants occurred in Maricopa County. The Defendants' Websites are available to people in Maricopa County.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

8. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko had a booking photo taken in the state of Arizona.

10 11

12 13

14 15

16

17 18

19

20

21 22

23

24 25

26

27 28

- 9. With respect to Plaintiff, the Defendants, without permission, consent or knowledge of Plaintiff, reproduced, publicly displayed and distributed Plaintiff's booking photo on the Defendants' respective websites.
- 10. Plaintiff's image has commercial value, as is shown by the Defendants profiting from the unlawful appropriation of the image for commercial purposes.
- The Defendants' respective websites, along with Plaintiff's image, were indexed 11. by Yahoo.com and Google.com, and the image appears under Google Images when a web search for Plaintiff's name is conducted.
- 12. The Defendants' use of Plaintiff's image is for a commercial purpose, among other purposes.
- 13. The Defendants operate one or more websites that are used to display Plaintiff's image as part of a commercial enterprise.
- 14. The display by the Defendants of Plaintiff's image is intended, among other things, to subject her to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to damage her personal or business repute, or to impair her credit.
- 15. Each Defendant, acting on their own or in conjunction with one or more of the other Defendants, derives revenue from the Websites through Google Ads and other means.
- 16. Each Defendant, acting on their own or in conjunction with one or more of the other Defendants, utilizes the Websites to intimidate and defame Plaintiff.
- 17. Plaintiff's attorney emailed the Defendants a demand letter dated January 15, 2019, requesting that her mugshot be removed from the Websites based on her charges not being filed and/or dismissed. The Defendants refused this request. A more aggressive demand letter

was emailed to the Defendants on February 13, 2019. The Defendants again refused Plaintiff's request by email response dated February 19, 2019.

- 18. Based on information and belief, the Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by publishing, or arranging to have published, Plaintiff's mugshot, as well as additional false, malicious, and defamatory statements, on two other websites, www.thiswebsiterocks.com and Twitter.com/zim_rogers_fans?lang=en. Plaintiff's mugshot appeared on these websites on February 19, 2019, the same day the Defendants replied to her second demand letter.
- 19. Unless the Defendants are enjoined from further use and publication of Plaintiff's image and name, Plaintiff will suffer further irreparable injury.

CAUSES OF ACTION

20. Mrs. Ivchenko is entitled to recover damages from the Defendants jointly and from each of them based on the theories of liability hereinafter enumerated in Counts I through V, and under such other theories of liability as may be appropriate based upon the facts as alleged herein or as revealed during discovery.

COUNT I VIOLATION OF ARIZONA'S RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

- 21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 22. In doing the acts alleged herein, the Defendants have used for commercial purposes Plaintiff's name, likeness, identity and persona without her consent.
- 23. The commercial use and misappropriation of Plaintiff's name, likeness, identity and persona is a violation of the Arizona common law right of privacy, which includes the right of publicity.

24. The status of Plaintiff's booking photo and name as part of the public record does not relieve the Defendants of the obligation to obtain her consent before exploiting her persona for commercial gain.

- 25. The Defendants wrongfully use Plaintiffs' persona for a commercial purpose in multiple ways, including but not limited to, the generation of revenue through Google Ads.
- 26. As a proximate result of the Defendants' acts alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

COUNT II INVASION OF PRIVACY

- 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 28. Defendants intentionally intruded upon Plaintiff's solitude, seclusion or private affairs and concerns. The Defendants' intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and was unwarranted and unjustified.
- 29. The Defendants made statements that were untrue and intended to misrepresent Plaintiff's character, history, activities and beliefs.
- 30. Specifically, the Defendants have utilized Plaintiff's persona without her consent, present her image and arrest information in a manner that suggests that she is still incarcerated, or that criminal charges are outstanding when in fact they have been dismissed.
- 31. The Defendants also made comments or suggestions that created a false implication about Plaintiff.
- 32. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that their statements regarding Plaintiff were false and/or represented her in a false light.

33. The Defendants acted with malice by posting Plaintiff's image and personal information on a bogus Twitter account in retaliation for her threats of initiating legal action against them.

- 34. These false and/or misleading statements were made to the public through the Internet. The Defendants had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which Plaintiff would be placed.
- 35. The Defendants invaded Plaintiff's privacy, with the sole purpose of making money and intimidating anyone who threatens to derail their scheme. As a result, Plaintiff has suffered mental and emotional damages as a proximate cause of such intrusion.

COUNT III DEFAMATION - LIBEL

- 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 37. Defendants have published Plaintiff's image on various Websites that they own and control. The language in the Websites refer to Plaintiff by name throughout, was made of and concerning Plaintiff, and was so understood by those who see the Websites.
- 38. Defendants knew that the statements about Plaintiff described above were false and/or recklessly disregarded the falsity of these statements when they published them, in that any criminal charges pertaining to Plaintiff have been dismissed, or were never charged in the first place.
- 39. The Websites and statements contained therein are libelous on their face. They clearly expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy because they insinuate that Plaintiff is guilty of having committed a crime.

The statements about Plaintiff adversely affect Plaintiff in her professional life

40.

 and her reputation and Plaintiff has been damaged by their publication. As a proximate result of the above-described publication, Plaintiff has suffered loss of her reputation, shame, mortification, and injury to her feelings.

41. The above-described publication was not privileged because it was published by defendents with malical hetrod and ill will toward Plaintiff and the desire to injure her in that the

- defendants with malice, hatred and ill will toward Plaintiff and the desire to injure her, in that the Defendants continued to defame Plaintiff after she objected to the publication of her image on the Defendants' Websites, by placing her image on two additional Websites as retribution.
- 42. Defendants are liable to Plaintiff as a result of these false and defamatory statements for actual, presumed and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but not less than \$1,000,000.

COUNT IV INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

- 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 44. Defendants, by and through the making of such false, defamatory, and libelous statements, and the false light in which Plaintiff has been placed, behaved intentionally and/or recklessly.
- 45. Defendants, by and through the making of such false, defamatory, and libelous statements, intended to cause emotional distress upon Plaintiff.
- 46. The making of such false, defamatory, and libelous statements by Defendants was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

- 47. Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress and emotional injury due to the Defendants' actions,
- 48. Defendants' aforementioned actions were the direct and proximate cause of such severe emotional distress and emotional injury to Plaintiff.
- 49. Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish as a result of being defamed and libeled by Defendants, and said mental anguish is of a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure.
- 50. As a result of these false and defamatory statements and false light in which Plaintiff has been placed, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for actual, presumed and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT V PUNITIVE DAMAGES

- 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 52. Defendants' aforementioned conduct was conscious, deliberate, intentional, and/or reckless in nature.
- 53. Defendants' aforementioned conduct was undertaken in a state of mind which evidences hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge. Defendants' evil hand was guided by an evil mind.
- 54. Defendants' aforementioned conduct evidences a conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiff and has caused, and continues to cause, her substantial harm.
 - 55. As a result, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages and attorneys' fees.
- WHEREFORE, Mrs. Ivchenko requests that the Court enter judgment in her favor and against the Defendants and each of them as follows:

Case 2:21-cv-00108-JJT Document 1-2 Filed 01/21/21 Page 39 of 40

| - 1 | | | | |
|-----|---|---|--|--|
| 1 | 1. For general | and special damages in an amount that Plaintiff will prove; | | |
| 2 | 2. For punitive damages to be consistent with proof in this action; | | | |
| 3 | 3. Plaintiff is requesting not less than \$1,000,000 in actual and punitive damages | | | |
| 4 | | | | |
| 5 | 4. Appropriate | 4. Appropriate preliminary and/or permanent injunctive relief; | | |
| 6 | 5. For Plaintiff | For Plaintiff's reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred herein; | | |
| 7 | 6. For such oth | 6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just. | | |
| 8 | | | | |
| 9 | | DATED this day of May 2019. | | |
| 10 | | DATED this tay of way 2017. | | |
| 11 | | | | |
| 12 | | LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW IVCHENKO | | |
| 13 | | /s/ Andrew Ivchenko | | |
| 14 | | Andrew Ivchenko Attorney for Plaintiff | | |
| 15 | | Thomas To Thumbur | | |
| 16 | | | | |
| 17 | Original filed thisday of May, 2019 with: | | | |
| 18 | Clerk of Court | | | |
| 19 | Maricopa County Superior Court 222 E Javelina Ave. Mesa, AZ 85210 | | | |
| 20 | | | | |
| 21 | | | | |
| 22 | | | | |
| 23 | By: /s/ Beth Rees Beth Rees | | | |
| 24 | | | | |
| 25 | | | | |
| 26 | | | | |
| 27 | | Ψ. | | |
| | 1 | | | |

Exhibit D

David Gingras

From: David Gingras

Sent: Tuesday, May 28, 2019 6:06 PM

To: Andrew Ivchenko
Cc: Jane Gingras

Subject: RE: Renee lvchenko v. Kyle Grant, et al., MCSC Case No. CV2019-090493

Attachments: Ivchenko - Consent to Diversion.PDF; Doe v. Oesterblad, 2015 WL 12940181 (D.Ariz.

2015).doc

Andrew,

Thanks for getting back to me. 11 am tomorrow is fine, so if you want to give me a call then, I'll be available.

However, I wanted to share some additional comments. After my previous email to you last week, I received some new information which really changes my perspective on this case. It also changes the "options for resolution" I mentioned before.

Here's the bottom line – I went down to the Superior Court today and I pulled some records relating to your wife's criminal case. I have to assume under the circumstances you were already familiar with the disposition of that case. However, just to eliminate any possible misunderstanding, attached is a document in which your wife admitted that she was guilty of the charges against her. Obviously, your wife was not *convicted* of any crimes because she participated in a pre-trial diversion program which resulted in the charges being dismissed. However, this document clearly and plainly says that your wife admits her guilt as to the charges.

Based on this information, I am really struggling to understand how your Complaint (filed in the civil case) doesn't violate numerous ethical rules including <u>ER 3.1</u> and <u>3.3(a)(1)</u>. Among other things, Paragraph 39 of the Complaint specifically alleges that my clients are guilty of defaming your wife because they published statements which falsely "insinuate that Plaintiff is guilty of having committed a crime." But your wife signed a statement avowing that she was, in fact, guilty of committing the crimes with which she was charged. Furthermore, according to the police report attached to the criminal Complaint, you were present at the time of your wife's arrest, so you must have known that she was guilty of a criminal act, as she later admitted.

Entirely separate and apart from that problem, your Complaint also seeks to impose liability based on the *republication* of information (meaning your wife's mugshot and information relating to crimes she was charged with) that was already published online by third parties. In this case, I believe the original publication was done by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office.

Attached is a case, *Doe v. Oesterblad*, 2015 WL 12940181 (D.Ariz. 2015), which explains such republication is completely protected by federal law, specifically the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). This is so even assuming the underlying information was false or misleading in some way (although that isn't the case here).

Based on these points, my clients have asked me to request that you immediately and voluntarily dismiss the civil action you filed against them. If you refuse to do so, my clients are prepared to defend this matter aggressively. I hope that won't be necessary.



Ivchenko - Consent to Divers

File Edit View Window He

Home Tools









E



David Gingras, Esq.
Gingras Law Office, PLLC
David@GingrasLaw.com
https://twitter.com/DavidSGingras

http://gingraslaw.com Tel.: (480) 264-1400 Fax: (480) 248-3196



From: Andrew Ivchenko <aivchenkopllc@gmail.com>

Sent: Tuesday, May 28, 2019 9:13 AM **To:** David Gingras <david@gingraslaw.com> **Cc:** Jane Gingras <jane@gingraslaw.com>

Subject: Re: Renee Ivchenko v. Kyle Grant, et al., MCSC Case No. CV2019-090493

David,

I've been out of town and have a full day today, but I have some availability tomorrow. How does 11am work for you?

Andrew Ivchenko, Esq. 4960 S. Gilbert Rd., Suite 1-226 Chandler, AZ 85249 Phone: (480) 250-4514

Email: aivchenkopllc@gmail.com

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmittal is a confidential communication or may otherwise be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this transmittal in error and that any review, dissemination, distribution or copying of this transmittal is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify this office, and immediately delete this message and all its attachments, if any.

---- Original Message -----

From: David Gingras <david@gingraslaw.com>

To: <aivchenkopllc@gmail.com>

Cc: Jane Gingras < jane@gingraslaw.com>

Sent: 5/23/2019 2:04:46 PM

Subject: Renee Ivchenko v. Kyle Grant, et al., MCSC Case No. CV2019-090493

Andrew,

Case 2:21-cv-00108-JJT Document 1-3 Filed 01/21/21 Page 4 of 40

I just called and left you a message but since you weren't available, I'm following up with an email. As I said in my message, I have just been retained to represent the defendants in the lawsuit you filed against Rapsheets.org.

Before pursuing other avenues, I wanted to talk to you about this case and discuss some options for resolution. If you're interested in having that discussion, please give me a call at (480) 264-1400 (office) or you're welcome to try my cell: (480) 570-6157.

Thanks.

David Gingras, Esq.
Gingras Law Office, PLLC
David@GingrasLaw.com
https://twitter.com/DavidSGingras
https://gingraslaw.com

Tel.: (480) 264-1400 Fax: (480) 248-3196



Virus-free. www.avast.com

Exhibit E

| | RETURN DER A | | |
|----|--|--|--|
| 1 | Firm E-Mail: courtdocs@dickinsonwright.c | 2019 DEC 17 PH 5: 03 | |
| 2 | David N. Ferrucci (#027423) | | |
| 3 | dferrucci@dickinsonwright.com David G. Bray (#014346) | BY B. BARRETT, DEP | |
| 4 | dbray@dickinsonwright.com Paxton D. Endres (#034796) | PAID | |
| 5 | pendres@dickinsonwright.com DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC | \$333 ρ | |
| 6 | 1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 1400 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 | PH 27563447 | |
| 7 | Phone: (602) 285-5000 | | |
| 8 | Facsimile: (844) 670-6009 | | |
| 9 | Attorneys for Plaintiffs | | |
| 10 | IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA | | |
| 11 | IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA | | |
| 12 | | | |
| 13 | RENEE IVCHENKO and ANDREW IVCHENKO, wife and husband, | Case No.: CV2019-015355 | |
| 14 | | | |
| 15 | Plaintiffs | COMPLAINT | |
| 16 | vs. | (Invasion of Privacy / Appropriation / Defamation) | |
| 17 | KYLE DAVID GRANT and JANE DOE | Jury Trial Demanded | |
| 18 | GRANT, husband and wife; TRAVIS PAUL GRANT and MARIEL LIZETTE | | |
| 19 | GRANT, husband and wife; BLACK | | |
| 20 | CORPORATIONS I-X; and WHITE COMPANIES I-X, | | |
| 21 | Defendants. | | |
| 22 | Dolondants. | | |
| 23 | | | |
| 24 | Plaintiffs Renee Ivchenko and Andrew Ivchenko (hereinafter Plaintiffs or "Mrs. | | |
| 25 | Ivchenko" or "Mr. Ivchenko"), through their undersigned counsel, for their Complaint | | |
| 26 | against Defendants, allege the following: | | |
| 27 | | | |
| 28 | | | |
| | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | |

INTRODUCTION

- 1. Defendants are First Amendment opportunists that exploit arrest information and misappropriate images in booking photos to create misleading advertisements designed to generate substantial advertising revenue and to extort payment from the victims whose images have been misappropriated.
- 2. Defendants do not inform the public; instead, Defendants exploit booking photos and arrest information for purely commercial purposes. These "[b]ooking photos—snapped in the vulnerable and embarrassing moments immediately after an individual is accused, taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties—fit squarely within this realm of embarrassing and humiliating information. More than just vivid symbols of criminal accusation, booking photos convey guilt to the viewer." *Detroit Free Press Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice*, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted). Defendants' business model is to exploit this embarrassing and humiliating information that falsely conveys guilt for their own commercial gain.
- 3. This is an action for defamation, false light, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under applicable decisional law in Arizona. Plaintiffs seek redress for injuries caused by, and an injunction enjoining, the unlawful conduct of Defendants, Kyle David Grant, his brother Travis Paul Grant, and Travis Paul Grant's wife, Mariel Lizette Grant, all doing business in conjunction with their websites Rapsheets.org, Bailbondcity.com, and Twitter.com/zim_rogers_fans. These Defendants have acted individually, collectively, and in concert with one another, and such actions have injured Plaintiffs. Defendants' conduct that is the subject of this civil action involves ongoing online activity directed against Plaintiffs.

- 4. Defendants own several websites, including rapsheets.org, on which they use booking photos of arrestees for their own commercial purposes (the "Websites"). Defendants use software to "scrape" arrest information, including booking photos, from the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office's website, and the websites of other law enforcement agencies, for all, or substantially all, arrestees. Defendants then use the arrest photos to create original content in the form of advertisements that serve three purposes: 1) to attract third party advertisers to the website; 2) generate pay-per-click advertising revenue; and 3) extort payment of fees for removal of the arrest information from the victims who identities and likenesses have been misappropriated.
- 5. "A disclosed booking photo casts a long, damaging shadow over the depicted individual." *Detroit Free Press Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice*, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016). Perhaps for this reason, law enforcement agencies do not intend for booking photos and arrest information to be used in this way or to be available online to the public indefinitely. The Maricopa County Sherriff's Office, for example, only posts arrest photos for three days, after which they are taken down. However, this is enough time for Defendants to capture the images and data using spiders and bot programs. To further this scheme and maximize its commercial effect, Defendants then use analytics and search optimization to ensure that each booking photo is among the first search results found when an arrestee's name is entered into a search engine such as *Google, Bing* or *Yahoo*.
- 6. Contrary to Defendants' false representations, rapsheets.org and bailbondcity.com and Defendants other websites are not public safety service or media outlets. If they were, Defendants would not select what information and which booking photos remain on the Websites based on extorted payments. Instead, Defendants hide behind that false pretense, post these mugshots and create advertisements out of them

solely in order to profit by generating advertising revenue through Google Ads and extorted payments. Companies pay for Google Ads so that people will notice their business whenever they are searching Google. These companies only have to pay a website owner whenever someone clicks on the ad. This is known as cost-per-click (CPC) or pay-per-click (PPC) advertising. Defendants generate substantial revenue through the misleading manner in which they use these booking photos as advertisements to induce users of their Websites to click on the banner ads.

- 7. Also contrary to Defendants' false representations, upon information and belief, absent a substantial extorted payment, Defendants refuse to remove someone's mugshot from the Websites even if the arrestee has been found innocent of any crime, or have otherwise had their charges dropped, not filed, expunged, or dismissed, as in Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's case. Prospective employers (or anyone else) conducting a web search find, in many cases, intentional misinformation indicating that people are still charged, incarcerated, or on parole years even after release or an adjudication of not guilty. Defendants intentionally and maliciously set up the Websites to give the false impression people are incarcerated or have been adjudged guilty of a crime. The end result for many arrestees is job loss, broken families, and homelessness. The end result for Defendants is substantial profits.
- 8. Defendants' scheme proceeds serially through Websites operated by or in conjunction with one another. Individuals who attempt to apply legal pressure on Defendants in an effort to have their mugshot removed from the Websites are retaliated against and further harmed by Defendants by having their mugshots and other derogatory and defamatory comments placed on Twitter that, based on information and belief, is owned and operated by them. The Twitter site is located at

Twitter.com/zim_rogers_fans (the "Twitter Site"), and ostensibly is owned by someone named "Jennifer Becker," which is an apparently fictitious name.

- 9. The Twitter site was used to intimidate Plaintiffs and damage their reputations. Plaintiffs and a second Arizona resident are the only people displayed on the Twitter site. The Twitter site was also used to retaliate against Plaintiffs, and act as a deterrent against anyone contemplating legal action against Defendants. These actions by Defendants constitute libel and false light, and also have caused Plaintiffs significant emotional distress and other harm.
- 10. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's mugshot was placed on the Twitter Site immediately after her attorney demanded the removal of her mugshot from Defendants' main Websites located at Rapsheets.org and Bailbondcity.com. Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko is a licensed attorney in Arizona, and represented his wife, Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko. The timeline of his communications with Defendants, using their e-mail address as noted on the Websites, is as follows:
 - 01-08-19: Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko discovered her mugshot posted on Defendants' Websites.
 - 01-9-19: Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko sent Defendants an e-mail through an address provided in the Websites requesting confirmation of their street mailing address and the name of the entity that operates the Websites, in order to send Defendants registered mail to remove Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's mugshot under the provisions of Florida Statutes, Title XLVII, Chapter 901.43 (the "Florida mugshot statute").

- 01-10-19: Defendants responded by agreeing to communicate via e-mail through their website's opt out page at https://www.rapsheets.org/opt-out, stating, "use email like everyone else this century."
- 01-15-19: Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko emailed Defendants his first demand letter, requesting removal of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's mugshot from the Websites.
- 01-15-19: Defendants responded and refused to remove the mugshot, again referring Plaintiffs to the opt out page, and stating,
 "Use our records update page like everyone else its [sic] pretty simple."
- 02-13-19: Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko wrote Defendants a second demand letter, requesting removal of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's mugshot from the Websites.
- 02-18-19: Defendants again responded by referencing the opt out page, and refused to remove Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's mugshot.
- 02-19-19: One day after responding to Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko,
 Defendants caused Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's mugshot to appear on the Twitter site, along with derogatory commentary directed against Plaintiffs.

- 03-18-19: Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko sent Defendants a third demand letter referencing the Twitter site, and requesting removal of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's mugshot from the Websites and the Twitter site.
- 03-20-19: Defendants responded by again merely referencing the opt out page.
- 05-09-19: Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko filed a lawsuit against
 Defendants in the Maricopa County Superior Court (Case No.
 CV2019-090493). Defendants immediately removed Plaintiff
 Renee Ivchenko's mugshot from the Websites once they were
 served with the complaint, but they refused to remove the mugshot
 and defamatory statements from the Twitter site.
- 11. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko obtained a copyright of her image through the US Copyright Office on March 23, 2019, and subsequently filed a DMCA Takedown Notice with Twitter on September 13, 2019 in connection with her image on the Twitter site. Twitter removed Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's image from the Twitter site on that day. On or about September 15, 2019, the purported owner of the site, "Jennifer Becker," filed a DMCA counter-notice objecting to the removal of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's image from the Twitter site. On that same day, additional defamatory comments directed against Plaintiffs were placed on the Twitter site.
- 12. Starting on or about February 19, 2019, five tweets mentioning Plaintiffs, including two mugshot images of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko, were added to the Twitter site. These tweets were designed to increase the online exposure of Plaintiff Renee

Ivchenko's mugshot. The Twitter site appears as the first two search results when conducting a Google search of Renee Ivchenko's name. The tweets purposely include variations of Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko's name, so that the online exposure of the Twitter site is increased when searching his name.

- 13. On or about September 15, 2019, four tweets mentioning Plaintiffs were added to the Twitter site. These occurred one day after the owner of the site filed a DMCA counter-notice objecting to the removal of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's image from the Twitter site. On or about September 18, 2019, two additional tweets mentioning Plaintiffs were added to the Twitter site. The tweets are unequivocally false and defamatory, and accuse Plaintiffs of criminal activity, as follows:
 - I AM ABSOLUTELY REPORTING RENEE IVCHENKO TO
 THE US COPYRIGHT OFFICE!!! SHE HAS COMMITTED
 FRAUD!!!
 - if andy ivchenko has illegally claimed ownership over your work,
 you can report him to the us government here
 https://www.copyright.gov/help/index.html.
 - asserting a copyright claim over work that does not belong to you is
 a federal offence is the united states!! is andy ivchenko trying to get
 his wife renee ivchenko tossed back in jail? trying to get himself
 disbarred? what is wrong with this guy?
- 14. The manipulation of information by Defendants also present Plaintiffs in a false light, in that it creates the false and damaging implication that Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko is a convicted criminal, when in fact the charges referenced in the tweets have

been dismissed. The use of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's booking photo, coupled with the derogatory information in the tweets, conveys to the public a perception of guilt. In addition, the implication that Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko, a licensed attorney, engaged in fraud is inflammatory, false, and constitutes defamation *per se*.

- 15. The Twitter site was launched in March 2018 and on a single day March 31, 2018 it made several posts directed at Zim Rogers, posting his arrest information and booking photos. Zim Rogers was the lead plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against JustMugshots that was filed in California in 2014. See Rogers v. Justmugshots.Com, Corp., No. B258863. Plaintiffs believe that Zim Rogers also attempted to get his information removed from Defendants' Websites, and that the Twitter account was the response. Thus, the Twitter site was established specifically to further circulate the mugshots of only two individuals, both of whom pursued their rights in court. There are no other tweets on the Twitter site. The only logical conclusion under the circumstances is that Defendants own, operate or control the Twitter site either directly or indirectly through a related third party yet to be named in this lawsuit.
- 16. Defendants are notorious operators of mugshot Websites, and are known in the industry as being extremely vindictive. Several online sites have been established by aggrieved parties to expose the nefarious and possibly illegal activities of Defendants, including https://rapsheetsorgkyledavidgrant.wordpress.com and http://classactionagainstmugshotwebsites.com/rapsheets-org-kyle-david-grant-travis-paul-grant.
- 17. This action seeks to put an end to Defendants' harassment of Plaintiffs.

 Defendants will continue to cause Plaintiffs harm until they are enjoined from their intentional and malicious violation of their rights.

JURISDICTION AND PARTIES

- 18. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko and Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko are residents of Maricopa County, Arizona.
- 19. Defendants Kyle David Grant, Travis Paul Grant, and Mariel Lizette Grant, are residents of the state of Florida. Defendants are the owners and operators of at least the following Websites:
 - · Rapsheets.org;
 - Rapsheetz.com;
 - · Bailbondcity.com;
 - bailbondsearch.com; and, upon information and belief,
 - Twitter.com/zim_rogers_fans.
- 20. Defendants are being sued in their individual capacities. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendants under Arizona's long-arm rule and applicable decisional law, which allows for assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident consistent with federal constitutional due process. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a).
- 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based on that information and belief allege, that at all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendants were the agents and employees of their codefendants and in doing the things alleged in this complaint were acting within the course and scope of such agency and employment.
- 22. At all material times, Defendants (i) committed a tortious act within this state, and (ii) are engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state. Sufficient minimum contacts exist between Defendants and the state of Arizona to satisfy the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. These include

directly targeting their Websites to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via their Websites, or through sufficient other related contacts.

- 23. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court because Plaintiffs reside in and have suffered injury in Arizona as a result of Defendants' tortious act of publishing defamatory statements about Plaintiffs on the Internet. In addition, jurisdiction is proper because the defamatory statements were published to millions of people in the United States including persons in the state of Arizona.
- 24. Defendants solicit customers in the state of Arizona. Upon information and belief, Defendants have many paying customers who reside in the state of Arizona who each use Defendants' respective services in the state of Arizona. Upon information and belief, Defendants conduct continuous and systematic business in the state of Arizona.
- 25. Defendants JOHN and JANE DOES I-X; BLACK CORPORATIONS I-X; and WHITE COMPANIES I-X, are persons, partnerships, corporations or unincorporated associates subject to suit in a common name whose names are unknown to Plaintiffs and who are wholly or partially responsible for the acts complained of, including those who have participated in managing, organizing, marketing, facilitating, and profiting from the operations of the Websites and the Twitter site owned and controlled by Defendants, and therefore, designated by fictitious names pursuant to Rule 10(d), Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs will ask leave of the Court to substitute the true names of the said parties prior to the entry of judgment herein.
- 26. Maricopa County is a proper venue, pursuant to A.R.S. §12-401(1). The acts and conduct of Defendants occurred in Maricopa County. Defendants' Websites and the Twitter site are available to people in Maricopa County.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 27. Plaintiffs are individuals and are now, and at all times mentioned in this complaint were, residents of Maricopa County, Arizona.
- 28. Plaintiff Andrew Ivchenko has been a licensed attorney for thirty years, and has been licensed in Arizona since 2002. Plaintiff has during all this time enjoyed a good reputation, both generally and in his occupation.
- 29. Defendants generate substantial revenue from the misleading use of the original content Defendants create from the booking photos.
- 30. Defendants gather and collect arrest photos and create original content out of that material in the form of advertisements ("arrest photo advertisements").
- 31. The arrest photo advertisements are strategically placed on the Website for maximum commercial exploitation. Specifically, Defendants place the arrest photo advertisements directly above, and/or directly alongside banner ads that advertise services for public records information, thus making it appear (falsely) that by clicking on the banner ad the user would be directed to "Arrest Details" located in the rapsheets.com database.
- 32. The following screenshot capture of a page on rapsheets.com exemplifies the misleading manner in which Defendants use the arrest photo advertisements to entice the public into clicking on third party banner ads, thus generating substantial pay-per-click advertising for Defendants:

Phoenix Arrest Records for Inmate Scotty Hugh Cooper


Access Court Records

ReviewPublicRecords

I will not use this information to harass anyone whose criminal records are exposed

OPEN

Scotty Hugh Cooper Arrest Details



- 33. Because, as in the above example, the third party banner ads are typically for services such as public arrest records databases and because the third-party banner ad is located directly beneath, alongside, and embedded within the arrest photo advertisements, the user mistakenly clicks on the banner ad falsely believing that by doing so they will be directed to the "arrest details" in the rapsheets.com database, but are instead directed to the third party database. Defendants purposefully and intentionally create the arrest photo advertisements in this manner to increase user clicks on third party ads, thus earning substantial pay-per-click advertising revenue.
- 34. Thus, the arrest photos advertisements serve at least two commercial purposes: 1) to attract third party advertisers to the Website; and 2) entice any user of

the website to mistakenly click the third party banner ad so as to generate pay-per-click advertising revenue for Defendants.

- 35. Contrary to Defendants' false representations on rapsheets.com, Defendants also use the arrest photo advertisements and the stigma of criminal guilt they falsely imply, to extort payment of fees from the victims who images have been misappropriated. Prior to the Florida Legislature's passage of the Florida Mugshots Act, Defendants openly and publically solicited and accepted fees for removal of the arrest photos and information. The Florida Mugshots Act became effective on or about July 18, 2018. Although Rapsheets.com states that Defendants no longer solicit or collect fees for removal, and therefore their conduct is not regulated by the Act, upon information and belief Defendants continue to solicit and accept fees for removal, but now do so surreptitiously by waiting to be contacted for removal (through its "free" removal process) and then solicit and accept payment for removal in violation of Florida law. Also contrary to their representations, Defendants do not comply with the Florida Mugshots Act, which requires removal upon request, regardless of the conviction or non-conviction status of the arrestee or whether any charge has been expunged or dismissed; under the Act, if an arrestee requests that the information be taken down, Defendants have ten days to do so. Period. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko attempted on two separate occasions to have her information removed pursuant to the Act, and Defendants repeatedly refused to do so.
- 36. The arrest information and booking photos that Defendants use to create the arrest photo advertisements was never intended by law enforcement to be used in this manner or posted by Defendants. The booking photos Defendants use to create the arrest photo advertisements are not tendered by law enforcement agencies to Defendants.

2728

- 37. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko had a booking photo taken in the state of Arizona.
- 38. With respect to Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko, Defendants, without permission, consent or knowledge of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko, reproduced, publicly displayed, distributed, and created original advertising content out of her booking photo.
- 39. Defendants' respective Websites, along with Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's image, were indexed by Yahoo.com and Google.com, and the image appears under Google Images when an internet search for Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's name is conducted.
- 40. Defendants' use of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's image is for a purely commercial purpose.
- 41. Defendants operate one or more Websites that are used to display Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's image as part of a commercial enterprise.
- 42. The display by Defendants of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's image on their Websites, including defamatory information directed against Plaintiffs in the Twitter site, are intended, among other things, to subject Plaintiffs to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and to damage their personal and business reputations, or to impair their credit.
- 43. Each Defendant, acting on their own or in conjunction with one or more of the other Defendants, derives revenue from the Websites through Google Ads and other means.
- 44. Each Defendant, acting on their own or in conjunction with one or more of the other Defendants, utilize the Twitter site to intimidate and defame Plaintiffs.
- 45. Unless Defendants are enjoined from further commercial use and publication of Plaintiffs' image and name, Plaintiffs will suffer further irreparable injury.

///

CAUSES OF ACTION

- 46. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 47. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages from Defendants jointly and from each of them based on the theories of liability hereinafter enumerated in Counts I through VII, and under such other theories of liability as may be appropriate based upon the facts as alleged herein or as revealed during discovery.

COUNT I DEFAMATION

- 48. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 49. Defendants made the defamatory statements set forth in the online postings described above that were false and brought Plaintiffs into disrepute, contempt, and ridicule. Defendants' defamatory statements attacked Plaintiffs' integrity, virtue, and reputation and accused Plaintiffs of criminal activity, including fraud.
- 50. Defendants made false and defamatory statements about Plaintiffs, knowing the statements were false and defamatory, in reckless disregard of the truth of the statements, or negligently failing to ascertain the truth of the matters stated.
- 51. As a direct and proximate result of the statements set forth in the online postings described above, Plaintiffs have been damaged and will continue to suffer damage. Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable harm to their businesses and their reputations.

/// ///

COUNT II FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY

- 52. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 53. "[I]ndividuals have a privacy interest in preventing disclosure of their booking photos[.]" Detroit Free Press Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir. 2016).
- 54. Defendants' publication and use of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's booking photo as an advertisement and publication of Plaintiff's arrest information placed Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko before the public in a false light, falsely portrayed her as a convicted criminal, and was done for the purpose of extortion by shaming the Plaintiff into offering to pay a fee to remove the information.
- 55. The false and/or misleading portrayal of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko as a criminal was highly offensive to the Plaintiff and would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
- 56. Defendants publication (and use as an advertisement) of the Plaintiff's booking photo and arrest information and portrayal of the Plaintiff as a criminal was done with reckless disregard for the fact that the Plaintiff had not been convicted of any crimes.
- 57. Defendants' publication (and use as an advertisement) of the Plaintiff's booking photo and arrest information created a false impression regarding the Plaintiff's criminal history and character and damaged her reputation and caused severe emotional distress.
- 58. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' malicious acts, Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko has been harmed.

COUNT III INVASION OF PRIVACY BASED ON APPROPRIATION

- 59. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 60. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko has a privacy interest in the exclusive use of her name and likeness.
- 61. Defendants' appropriation (and use as an advertisement) of the Plaintiff's booking photo was done for Defendants own commercial purposes and benefit.
- 62. Defendants' appropriation of Plaintiff's image constituted an invasion of privacy as prescribed by *Restatements (Second) of Torts* § 652C.
- 63. Defendant's misappropriation of Plaintiff's image proximately caused damage to Plaintiff in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT IV INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

- 64. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 65. Defendants, by and through the making of the false, defamatory, and libelous statements described above, and by publishing and using Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's booking photo as an advertisement and to extort payment for removal, behaved intentionally and/or recklessly.
- 66. Defendants, by and through the making of such false, defamatory, and libelous statements, and by publishing and using Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's booking photo as an advertisement and to extort payment for removal, intended to cause emotional distress upon Plaintiffs.

- 67. The making of the false, defamatory, and libelous statements as described above by Defendants, and by publishing and using Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's booking photo as an advertisement and to extort payment for removal, was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
- 68. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer severe emotional distress and emotional injury due to Defendants' actions.
- 69. Defendants' actions were the direct and proximate cause of such severe emotional distress and emotional injury to Plaintiffs.
- 70. Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer mental anguish as a result of being defamed and libeled by Defendants, and as a result of Defendants publishing and using Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's booking photo as an advertisement and to extort payment for removal, and said mental anguish is of a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure.
- 71. As a result, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for actual, presumed and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT V UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION/RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

- 72. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 73. Arizona courts "recognize[] the right of publicity, both as a tort claim and an unfair competition claim." Lemon v. Harlem Globetrotters Int'l, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1100 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C).
- 74. Defendants used the name and likeness of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko without Plaintiff's consent or permission to Defendants' commercial advantage.

- 75. Defendants' wrongful use included, *inter alia*, use of Plaintiff's image as an advertisement and to extort Plaintiff to pay a fee for removal.
- 76. As a result of Defendants' use of Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's name, the Plaintiff has suffered harm including harm to reputation, emotional distress, and additional harms.

COUNT VI CIVIL CONSPIRACY

- 77. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 78. Defendants, individually and each of them together have conspired with each other to injure Plaintiffs.
- 79. Defendants are guilty of civil conspiracy designed and implemented to injure Plaintiffs and to cause irreparable harm to Plaintiffs and their businesses and trade.
- 80. As a direct and proximate cause of the civil conspiracy committed by Defendants, Plaintiffs have been damaged.

COUNT VII PUNITIVE DAMAGES

- 81. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 82. Defendants' aforementioned conduct was conscious, deliberate, intentional, and/or reckless in nature.
- 83. Defendants' aforementioned conduct was undertaken in a state of mind which evidences hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge. Defendants' evil hand was guided by an evil mind.

- 84. Defendants' aforementioned conduct evidences a conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and has caused, and continues to cause, them substantial harm.
 - 85. As a result, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages and attorneys' fees.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendants and each of them as follows:

- 1. For general and special damages in an amount that Plaintiff will prove;
- 2. For punitive damages to be consistent with proof in this action;
- 3. Appropriate preliminary and/or permanent injunctive relief;
- 4. For Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein;
- 5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

DATED this 17 day of December, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

DICKINSON WRIGHTHUC

Bavid N. Ferrucci

David G. Bray Paxton D. Endres

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

PHOENIX 89794-1 611594v1

Exhibit F

David Gingras

From: David Gingras

Sent: Friday, January 10, 2020 5:41 PM

To: 'David N. Ferrucci'

Cc: David G. Bray; Paxton D. Endres

Subject: RE: EXTERNAL: Ivchenko v. Grant; MCSC Case No. CV2019-015355

Attachments: O'Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2016).doc; Ivchenko - Consent to

Diversion.PDF

David,

Thanks for the quick response. I am also pretty wide-open on Monday, so I'm happy to talk any time that works for. Just tentatively, I'll try to call you about 11 am, but if that's not the best time, we can do it later in the afternoon or whatever. Also, as noted below, I understand this email is fairly long and is being sent late on a Friday afternoon, so if you need more time to digest my comments prior to talking, that's fine; just let me know.

Having said that, I think these types of calls are most productive when you have some advance notice of the subjects I want to discuss, so I wanted to give you a head's up in that regard. However, before I explain my points, I also wanted to let you know – I am currently co-counsel on a matter with another attorney in your firm (Chuck Price). That case is *Xcentric Ventures, LLC v. Zarokian*, Case No. 18-CV-3661 (D.Ariz.). Obviously this is a completely different case involving different clients and different issues, so I am not mentioning it as any sort of conflict (it is clearly not). I am just mentioning to let you know that I have a good working relationship with your firm, so please do not take my comments below too harshly.

Here's the deal – after speaking to my client and reviewing the facts, we have some concerns that the Complaint you filed is not compliant with Rule 11. At this point, I am NOT threaten to seek sanctions; I am just writing to let you know about my concerns. I am also assuming your client probably did not inform you of all the facts, so I want to take a minute to bring some points to your attention.

First, as you probably know, Mrs. Ivchenko was arrested in April 2018, and her mugshot was posted online by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office within a day or two, as per their normal practice. My client's website (rapsheets.org) automatically "scrapes" these mugshots within a day or two, and they are republished on my client's site virtually instantly. Based on this, we know that Mrs. Ivchenko's mugshot first appeared on rapsheets.org in April 2018. I think the exact date is April 21, 2018, but the exact date isn't relevant.

As I'm sure you know, the statute of limitations for defamation is one year per A.R.S. § 12-541, and that date begins to run on the first date of publication, not when the plaintiff discovers the publication. *See Larue v. Brown*, 235 Ariz. 440, 443 (App. 2014) ("Arizona provides that the statute of limitations for a defamation action begins to run upon publication of the defamatory statement.") (emphasis added).

As the court also noted in *Larue*, Arizona has adopted the Uniform Single Publication Act, A.R.S. § 12-651(A) which further provides: "No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel, slander, invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon a single publication, exhibition or utterance ..." and this rule fully applies to statements published on the Internet.

Based on this, the following points seem beyond dispute:

Case 2:21-cv-00108-JJT Document 1-3 Filed 01/21/21 Page 29 of 40

- If Mrs. Ivchenko had any claim against anyone arising from the publication of her mugshot, that claim initially
 arose in April 2018 and (at least as to rapsheets.org) it expired in April 2019 many months before this lawsuit
 was filed.
- Based on the Single Publication Rule, Mrs. Ivchenko cannot assert multiple different claims based on the same Internet post; she is only allowed a single claim, and that claim is now time-barred.

Again, based on the facts as I understand them, it seems beyond question that Mrs. Ivchenko's new suit is untimely, at least as it relates to the publication of her mugshot on my client's website (I understand the information posted on Twitter is a different issue which I will address separately). Absent some other explanation, this aspect of the case appears to be inconsistent with Rule 11 because it is entirely without merit. Indeed, aside from Rule 11, it is unethical for a lawyer to pursue claims which they know are untimely. *See In re Aubuchon*, 233 Ariz. 62, 68-69, 309 P.3d 866 (2013) (affirming disbarment of deputy county attorney who, *inter alia*, pursued charges knowing they were barred by the statute of limitations).

I presume that Mr. Ivchenko did not inform you of these facts prior to retaining your firm. However, now that you are aware of the facts, I do not believe Rule 11 permits you to continue prosecuting that aspect of the case. Of course, if you are aware of any factual or legal grounds that would show Mrs. Ivchenko's claims are timely, I would like to hear what they are. Otherwise, I would expect you to withdraw that aspect of their case. If that does not happen, I don't see any option other than for me to prepare and serve a draft Rule 11 motion for the reasons stated above. I hope that won't be necessary, but I will pursue that course of action if given no other choice.

Second, entirely separate and aside from this issue, there is a separate problem with your client's claims based on the publication of her mugshot. In short, all of the information that gives rise to her claim (i.e., the mugshot itself, and a description of the charges filed) was originally published on the Internet by a third party source; i.e., the MCSO. Because this information was initially published by a third party, not by my clients, even assuming the publication of that information was unlawful (which it is not), your client's only recourse would be against the MCSO. Any claims against my clients would be barred by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).

The most analogous case that supports this conclusion is *O'Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc.*, 831 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2016) (attached). Although this case did not involve a mugshot, it did involve criminal court records scraped from one source and reposted in another location. The court explained this type of republication of criminal records is fully protected by the Communications Decency Act, and thus the republisher (in that case, Google) was not liable as to any of plaintiff's claims including: "'libel' ... 'invasion of privacy' ... 'failure to provide due process' ... 'cruel and unusual punishment,' ... 'cyber-bullying' ... [and] 'psychological torture.'". Again, this result is true *even assuming* the original publication was unlawful.

For what it's worth, although it involved different facts, I personally litigated one of the leading cases in Arizona involving the Communications Decency Act. *See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC*, 544 F.Supp.2d 929 (D.Ariz. 2008).

Again, if you are aware of any facts that would show your clients' claims are *not* barred by the CDA (to the extent they are based on my client "republishing" information from the MCSO's website), I would like to hear your position including any legal authority that supports your position. However, based on my review of the facts, I do not see any basis to argue that the CDA doesn't apply here. To be clear -- the fact that my client's website includes commercial ads does not affect the analysis because: A.) Google does the same thing; and B.) the CDA does not contain a "for-profit exception". *M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC,* 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2011); *see also Global Royalties,* 544 F.Supp.2d at 933 (explaining, when CDA applies, "Unless Congress amends the statute, it is legally (although perhaps not ethically) beside the point whether defendants refuse to remove the material, *or how they might use it to their advantage.*") (emphasis added).

Third, entirely separate and apart from the statute of limitations and the CDA, your Complaint appears to suggest – falsely – that Mrs. Ivchenko was somehow exonerated or innocent of all wrongdoing, and thus my clients defamed her

Case 2:21-cv-00108-JJT Document 1-3 Filed 01/21/21 Page 30 of 40

by implying her guilt. Again, I do not think a court or jury would even reach that question for many different reasons, but if they did, I do not think Rule 11 would permit you to make this argument.

The reason is very simple – although Mrs. Ivchenko did not *plead* guilty, as part of her plea, she signed a statement (attached) in which she admitted that <u>she was, in fact, guilty of the crimes with which she was charged.</u> Having made that admission (which is really not surprising given the circumstances), Mrs. Ivchenko cannot argue that her reputation was somehow harmed by a *false* implication that she committed a crime. Put simply, Mrs. Ivchenko DID commit a crime, and she admitted in writing that she was guilty of that criminal conduct. The fact that she avoided a criminal *conviction* is wholly beside the point because the *gist* of the statement remains entirely true.

I understand that it is technically possible that Mrs. Ivchenko could try to argue that, in fact, she was not guilty of any crime, thus showing that she lied to the criminal court in her plea agreement. However, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, I am confident that such an argument would not be permitted in our case. Mrs. Ivchenko made a representation to the court that she was, in fact, guilty of a crime. Having made that admission and having obtained a benefit from it, she would be estopped from taking a different position in our case. As such, Mrs. Ivchenko cannot deny that she did, in fact, commit a criminal act.

Fourth, and finally, I understand your client is not happy with various statements posted on this Twitter account: https://twitter.com/zim_rogers_fans. Putting aside the fact that it appears everything posted about your clients on that page is either true, or simply the author's opinion, the simple fact is that my clients have nothing to do with this page. They did not create the page, have never posted anything there, and have no idea who is behind it.

While I appreciate that your clients might not be willing to accept this bare denial, the fact remains that my clients are not under any burden to *disprove* a specious allegation. On the contrary, Rule 11 requires a lawyer to conduct a reasonable investigation *first*, before making accusations in a pleading, and the lawyer must obtain evidence that reasonably supports his/her contentions. To my knowledge, that did not occur here. At this point, other than sheer speculation on the part of your clients, I am not aware of any evidence to show that my clients have any involvement in running this page. I am also not aware of any evidence showing that your clients made any attempt to identify the person responsible for this page (which could easily have been done by, for instance, filing a pre-suit petition under Rule 27(a)).

Rather than conducting *any* pre-suit investigation (much less a reasonable one), your clients have now filed *two* lawsuits against my clients accusing them of running the Zim Rogers Twitter page without any factual basis for that allegation. Again, I do not believe these actions are consistent with Rule 11.

Based on the above, I would like to know if there are additional facts/legal points that I have somehow missed. I fully understand that when you filed this action, you may have been relying on false/incomplete information from your clients. However, based on the points set forth above, I do not believe that Rule 11 would permit the pursuit of any aspect of this case. If you disagree, I would like to hear the factual and legal grounds for that position.

Having said all this, I understand that I have given you a lot of information and you may need additional time to speak to your clients and conduct further research prior to talking on the phone. If you would prefer to have additional time prior to talking on Monday, just let me know.

Linui Audiess. 11 -17 11 N I V VV IVV

75.

Phone Number(s): 480 - 625 - 7709

I do not contest my guilt in this matter. I admit that I committed

2

the charged offenses as further explained in the attached factual basis. I acknowledge that this admission of guilt and factual basis may be used against me if I do not successfully complete the deferred prosecution program and I decide to have a trial in this matter.

David Gingras, Esq.
Gingras Law Office, PLLC
David@GingrasLaw.com
https://twitter.com/DavidSGingras
http://gingraslaw.com

Tel.: (480) 264-1400 Fax: (480) 248-3196

*Licensed in Arizona and California



From: David N. Ferrucci < DFerrucci@dickinson-wright.com>

Sent: Friday, January 10, 2020 6:30 AM **To:** David Gingras <david@gingraslaw.com>

Cc: David G. Bray <DBray@dickinson-wright.com>; Paxton D. Endres <PEndres@dickinson-wright.com>

Subject: RE: EXTERNAL: Ivchenko v. Grant; MCSC Case No. CV2019-015355

Mr. Gingras,

Let's schedule a call for Monday (if you are available). My schedule is fairly wide-open, so let me know what time works best for you.

Thank you,

David Ferrucci

David N. Ferrucci Member

1850 N. Central Avenue Suite 1400

Phone 602-889-5337 Fax 844-670-6009

Phoenix AZ 85004

Email <u>DFerrucci@dickinsonwright.com</u>



From: David Gingras < david@gingraslaw.com>
Sent: Thursday, January 9, 2020 11:17 AM

To: David N. Ferrucci < DFerrucci@dickinson-wright.com >; David G. Bray < DBray@dickinson-wright.com >; Paxton D.

Endres < PEndres@dickinson-wright.com >

Subject: EXTERNAL: Ivchenko v. Grant; MCSC Case No. CV2019-015355

Counsel,

I have been retained to represent Kyle and Travis Grant (and their spouses) in the matter you recently filed on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Ivchenko. My understanding is that Travis Grant was served yesterday, but Kyle Grant has not been served. In any event, I am authorized to accept/waive service on behalf of Kyle, so further attempts to serve him are not necessary.

Prior to moving forward, I wanted to discuss this case with whomever is lead counsel. Can you please let me know who is the best person to speak with, and what day/time would work for you. I'm available later this afternoon and most of tomorrow.

Thanks.

David Gingras, Esq.
Gingras Law Office, PLLC
David@GingrasLaw.com
https://twitter.com/DavidSGingras
http://gingraslaw.com

Tel.: (480) 264-1400 Fax: (480) 248-3196

*Licensed in Arizona and California

Case 2:21-cv-00108-JJT Document 1-3 Filed 01/21/21 Page 33 of 40



The information contained in this e-mail, including any attachments, is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s), and may be legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and any attachments, destroy any printouts that you may have made and notify us immediately by return e-mail.

Neither this transmission nor any attachment shall be deemed for any purpose to be a "signature" or "signed" under any electronic transmission acts, unless otherwise specifically stated herein. Thank you.

Exhibit G

| | Firm E-Mail: <u>courtdocs@dickinsonwright.com</u> | |
|----|--|--|
| 2 | David N. Ferrucci (#027423) dferrucci@dickinsonwright.com | |
| 3 | David G. Bray (#014346) | |
| 4 | dbray@dickinsonwright.com Paxton D. Endres (#034796) | |
| 5 | pendres@dickinsonwright.com DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC | |
| 6 | 1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 1400 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 | |
| 7 | Phone: (602) 285-5000 | |
| 8 | Facsimile: (844) 670-6009 | |
| 9 | Attorneys for Plaintiffs | |
| 10 | IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA | |
| 11 | IN AND FOR THE CO | DUNTY OF MARICOPA |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | JANE DOE I; JANE DOE II; JANE DOE III; JANE DOE IV; JANE DOE V; JOHN | Case No.: CV2019-015355 |
| 14 | DOE I; JOHN DOE II; JOHN DOE III; | |
| 15 | JOHN DOE IV; JOHN DOE V; JOHN DOE VI; JOHN DOE VII; JOHN DOE | AMENDED COMPLAINT |
| 16 | VIII; JOHN DOE IX; JOHN DOE X; | (Jury Trial Demanded) |
| 17 | JOHN DOE XI; JANE DOE VI; JANE | (0.02) 1100 2 011101000) |
| | DOE VII; JOHN DOE XII; JANE DOE VIII; and RENEE IVCHENKO, a married | |
| 18 | woman, | |
| 19 | Plaintiffa | |
| 20 | Plaintiffs, | |
| 21 | vs. | |
| 22 | KYLE DAVID GRANT and JANE DOE | |
| 23 | GRANT, husband and wife; TRAVIS PAUL GRANT and MARIEL LIZETTE | |
| 24 | GRANT, husband and wife; JOHN and | |
| 25 | JANE DOES I-X; BLACK | |
| 26 | CORPORATIONS I-X; and WHITE COMPANIES I-X, | (Assigned to Honorable Teresa Sanders) |
| 27 | Defendants. | |
| 28 | | • |

Plaintiffs Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, Jane Doe III, Jane Doe IV, Jane Doe V, John Doe I, John Doe II, John Doe III, John Doe IV, John Doe VI, John Doe VI, John Doe VIII, John Doe IX, John Doe XI, Jane Doe VI, Jane Doe VII, John Doe XII, Jane Doe VII, and Renee Ivchenko, a married woman (collectively "Plaintiffs"), through their undersigned counsel, for their Amended Complaint against Defendants, allege the following:

INTRODUCTION

- 1. Defendants are First Amendment opportunists that exploit arrest information and misappropriate images in booking photos to create misleading advertisements designed to generate substantial advertising revenue and to extort payment from the victims whose images have been misappropriated.
- 2. Defendants do not inform the public; instead, Defendants exploit booking photos and arrest information for purely commercial purposes. These "[b]ooking photos—snapped in the vulnerable and embarrassing moments immediately after an individual is accused, taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties—fit squarely within this realm of embarrassing and humiliating information. More than just vivid symbols of criminal accusation, booking photos convey guilt to the viewer." *Detroit Free Press Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice*, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted). Defendants' business model is to exploit this embarrassing and humiliating information that falsely conveys guilt for their own commercial gain.
- 3. The online dissemination of arrest information and images in booking photos creates substantial barriers for those attempting to reintegrate into society from

finding employment, housing, and starting a new life. Abuse of these records by profiteers such as the Defendants cuts against efforts for criminal justice reform and rehabilitation of those who have made mistakes in their pasts. Moreover, in many cases arrestee's are never charged, are adjudicated not guilty, or their charges are dismissed for various reasons, including by completing diversion programs. Mugshot companies have wide sweeping negative effects on not only those directly impacted but on the community as a whole.

- 4. In response to the proliferation of mugshot website operators, such as Defendants, several states have passed statutes relating to the exploitation of mugshots, most recently Arizona. On August 27, 2019, HB2191 became effective law as Arizona Revised Statute §§ 44-7901, 7902; Mugshot website operators; prohibited acts; exceptions (the "Arizona Mugshot Statute"). The new law defines mugshot website companies as "mugshot website operators" and prohibits their operation for commercial purposes, which the law defines to include "any purpose in which the [mugshot website operator] can reasonably anticipate the receipt of monetary gain from the direct or indirect use of the public record." A.R.S. § 39-121.03(D); A.R.S. § 44-7901(2). The Arizona Mugshot Statute also prescribes hefty *minimal* damages that mugshot website companies will have to pay to those affected if they do not comply with the law.
- 5. This is an individual action for violation of the Arizona Mugshot Statute, unlawful appropriation/right of publicity, invasion of privacy based on appropriation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under applicable decisional law in Arizona.
- 6. This is a civil action seeking damages, declaratory, and injunctive relief for the violation of the right of publicity under the common laws of the State of Arizona and to recover damages pursuant to the Arizona Mugshot Statute. Plaintiffs seek redress

for injuries caused by, and an injunction enjoining, the unlawful conduct of Defendants, Kyle David Grant, his brother Travis Paul Grant, and Travis Paul Grant's wife, Mariel Lizette Grant, all doing business in conjunction with their websites, including rapsheetz.com and bailbondsearch.com (the "Websites").

- 7. Defendants' conduct that is the subject of this civil action involves ongoing online activity directed against Plaintiffs. Defendants own the Websites, including rapsheetz.com, on which they use the arrest information and booking photos of arrestees for their own purely commercial purposes. Defendants use software to "scrape" arrest information, including booking photos, from the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office's website, and the websites of other law enforcement agencies who post booking photos online, for all, or substantially all, arrestees, albeit for a limited duration of time, typically three days. Defendants then use the arrest photos to create original content in the form of advertisements that serve three purposes: 1) to attract third party advertisers to the website; 2) generate pay-per-click advertising revenue; and 3) extort payment of fees for removal of the arrest information from the victims who identities and likenesses have been misappropriated.
- 8. "A disclosed booking photo casts a long, damaging shadow over the depicted individual." *Detroit Free Press Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice*, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016). For this reason, law enforcement agencies and the State of Arizona do not intend for booking photos and arrest information to be used in this way or to be available online to the public indefinitely. The Maricopa County Sherriff's Office, for example, only posts arrest photos for three days, after which they are taken down. The Arizona Mugshot Act makes crystal clear that the public policy of Arizona is that arrest information and photos published for a limited time by Arizona law enforcement agencies is not to be "scraped" and then disseminated indefinitely for

1

4 5

7

6

9

1112

13

1415

1617

18

1920

2122

2324

2526

27

28

Defendants' purely commercial purposes. Yet, that is precisely how Defendants' illegal scheme operates.

- 9. To further their illegal scheme and maximize its commercial effect, Defendants use analytics and search optimization tools to ensure that each booking photo is among the first search results found when an arrestee's name is entered into a search engine such as *Google*, *Bing* or *Yahoo*. Such conduct contributes substantially to to the illegality of Defendants' use of the arrest information and booking photos.
- 10. Contrary to Defendants' false representations, rapsheetz.com and bailbondsearch.com are not a public safety service or media outlets. If they were, Defendants would not select what information and which booking photos remain on the Websites based on extorted payments, which occurred prior to the enactment of the Florida mugshot statute on or about July 18, 2018 (FL Stat § 901.43, Dissemination of Arrest Booking Photographs) (the "Florida mugshot statute"). Indeed, after being served with the initial complaint in this lawsuit, in a tacit admission that they have never operated as a bona fide news organization Defendants began posting so-called "news" reports on the Rapsheetz.com website. Again, Defendants hide behind the false pretense that they are a media organization, post these mugshots and create advertisements out of them solely in order to profit by generating advertising revenue through Google Ads and, at least up until July 18, 2018, extorted payments, and upon information and belief, since that time. Companies pay for Google Ads so that people will notice their business whenever they are searching Google. These companies only have to pay a website owner whenever someone clicks on the ad. This is known as cost-per-click (CPC) or pay-per-click (PPC) advertising. Defendants generate substantial revenue through the misleading manner in which they use these booking photos as advertisements to induce users of their Websites to click on the banner ads.

- 11. Also contrary to Defendants' false representations, upon information and belief, absent a substantial extorted payment, Defendants refuse to remove someone's mugshot from the Websites even if the arrestee has been found innocent of any crime, or have otherwise had their charges dropped, not filed, expunged, or dismissed as part of a diversion program, as in Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's case. Prospective employers (or anyone else) conducting a web search find, in many cases, misinformation indicating that people are still charged, incarcerated, or on parole years even after release or an adjudication of not guilty. Defendants intentionally and maliciously set up the Websites to give the false impression people are incarcerated or have been adjudged guilty of a crime. The end result for many arrestees is continuous emotional distress, job loss, broken families, and homelessness. The end result for Defendants is substantial profits.
- 12. Defendants are notorious operators of mugshot Websites, and are known in the industry as being extremely vindictive. Several online sites have been established by aggrieved parties to expose the nefarious and illegal activities of Defendants, including https://rapsheetsorgkyledavidgrant.wordpress.com and http://classactionagainstmugshotwebsites.com/rapsheets-org-kyle-david-grant-travis-paul-grant.
- 13. This action seeks to put an end to Defendants' harassment of countless individuals in Arizona and other states. Defendants will continue to cause Plaintiffs harm until Defendants are enjoined from intentionally and maliciously violating Plaintiffs' rights.

JURISDICTION AND PARTIES

14. Plaintiff Jane Doe I is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe I's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a

paul-grant.

11. Also contrary to Defendants' false representations, upon information and belief, absent a substantial extorted payment, Defendants refuse to remove someone's mugshot from the Websites even if the arrestee has been found innocent of any crime, or have otherwise had their charges dropped, not filed, expunged, or dismissed as part of a diversion program, as in Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's case. Prospective employers (or anyone else) conducting a web search find, in many cases, misinformation indicating that people are still charged, incarcerated, or on parole years even after release or an adjudication of not guilty. Defendants intentionally and maliciously set up the Websites to give the false impression people are incarcerated or have been adjudged guilty of a crime. The end result for many arrestees is continuous emotional distress, job loss, broken families, and homelessness. The end result for Defendants is substantial profits.

- 12. Defendants are notorious operators of mugshot Websites, and are known in the industry as being extremely vindictive. Several online sites have been established by aggrieved parties to expose the nefarious and illegal activities of Defendants, including https://rapsheetsorgkyledavidgrant.wordpress.com and https://classactionagainstmugshotwebsites.com/rapsheets-org-kyle-david-grant-travis-
- 13. This action seeks to put an end to Defendants' harassment of countless individuals in Arizona and other states. Defendants will continue to cause Plaintiffs harm until Defendants are enjoined from intentionally and maliciously violating Plaintiffs' rights.

JURISDICTION AND PARTIES

14. Plaintiff Jane Doe I is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe I's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a

result, Plaintiff Jane Doe I's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe I has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe I did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe I has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 15. Plaintiff Jane Doe II is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe II's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe II's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe II has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe II did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe II has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 16. Plaintiff Jane Doe III is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe III's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe III's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe III has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe III did not

provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe III has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 17. Plaintiff Jane Doe IV is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe IV's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe IV's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe IV has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe IV did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe IV has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 18. Plaintiff Jane Doe V is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe V's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe V's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe V has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe V did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe V has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to,

injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 19. Plaintiff John Doe I is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe I's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe I's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe I has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe I did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe I has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 20. Plaintiff John Doe II is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe II's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe II's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe II has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe II did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe II has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

21. Plaintiff John Doe III is a resident of Pinal County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe III's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe III's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe III has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe III did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe III has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 22. Plaintiff John Doe IV is a resident of Denton County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe IV's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe IV's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe IV has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe IV did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe IV has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 23. Plaintiff John Doe V is a resident of Brazoria County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe V's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a

result, Plaintiff John Doe V's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe V has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe V did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe V has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 24. Plaintiff John Doe VI is a resident of Denton County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe VI's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe VI's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe VI has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe VI did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe VI has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 25. Plaintiff John Doe VII is a resident of Kerr County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe VII's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe VII's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe VII has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe VII did not

provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe VII has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 26. Plaintiff John Doe VIII is a resident of Harris County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe VIII's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe VIII's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe VIII has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe VIII did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe VIII has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 27. Plaintiff John Doe IX is a resident of Bexar County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe IX's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe IX's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe IX has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe IX did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe IX has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to,

arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

28. Plaintiff John Doe X is a resident of Hays County, Texas. During the

injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his

- relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe X's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe X's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe X has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe X did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe X has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 29. Plaintiff John Doe XI is a resident of Travis County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe XI's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe XI's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe XI has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe XI did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe XI has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 30. Plaintiff Jane Doe VI is a resident of Collin County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe VI's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe VI 's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe VI has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe VI did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe VI has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 31. Plaintiff Jane Doe VII is a resident of Harris County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe VII's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe VII's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe VII has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe VII did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe VII has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 32. Plaintiff John Doe XII is a resident of Los Angeles County, California. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe XII's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes.

As a result, Plaintiff John Doe XII 's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe XII has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe XII did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about him, including, but not limited to, his arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe XII has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to his business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of his arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 33. Plaintiff Jane Doe VIII is a resident of Suffolk County, New York. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe VIII's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe VIII's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe VIII has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe VIII did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe VIII has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 34. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko is a resident of Maricopa County. Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko was arrested in Maricopa County on April 21, 2018, and her charges were subsequently dismissed by prosecution motion on September 21, 2018. Based on information and belief, Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko's arrest information and booking photo was posted on the Websites within days of her arrest, although not discovered by her until late October 2018. Defendants repeatedly refused to remove this information until

such time as she filed her first lawsuit in Maricopa County against Defendants on May 9, 2019 (subsequently voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff). Plaintiff Renee Ivchenko has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the publication of her name and photograph by the Defendants.

- 35. Defendants Kyle David Grant, Travis Paul Grant, and Mariel Lizette Grant, are residents of the state of Florida. Defendants are the owners and operators of at least the following Websites:
 - Rapsheets.org;
 - Rapsheetz.com;
 - Bailbondcity.com; and
 - bailbondsearch.com.
- 36. Defendants are being sued in their individual capacities. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendants under Arizona's long-arm rule and applicable decisional law, which allows for assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident consistent with federal constitutional due process. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a).
- 37. Under the provisions of the A.R.S. 44-7902(A), Defendants, as mugshot website operators that publish a subject individual's criminal justice record for a commercial purpose on a publicly accessible website, are deemed to be transacting business in this state.
- 38. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based on that information and belief allege, that at all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendants were the agents and employees of their codefendants and in doing the things alleged in this complaint were acting within the course and scope of such agency and employment.

- 39. At all material times, Defendants (i) committed a tortious act within this state, and (ii) are engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state. Sufficient minimum contacts exist between Defendants and the state of Arizona to satisfy the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. These include directly targeting their Websites to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via their Websites, or through sufficient other related contacts.
- 40. Defendants solicit customers in the state of Arizona. Upon information and belief, Defendants have many paying customers who reside in the state of Arizona who each use Defendants' respective services in the state of Arizona. Upon information and belief, Defendants conduct continuous and systematic business in the state of Arizona.
- 41. Defendants JOHN and JANE DOES I-X; BLACK CORPORATIONS I-X; and WHITE COMPANIES I-X, are persons, partnerships, corporations or unincorporated associates subject to suit in a common name whose names are unknown to Plaintiffs and who are wholly or partially responsible for the acts complained of, including those who have participated in managing, organizing, marketing, facilitating, and profiting from the operations of the Websites, and therefore, designated by fictitious names pursuant to Rule 10(d), Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs will ask leave of the Court to substitute the true names of the said parties prior to the entry of judgment herein.
- 42. Maricopa County is a proper venue, pursuant to A.R.S. §12-401(1). The acts and conduct of Defendants occurred in Maricopa County. Defendants' Websites are available to people in Maricopa County.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 43. Plaintiffs are individuals and are now, and at all times mentioned in this complaint were, residents of Maricopa County, Arizona; Pinal County, Arizona; Denton County, Texas; Brazoria County, Texas; Kerr County, Texas; Harris County, Texas; Bexar County, Texas; Hays County, Texas; Travis County, Texas; Collin County, Texas; Los Angeles County, California; and Suffolk County, New York.
- 44. Defendants generate substantial revenue from the misleading use of the original content Defendants create from the booking photos.
- 45. Defendants gather and collect arrest photos and create original content out of that material in the form of advertisements ("arrest photo advertisements").
- 46. The arrest photo advertisements are strategically placed on the Websites for maximum commercial exploitation. Specifically, Defendants place the arrest photo advertisements directly above, and/or directly alongside banner ads that advertise services for, *inter alia*, public records information, thus making it appear (falsely) that by clicking on the banner ad the user would be directed to "Arrest Details" located in the rapsheetz.com database.
- 47. The following screenshot capture of a page on rapsheetz.com exemplifies the misleading manner in which Defendants use the arrest photo advertisements to entice the public into clicking on third party banner ads, thus generating substantial pay-per-click advertising for Defendants:

Phoenix Arrest Records for Inmate Scotty Hugh Cooper

Access Court Records

ReviewPublicRecords

I will not use this information to harass anyone whose criminal records are exposed

OPEN

Scotty Hugh Cooper Arrest Details



- 48. Because, as in the above example, the third party banner ads are typically for services such as public arrest records databases and because the third-party banner ad is located directly beneath, alongside, and embedded within the arrest photo advertisements, the user mistakenly clicks on the banner ad falsely believing that by doing so they will be directed to the "arrest details" in the rapsheetz.com database, but are instead directed to the third party database. Defendants purposefully and intentionally create the arrest photo advertisements in this manner to increase user clicks on third party ads, thus earning substantial pay-per-click advertising revenue.
- 49. Thus, the arrest photos advertisements serve at least two commercial purposes: 1) to solicit and attract third party advertisers to the Website; and 2) entice

any user of the website to mistakenly click the third party banner ad so as to generate pay-per-click advertising revenue for Defendants.

- 50. Defendants have also used the arrest photo advertisements and the stigma of criminal guilt they falsely imply, to extort payment of fees from the victims who images have been misappropriated. Prior to the Florida Legislature's passage of the Florida Mugshots Act, Defendants openly and publically solicited and accepted fees for removal of the arrest photos and information. The Florida Mugshots Act became effective on or about July 18, 2018. Although rapsheetz.com states that Defendants no longer solicit or collect fees for removal, and therefore their conduct is not regulated by the Act, discussion by the online community about Defendants' business practices suggest that Defendants continue to solicit and accept fees for removal, but now do so surreptitiously by waiting to be contacted for removal (through its "free" removal process) and then solicit and accept payment for removal in violation of Florida law.
- 51. The arrest information and booking photos that Defendants use to create the arrest photo advertisements was never intended by law enforcement to be used in this manner or posted by Defendants. The booking photos Defendants use to create the arrest photo advertisements are not tendered by law enforcement agencies to Defendants. It is the public policy of the State of Arizona, as made crystal clear by the Arizona Mugshot Act, that the arrest information and arrest photos briefly disseminated by Arizona's law enforcement and other agencies not be used in the manner that Defendants use them.
 - 52. Plaintiffs had an arrest photo taken.
- 53. Defendants, without permission, consent or knowledge of Plaintiffs, reproduced, publicly displayed, and distributed, and created original advertising content

out of their arrest photos. Defendants also, without permission, consent or knowledge of Plaintiffs, reproduced, publicly displayed, and distributed Plaintiffs' arrest information.

- 54. Defendants' respective Websites, along with Plaintiffs' images, were indexed by Yahoo.com and Google.com, and the images appear under Google Images when an internet search for Plaintiffs name is conducted.
- 55. Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' images and arrest information is for a purely commercial purpose.
- 56. Defendants operate one or more Websites that are used to display Plaintiffs' images as part of a commercial enterprise.
- 57. The display by Defendants of Plaintiffs' images on their Websites, are intended, among other things, to subject Plaintiffs to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and to damage their personal and business reputations, or to impair their credit.
- 58. Each Defendant, acting on their own or in conjunction with one or more of the other Defendants, derives revenue from the Websites through Google Ads and other means.
- 59. Unless Defendants are enjoined from further commercial use and publication of Plaintiffs' images and names and other arrest information, Plaintiffs will suffer further irreparable injury.

CAUSES OF ACTION

- 60. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 61. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages from Defendants jointly and from each of them based on the theories of liability hereinafter enumerated in Counts I through V, and under such other theories of liability as may be appropriate based upon the facts as alleged herein or as revealed during discovery.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF THE ARIZONA MUGSHOT ACT (A.R.S. 44-7901/7902)

On behalf of Plaintiffs Jane Doe I-VIII and John Does I-XII

Against All Defendants

- 62. Plaintiffs Jane Does I-VIII and John Does I-XII incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 63. The people of the State of Arizona, by and through their popularly elected legislature, enacted a statute entitled "Mugshot website operators; prohibited acts; exceptions," codified at Arizona Revised Statute §§ 44-7901, 7902 (the "Arizona Mugshot Statute"). That statute was in force and effective at all times herein relevant.
 - 64. A.R.S. 44-7902 states as follows:

Mugshot website operators; prohibited acts; exceptions

- A. A mugshot website operator that publishes a subject individual's criminal justice record for a commercial purpose on a publicly accessible website is deemed to be transacting business in this state.
- B. A mugshot website operator may not use criminal justice records or the names, addresses, telephone numbers and other information contained in criminal justice records for the purpose of soliciting business for pecuniary gain, including requiring the payment of a fee or other valuable consideration in exchange for removing or revising criminal justice records that have been published on a website or other publication.
- C. A subject individual whose criminal justice record is published in violation of subsection B of this section and who suffers a pecuniary loss or who is otherwise adversely affected as a result of a violation of subsection B of this section has a cause of action against the person responsible for the violation and may recover damages in addition to the

damages prescribed in subsection D of this section in any court of competent jurisdiction.

- D. A person that violates subsection B of this section is liable for damages for each separate violation in an amount of at least:
 - 1. \$100 per day during the first thirty days of the violation.
 - 2. \$200 per day during the subsequent thirty days of the violation.
 - 3. \$500 per day for each day thereafter.

E. This article does not apply to any act performed for the purpose of disseminating news to the public, including the gathering, publishing or broadcasting information to the public for a news-related purpose, or to any act performed by a publisher, owner, agent, employee or retailer of a newspaper, radio station, radio network, television station, television broadcast network, cable television network or other online news outlet associated with any news organization in connection with the dissemination of news to the public, including the gathering, publishing or broadcasting information to the public for a news-related purpose.

F. This article does not apply to activities by a licensed attorney, private investigator or registered process server that are associated with purposes relating to a current or anticipated criminal or civil proceeding. This section does not affect the conduct of trials or the discovery process in any proceeding as otherwise provided by law or court rule.

65. A.R.S. 44-7901 states as follows:

44-7901. Definitions

In this article, unless the context otherwise requires:

- 1. "Booking photograph" means a photograph of a subject individual that is taken pursuant to an arrest or other involvement in the criminal justice system.
- 2. "Commercial purpose" has the same meaning prescribed in section 39-121.03.
- 3. "Criminal justice record" includes a booking photograph and the name, address and description of and the charges filed against a subject individual.
- 4. "Mugshot website operator" means a person that publishes a criminal justice record on a publicly available internet website for a commercial purpose.
- 5. "Person" means a natural person, partnership, association, joint venture, corporation, limited liability company, nonprofit organization or trust or any similar entity or organized group of persons.
- 6. "Subject individual" means an individual who has been arrested.
- 66. A.R.S. 39-121.03(D) states as follows:

For the purposes of this section, "commercial purpose" means the use of a public record for the purpose of sale or resale or for the purpose of producing a document containing all or part of the copy, printout or photograph for sale or the obtaining of names and addresses from public records for the purpose of solicitation or the sale of names and addresses to another for the purpose of solicitation or for any purpose in which the purchaser can reasonably anticipate the receipt of monetary gain from the direct or indirect use of the public record (emphasis added). Commercial

 $_{26} \|$

///

///

///

///

- purpose does not mean the use of a public record as evidence or as research for evidence in an action in any judicial or quasi-judicial body.
- 67. Defendants posted Plaintiffs Jane Does I-VIII and John Does I-XII arrest photo and criminal record information to rapsheetz.com and/or bailbondsearch.com as set forth herein.
- 68. Plaintiffs Jane Does I-VIII and John Does I-XII arrest photo and criminal record information to rapsheetz.com and/or bailbondsearch.com for a commercial purpose, as defined in A.R.S. 39-121.03(D).
- 69. Defendants violated the Arizona Mugshot Statute by posting Plaintiffs Jane Does I-VIII and John Does I-XII criminal record information and mugshot to rapsheetz.com and/or bailbondsearch.com for commercial purposes, namely, by soliciting and generating advertising revenue through Google Ads, and by other acts and/or omissions as specified in this Amended Complaint.
- 70. Pursuant to the Arizona Mugshot Statute, "A person that violates subsection B of this section is liable for damages for each separate violation in an amount of *at least*: 1. \$100 per day during the first thirty days of the violation. 2. \$200 per day during the subsequent thirty days of the violation. 3. \$500 per day for each day thereafter." A.R.S. 44-7902(D) (emphasis added).
- 71. Defendants' violation of the Arizona Mugshot Statute proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs Jane Does I-VIII and John Does I-XII in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT II INVASION OF PRIVACY BASED ON APPROPRIATION

On behalf of All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants

- 72. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 73. Plaintiffs have a privacy interest in the exclusive use of their names and likenesses.
- 74. Defendants' appropriation (and use as an advertisement) of the Plaintiffs' booking photos was done for Defendants own commercial purposes and benefit.
- 75. Defendants' appropriation of Plaintiff's images constituted an invasion of privacy as prescribed by *Restatements (Second) of Torts* § 652C.
- 76. Defendant's misappropriation of Plaintiffs' images proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT III INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

On behalf of All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants

- 77. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 78. Defendants, by and through publishing and using Plaintiffs' booking photos as advertisements, behaved intentionally and/or recklessly.
- 79. Defendants, by and through publishing and using Plaintiffs' booking photos as advertisements, intended to cause emotional distress upon Plaintiffs.
- 80. Publishing and using Plaintiffs' booking photos as advertisements and to extort payment for removal, was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as

to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

- 81. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer severe emotional distress and emotional injury due to Defendants' actions.
- 82. Defendants' actions were the direct and proximate cause of such severe emotional distress and emotional injury to Plaintiffs.
- 83. Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer mental anguish as a result of Defendants publishing and using Plaintiffs' booking photos as advertisements and to extort payment for removal, and said mental anguish is of a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure.
- 84. As a result, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for actual, presumed and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT IV UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION/RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

On behalf of All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants

- 85. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 86. Arizona courts "recognize[] the right of publicity, both as a tort claim and an unfair competition claim." *Lemon v. Harlem Globetrotters Int'l, Inc.*, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1100 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing *Restatement (Second) of Torts* § 652C).
- 87. Defendants used the name and likeness of Plaintiffs without their consent or permission to Defendants' commercial advantage.
- 88. Defendants' wrongful use included, *inter alia*, use of Plaintiffs' images as advertisements.

89. As a result of Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' names, Plaintiffs have suffered harm including harm to reputation, emotional distress, and additional harms.

COUNT V PUNITIVE DAMAGES

On behalf of All Plaintiffs Against all Defendants

- 90. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 91. Defendants' aforementioned conduct was conscious, deliberate, intentional, and/or reckless in nature.
- 92. Defendants' aforementioned conduct was undertaken in a state of mind which evidences hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge. Defendants' evil hand was guided by an evil mind.
- 93. Defendants' aforementioned conduct evidences a conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and has caused, and continues to cause, them substantial harm.
 - 94. As a result, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages and attorneys' fees.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendants and each of them as follows:

- 1. For damages in an amount that Plaintiffs will prove;
- 2. For punitive damages to be consistent with proof in this action;
- 3. Appropriate preliminary and/or permanent injunctive relief;
- 4. For Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein;
- 5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

| 1 | DATED this 27th day of February, 2020. | |
|----|---|--|
| 2 | | |
| 3 | Respectfully submitted, | |
| 4 | DICKINSON WRIGHTPLLC | |
| 5 | Dru /s/Druid N. Farmani | |
| 6 | By: /s/ David N. Ferrucci David N. Ferrucci | |
| 7 | David G. Bray Paxton D. Endres | |
| 8 | Attorneys for Plaintiffs | |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | ORIGINAL of the foregoing efiled with the Superior Court and a COPY thereof | |
| 11 | mailed this 27th day of February, 2020 to: | |
| 12 | David S. Gingras, Esq. | |
| 13 | GINGRAS LAW OFFICE, PLLC 4802 E. Ray Road, #23-271 | |
| 14 | Phoenix, Arizona 85044 | |
| 15 | Attorneys for Defendants | |
| 16 | By: <u>/s/ Christine Klepacki</u> | |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | | |
| 27 | | |

Exhibit H





Andrew Ivchenko (#021145) ANDREWIVCHENKOPLLC 4960 South Gilbert Road, #1-226 Chandler, AZ 85249 Phone: (480) 250-4514

Aivchenkopllc@gmail.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA

JOHN DOE I; JOHN DOE II; JOHN DOE III; JOHN DOE IV; JOHN DOE V; JOHN DOE VI; JANE DOE I; JANE DOE II; JOHN DOE VIII; JOHN DOE IX; JOHN DOE X; JOHN DOE XII; JOHN DOE XIII; JANE DOE III; JOHN DOE XIV; JANE DOE IV; JOHN DOE XV; and JOHN DOE XVI,

Plaintiff's,

VS.

TRAVIS PAUL GRANT and MARIEL LIZETTE GRANT, husband and wife; KYLE DAVID GRANT and JANE DOE GRANT, husband and wife; JOHN and JANE DOES I-X; BLACK CORPORATIONS I-X; and WHITE COMPANIES I-X,

Defendants.

Case No.CV 2020-093006

COMPLAINT

(Violation of A.R.S. 44-7902 / unlawful appropriation / invasion of privacy)

Jury Trial Demanded

Plaintiffs John Doe I; John Doe II; John Doe III; John Doe IV; John Doe V; John

Doe VI; John Doe VII; Jane Doe I; Jane Doe II; John Doe VIII; John Doe IX; John Doe XI; John Doe XII; John Doe XIII; Jane Doe III; John Doe XIV; Jane Doe IV; John Doe XV; and John Doe XVI (hereinafter "Plaintiffs" or "Jane Doe" or "John Doe"), through their undersigned counsel, for their Complaint against Defendants, allege the following:

INTRODUCTION

- 1. Defendants are First Amendment opportunists that exploit arrest information and misappropriate images in booking photos to create misleading advertisements designed to generate substantial advertising revenue from the victims whose images have been misappropriated.
- 2. Defendants do not inform the public; instead, Defendants exploit booking photos and arrest information for purely commercial purposes. These "[b]ooking photos—snapped in the vulnerable and embarrassing moments immediately after an individual is accused, taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties—fit squarely within this realm of embarrassing and humiliating information. More than just vivid symbols of criminal accusation, booking photos convey guilt to the viewer." Detroit Free Press Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted). Defendants' business model is to exploit this embarrassing and humiliating information that falsely conveys guilt for their own commercial gain. Once these images are online, they live on in perpetuity. They serve as the digital scarlet letter of our times, permanently affecting the reputation of those who have paid their debt to society.

photos creates substantial barriers for those attempting to reintegrate into society from

finding employment, housing, and starting a new life. "[N]early one out of every three

American adults"—77.7 million people—has been arrested and, thus, could be

impacted. See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, America Busted: As Arrest Records

Mount, Consequences Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2014, at A1. Abuse of

these records by profiteers such as Defendants cuts against efforts for criminal justice

reform and rehabilitation of those who have made mistakes in their pasts. Moreover, in

many cases arrestee's are never charged, are adjudicated not guilty, or their charges are

dismissed for various reasons, including by completing diversion programs. Mugshot

companies have wide sweeping negative effects on not only those directly impacted but

The online dissemination of arrest information and images in booking

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3.

on the community as a whole.

- 4. In response to the proliferation of mugshot website operators, such as Defendants, several states have passed statutes relating to the exploitation of mugshots, most recently Arizona. On August 27, 2019, HB2191 became effective law as Arizona Revised Statute §§ 44-7901, 7902; Mugshot website operators; prohibited acts; exceptions (the "Arizona Mugshot Statute"). The new law defines mugshot website companies as "mugshot website operators" and prohibits their operation for commercial purposes, which the law defines to include "any purpose in which the [mugshot website operator] can reasonably anticipate the receipt of monetary gain from the direct or indirect use of the public record." A.R.S. § 39-121.03(D); A.R.S. § 44-7901(2). The Arizona Mugshot Statute also prescribes hefty *minimal* damages that mugshot website companies will have to pay to those affected if they do not comply with the law.
- 5. This is an individual action for violation of the Arizona Mugshot Statute, unlawful appropriation/right of publicity, invasion of privacy based on appropriation,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress under applicable decisional law in Arizona. Each Plaintiff has had their booking photos and arrest information on the Websites since the effective date of the Arizona Mugshot Statute.

- 6. This is a civil action seeking damages, declaratory, and injunctive relief for the violation of the right of publicity under the common laws of the State of Arizona and to recover damages pursuant to the Arizona Mugshot Statute. Plaintiffs seek redress for injuries caused by, and an injunction enjoining, the unlawful conduct of Defendants, Kyle David Grant, his brother Travis Paul Grant, and Travis Paul Grant's wife, Mariel Lizette Grant, all doing business in conjunction with their websites rapsheetz.com and bailbondsearch.com (the "Websites").
- 7. Defendants' conduct that is the subject of this civil action involves ongoing online activity directed against Plaintiffs. Defendants own the Websites, including rapsheetz.com, on which they use the arrest information and booking photos of millions of arrestees for their own purely commercial purposes. Defendants use software to "scrape" arrest information, including booking photos, from the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office's website, and the websites of other law enforcement agencies in Arizona who post booking photos online, for all, or substantially all, arrestees, albeit for a limited duration of time, typically three days. Defendants then use the arrest information from the victims who identities and likenesses have been misappropriated to create original content in the form of advertisements that serve two purposes: 1) to attract third party advertisers to the website; and 2) generate pay-per-click advertising revenue.
- 8. "A disclosed booking photo casts a long, damaging shadow over the depicted individual." *Detroit Free Press Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice*, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016). For this reason, law enforcement agencies and the State of

Arizona do not intend for booking photos and arrest information to be used in this way or to be available online to the public indefinitely. The Maricopa County Sherriff's Office, for example, only posts arrest photos for three days, after which they are taken down. The Arizona Mugshot Act makes crystal clear that the public policy of Arizona is that arrest information and photos published for a limited time by Arizona law enforcement agencies is not to be "scraped" and then disseminated indefinitely for Defendants' purely commercial purposes. Yet, that is precisely how Defendants' illegal scheme operates.

- 9. To further their illegal scheme and maximize its commercial effect, Defendants use analytics and search optimization tools to ensure that each booking photo is among the first search results found when an arrestee's name is entered into a search engine such as *Google*, *Bing* or *Yahoo*. Such conduct contributes substantially to the illegality of Defendants' use of the arrest information and booking photos.
- bailbondsearch.com are not a public safety service or media outlets. If they were, Defendants would not select What information and Which booking photos remain on the Websites based on extorted payments, which occurred prior to the enactment of the Florida mugshot statute on or about July 18, 2018 (FL Stat § 901.43, Dissemination of Arrest Booking Photographs) (the "Florida mugshot statute"). Defendants hide behind the false pretense that they are a media organization, post these mugshots and create advertisements out of them solely in order to profit by generating advertising revenue through Google Ads and, at least up until July 18, 2018, extorted payments. Companies pay for Google Ads so that people will notice their business whenever they are searching Google. These companies only have to pay a website owner whenever someone clicks on the ad. This is known as cost-per-click (CPC) or pay-per-click (PPC) advertising.

Defendants generate substantial revenue through the misleading manner in which they use these booking photos as advertisements to induce users of their Websites to click on the banner ads.

- 11. Also contrary to Defendants' false representations, Defendants refuse to remove someone's mugshot from the Websites even if the arrestee has been found innocent of any crime, or have otherwise had their charges dropped, not filed, expunged, or dismissed as part of a diversion program. Prospective employers (or anyone else) conducting a web search find, in many cases, misinformation indicating that people are still charged, incarcerated, or on parole years even after release or an adjudication of not guilty. Defendants intentionally and maliciously set up the Websites to give the false impression people are incarcerated or have been adjudged guilty of a crime. The end result for many arrestees is continuous emotional distress, job loss, broken families, and homelessness. The end result for Defendants is substantial profits.
- 12. Defendants are notorious operators of mugshot Websites, on which millions of arrestees appear. Several online sites have been established by aggrieved parties to expose the nefarious and illegal activities of Defendants, including https://rapsheetsorgkyledavidgrant.wordpress.com and

http://classactionagainstmugshotwebsites.com/rapsheets-org-kyle-david-grant-travis-paul-grant.

13. This action seeks to put an end to Defendants' harassment of countless individuals in Arizona and other states. Defendants will continue to cause Plaintiffs harm until Defendants are enjoined from intentionally and maliciously violating Plaintiffs' rights.

JURISDICTION AND PARTIES

- 14. Plaintiff John Doe #1 is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #1's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #1's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #1 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #1 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #1 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 15. Plaintiff John Doe #2 is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #2's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #2's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #2 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #2 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #2 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, in jury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 16. Plaintiff John Doe #3 is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #3's arrest

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

17.

27

28

information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #3's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #3 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #3 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #3 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, in jury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- Plaintiff John Doe #4 is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #4's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #4's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #4 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #4 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #4 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, in jury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- Plaintiff John Doe #5 is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During 18. the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #5's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #5's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #5 has incurred damages under the

Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #5 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #5 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 19. Plaintiff John Doe #6 is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #6's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #6's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #6 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #6 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #6 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 20. Plaintiff John Doe #7 is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #7's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #7's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #7 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #7 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe

#7 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 21. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe #1's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe #1's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, in jury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 22. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe #2's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe #2's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #8's arrest

information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a

result, Plaintiff John Doe #8's image has been commercially misappropriated by

Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #8 has incurred damages under the

Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #8 did not

provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her,

including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe

#8 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to,

injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her

arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

Plaintiff John Doe #8 is a resident of Pinellas County, Florida. During the

23.

- 24. Plaintiff John Doe #9 is a resident of Pinellas County, Florida. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #9's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #9's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #9 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #9 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #9 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 25. Plaintiff John Doe #10 is a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #10's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes.

As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #10's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #10 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #10 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #10 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, in jury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 26. Plaintiff John Doe #11 is a resident of Williamson County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #11's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #11's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #11 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #11 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #11 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 27. Plaintiff John Doe #12 is a resident of Randall County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #12's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #12's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #12 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #12 did not

provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #12 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 28. Plaintiff John Doe #13 is a resident of Brazoria County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #13's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #13's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #13 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #13 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #13 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 29. Plaintiff Jane Doe #3 is a resident of Brazoria County, Texas. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe #3's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe #3's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe #3 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe #3 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe #3 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to,

in jury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

- 30. Plaintiff John Doe #14 is a resident of Cook County, Illinois. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #14's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #14's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #14 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #14 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #14 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 31. Plaintiff Jane Doe #4 is a resident of Cook County, Illinois. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff Jane Doe #4's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff Jane Doe #4's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff Jane Doe #4 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff Jane Doe #4 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff Jane Doe #4 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #15's

arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes.

As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #15's image has been commercially misappropriated by

Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #15 has incurred damages under

the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #15 did not

provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her,

including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe

#15 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to,

injury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her

arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.

Plaintiff John Doe #15 is a resident of Horry County, South Carolina.

32.

- 33. Plaintiff John Doe #16 is a resident of St. Louis County, Missouri. During the relevant time period, defendants have disseminated Plaintiff John Doe #16's arrest information and booking photo on the Websites for purely commercial purposes. As a result, Plaintiff John Doe #16's image has been commercially misappropriated by Defendants, causing damage, and Plaintiff John Doe #16 has incurred damages under the Arizona Mugshot Statute, as further described herein. Plaintiff John Doe #16 did not provide the Defendants with prior consent for the posting of any information about her, including, but not limited to, her arrest information and arrest photo. Plaintiff John Doe #16 has experienced both emotional and financial harm, including, but not limited to, in jury to her business and property as a result of the commercial dissemination of her arrest information and arrest photo by the Defendants.
- 34. Defendants Kyle David Grant, Travis Paul Grant, and Mariel Lizette Grant, are residents of the state of Florida. Defendants are the owners and operators of at least the following Websites:

- 3
- 5

- 10
- 11 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16 17 18
- 19
- 20 21
- 22 23

- 25 26
- 27 28

- Rapsheets.org;
- Rapsheetz.com;
- Bailbondcity.com; and
- Bailbondsearch.com.
- 35. Defendants are being sued in their individual capacities. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendants under Arizona's long-arm rule and applicable decisional law, which allows for assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident consistent with federal constitutional due process. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a).
- Under the provisions of the A.R.S. 44-7902(A), Defendants, as mugshot 36. website operators that publish a subject individual's criminal justice record for a commercial purpose on a publicly accessible website, are deemed to be transacting business in this state.
- 37. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and based on that information and belief allege, that at all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendants were the agents and employees of their codefendants and in doing the things alleged in this complaint were acting within the course and scope of such agency and employment.
- 38. At all material times, Defendants (i) committed a tortious act within this state, and (ii) are engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state. Sufficient minimum contacts exist between Defendants and the state of Arizona to satisfy the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. These include directly targeting their Websites to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via their Websites, or through sufficient other related contacts.
- 39. Defendants solicit customers in the state of Arizona. Upon information and belief, Defendants have many paying customers who reside in the state of Arizona

who each use Defendants' respective services in the state of Arizona. Upon information and belief, Defendants conduct continuous and systematic business in the state of Arizona.

- 40. Defendants JOHN and JANE DOES I-X; BLACK CORPORATIONS I-X; and WHITE COMPANIES I-X, are persons, partnerships, corporations or unincorporated associates subject to suit in a common name whose names are unknown to Plaintiffs and who are wholly or partially responsible for the acts complained of, including those who have participated in managing, organizing, marketing, facilitating, and profiting from the operations of the Websites, and therefore, designated by fictitious names pursuant to Rule 10(d), Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs will ask leave of the Court to substitute the true names of the said parties prior to the entry of judgment herein.
- 41. Maricopa County is a proper venue, pursuant to A.R.S. §12-401(1). The acts and conduct of Defendants occurred in Maricopa County. Defendants' Websites are available to people in Maricopa County.


GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 42. Plaintiffs are individuals and are now, and at all times mentioned in this complaint were, residents of Maricopa County, Arizona; Pinellas County, Florida; Miami-Dade County, Florida; Williamson County, Texas; Randall County, Texas; Brazoria County, Texas; Cook County, Illinois; Horry County, South Carolina; and St. Louis County, Missouri.
- 43. Defendants generate substantial revenue from the misleading use of the original content Defendants create from the booking photos.
- 44. Defendants gather and collect arrest photos and create original content out of that material in the form of advertisements ("arrest photo advertisements").

- 45. The arrest photo advertisements are strategically placed on the Websites for maximum commercial exploitation. Specifically, Defendants place the arrest photo advertisements directly above, and/or directly alongside banner ads that advertise services for, *inter alia*, public records information, thus making it appear (falsely) that by clicking on the banner ad the user would be directed to "Arrest Details" located in the rapsheetz.com database.
- 46. The following screenshot capture of a page on rapsheetz.com exemplifies the misleading manner in which Defendants use the arrest photo advertisements to entice the public into clicking on third party banner ads, thus generating substantial pay-per-click advertising for Defendants:

Phoenix Arrest Records for Inmate Scotty Hugh Cooper

Access Court Records ReviewPublicRecords I will not use this information to harass anyone whose criminal records are exposed



Scotty Hugh Cooper Arrest Details

- 47. Because, as in the above example, the third party banner ads are typically for services such as public arrest records databases and because the third-party banner ad is located directly beneath, alongside, and embedded within the arrest photo advertisements, the user mistakenly clicks on the banner ad falsely believing that by doing so they will be directed to the "arrest details" in the rapsheetz.com database, but are instead directed to the third party database. Defendants purposefully and intentionally create the arrest photo advertisements in this manner to increase user clicks on third party ads, thus earning substantial pay-per-click advertising revenue.
- 48. Thus, the arrest photos advertisements serve at least two commercial purposes: 1) to attract third party advertisers to the Website; and 2) entice any user of the website to mistakenly click the third party banner ad so as to generate pay-per-click advertising revenue for Defendants.
- 49. The arrest information and booking photos that Defendants use to create the arrest photo advertisements was never intended by law enforcement to be used in this manner or posted by Defendants. The booking photos Defendants use to create the arrest photo advertisements are not tendered by law enforcement agencies to Defendants. It is the public policy of the State of Arizona, as made crystal clear by the Arizona Mugshot Act, that the arrest information and arrest photos briefly disseminated by Arizona's law enforcement and other agencies not be used in the manner that Defendants use them.
 - 50. Plaintiffs had an arrest photo taken.
- 51. Defendants, without permission, consent or knowledge of Plaintiffs, reproduced, publicly displayed, distributed, and created original advertising content out of their arrest photos. Defendants also, without permission, consent or knowledge of Plaintiffs, reproduced, publicly displayed, and distributed Plaintiffs' arrest information.

- 52. Defendants' respective Websites, along with Plaintiffs' images, were indexed by Yahoo.com and Google.com, and the images appear under Google Images when an internet search for Plaintiff's name is conducted.
- 53. Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' images and arrest information is for a purely commercial purpose.
- 54. Defendants operate one or more Websites that are used to display Plaintiffs' images as part of a commercial enterprise.
- 55. The display by Defendants of Plaintiffs' images on their Websites, are intended, among other things, to subject Plaintiffs to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and to damage their personal and business reputations, or to impair their credit.
- 56. Each Defendant, acting on their own or in conjunction with one or more of the other Defendants, derives revenue from the Websites through Google Ads and other means.
- 57. Unless Defendants are enjoined from further commercial use and publication of Plaintiffs' images and names and other arrest information, Plaintiffs will suffer further irreparable injury.

CAUSES OF ACTION

- 58. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 59. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages from Defendants jointly and from each of them based on the theories of liability hereinafter enumerated in Counts I through V, and under such other theories of liability as may be appropriate based upon the facts as alleged herein or as revealed during discovery.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

COUNT I VIOLATION OF THE ARIZONA MUGSHOT ACT (A.R.S. 44-7901/7902)

- 60. Plaintiffs Jane Doe and John Doe 1-20 incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 61. The people of the State of Arizona, by and through their popularly elected legislature, enacted a statute entitled "Mugshot website operators; prohibited acts; exceptions," codified at Arizona Revised Statute §§ 44-7901, 7902 (the "Arizona Mugshot Statute"). That statute was in force and effective at all times herein relevant.
 - 62. A.R.S. 44-7902 states as follows:

Mugshot website operators; prohibited acts; exceptions

- A. A mugshot website operator that publishes a subject individual's criminal justice record for a commercial purpose on a publicly accessible website is deemed to be transacting business in this state.
- B. A mugshot website operator may not use criminal justice records or the names, addresses, telephone numbers and other information contained in criminal justice records for the purpose of soliciting business for pecuniary gain, including requiring the payment of a fee or other valuable consideration in exchange for removing or revising criminal justice records that have been published on a website or other publication.
- C. A subject individual whose criminal justice record is published in violation of subsection B of this section and who suffers a pecuniary loss or who is otherwise adversely affected as a result of a violation of subsection B of this section has a cause of action against the person responsible for the violation and may recover damages in addition to the

damages prescribed in subsection D of this section in any court of competent jurisdiction.

- D. A person that violates subsection B of this section is liable for damages for each separate violation in an amount of at least:
 - 1. \$100 per day during the first thirty days of the violation.
 - 2. \$200 per day during the subsequent thirty days of the violation.
 - 3. \$500 per day for each day thereafter.

E. This article does not apply to any act performed for the purpose of disseminating news to the public, including the gathering, publishing or broadcasting information to the public for a news-related purpose, or to any act performed by a publisher, owner, agent, employee or retailer of a newspaper, radio station, radio network, television station, television broadcast network, cable television network or other online news outlet associated with any news organization in connection with the dissemination of news to the public, including the gathering, publishing or broadcasting information to the public for a news-related purpose.

F. This article does not apply to activities by a licensed attorney, private investigator or registered process server that are associated with purposes relating to a current or anticipated criminal or civil proceeding. This section does not affect the conduct of trials or the discovery process in any proceeding as otherwise provided by law or court rule.

63. A.R.S. 44-7901 states as follows:

44-7901. Definitions

In this article, unless the context otherwise requires:

- 1. "Booking photograph" means a photograph of a subject individual that is taken pursuant to an arrest or other involvement in the criminal justice system.
- 2. "Commercial purpose" has the same meaning prescribed in section 39-121.03.
- 3. "Criminal justice record" includes a booking photograph and the name, address and description of and the charges filed against a subject individual.
- 4. "Mugshot website operator" means a person that publishes a criminal justice record on a publicly available internet website for a commercial purpose.
- 5. "Person" means a natural person, partnership, association, joint venture, corporation, limited liability company, nonprofit organization or trust or any similar entity or organized group of persons.
- 6. "Subject individual" means an individual who has been arrested.

64. A.R.S. 39-121.03(D) states as follows:

For the purposes of this section, "commercial purpose" means the use of a public record for the purpose of sale or resale or for the purpose of producing a document containing all or part of the copy, printout or photograph for sale or the obtaining of names and addresses from public records for the purpose of solicitation or the sale of names and addresses to another for the purpose of solicitation or for any purpose in which the purchaser can reasonably anticipate the receipt of monetary gain from the direct or indirect use of the public record (emphasis added). Commercial

purpose does not mean the use of a public record as evidence or as research for evidence in an action in any judicial or quasi-judicial body.

- 65. Defendants posted Plaintiffs Jane Doe's and John Doe's 1-20 mugshot and criminal record information to rapsheetz.com and/or bailbondsearch.com as set forth herein.
- 66. Defendants posted Plaintiff Jane Doe's and John Doe's 1-20 mugshot and criminal record information to rapsheetz.com and/or bailbondsearch.com for a commercial purpose, as defined in A.R.S. 39-121.03(D).
- 67. Defendants violated the Arizona Mugshot Statute by posting Plaintiff Jane Doe's and John Doe's 1-20 criminal record information and mugshots to rapsheetz.com and/or bailbondsearch.com for commercial purposes, namely, by soliciting and generating advertising revenue through Google Ads, and by other acts and/or omissions as specified in this Amended Complaint.
- 68. Pursuant to the Arizona Mugshot Statute, "A person that violates subsection B of this section is liable for damages for each separate violation in an amount of *at least*: 1. \$100 per day during the first thirty days of the violation. 2. \$200 per day during the subsequent thirty days of the violation. 3. \$500 per day for each day thereafter." A.R.S. 44-7902(D) (emphasis added).
- 69. Defendants' violation of the Arizona Mugshot Statute proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs Jane Doe and John Doe 1-20 in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT II INVASION OF PRIVACY BASED ON APPROPRIATION

70. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.

- 71. Plaintiffs have a privacy interest in the exclusive use of their names and likenesses.
- 72. Defendants' appropriation (and use as an advertisement) of the Plaintiffs' booking photos was done for Defendants own commercial purposes and benefit.
- 73. Defendants' appropriation of Plaintiff's image constituted an invasion of privacy as prescribed by Restatements (Second) of Torts § 652C.
- 74. Defendant's misappropriation of Plaintiffs' image proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT III INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

- 75. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 76. Defendants, by and through publishing and using Plaintiffs' booking photo as an advertisement, behaved intentionally and/or recklessly.
- 77. Defendants, by and through publishing and using Plaintiffs' booking photo as an advertisement, intended to cause emotional distress upon Plaintiffs.
- 78. Publishing and using Plaintiffs' booking photo as an advertisement was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
- 79. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer severe emotional distress and emotional injury due to Defendants' actions.
- 80. Defendants' actions were the direct and proximate cause of such severe emotional distress and emotional injury to Plaintiffs.

- 81. Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer mental anguish as a result of Defendants publishing and using Plaintiffs' booking photo as an advertisement, and said mental anguish is of a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure.
- 82. As a result, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for actual, presumed and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT IV UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION/RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

- 83. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 84. Arizona courts "recognize[] the right of publicity, both as a tort claim and an unfair competition claim." Lemon v. Harlem Globetrotters Int'l, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1100 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 652C).
- 85. Defendants used the name and likeness of Plaintiffs without their consent or permission to Defendants' commercial advantage.
- 86. Defendants' wrongful use included, *inter alia*, use of Plaintiffs' image as an advertisement.
- 87. As a result of Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' names, Plaintiffs have suffered harm including harm to reputation, emotional distress, and additional harms.

COUNTV PUNITIVE DAMAGES

- 88. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.
- 89. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of each paragraph above into this claim as though fully set forth herein.

- 90. Defendants' aforementioned conduct was conscious, deliberate, intentional, and/or reckless in nature.
- 91. Defendants' aforementioned conduct was undertaken in a state of mind which evidences hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge. Defendants' evil hand was guided by an evil mind.
- 92. Defendants' aforementioned conduct evidences a conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and has caused, and continues to cause, them substantial harm.
 - 93. As a result, Plaintiff's are entitled to punitive damages and attorneys' fees.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendants and each of them as follows:

- 1. For damages in an amount that Plaintiffs will prove;
- 2. For punitive damages to be consistent with proof in this action;
- 3. Appropriate preliminary and/or permanent injunctive relief;
- 4. For Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein;
- 5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just.

DATED: May _____, 2020.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREWIVCHENKOPLLC

Andrew Ivchenko, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiffs

Exhibit I

David Gingras

From: Andrew lvchenko <aivchenkopllc@gmail.com>

Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2020 3:21 PM

To: David Gingras

Subject: Re: Activity in Case 2:20-cv-01142-SMB Doe I et al v. Grant et al Order on Motion for

Discovery

David,

I am in meetings all day but you asked for a quick response so I will do that. Obviously there is no need to do depositions so we can stipulate to something along the lines of item #1. Not sure where the court is going with the remand motion. Also, you are dealing with a Federal and state case through the Rosenstein firm (are you still counting these? Perhaps you can use Roman numerals like in the Super Bowl, it's more dignified). My actions in this case will be coordinated with them, once I do that I will have a follow-up response.

No matter what happens with the remand motion, it's not staying in Federal court even if it gets dismissed by us - this is the first action filed by these 20 plaintiffs. The 20 plaintiffs from the previous case are on the sidelines, but will likely be filing individual actions such as done in state action no. CV2020-055722.

Your last sentence in #2 makes no sense - you and your clients harassed Mrs. Emery, opposing counsel, and my wife (and you aided and abetted your client by obtaining the police video). Needless to say, this is all legally actionable and will be addressed through the courts. I urge you to counsel your clients to remove all of that from their home page, although it is so inflammatory that it actually helps us when we ask for the injunction in a few weeks.

Andrew Ivchenko, Esq. 4960 S. Gilbert Rd., Suite 1-226 Chandler, AZ 85249

Phone: (480) 250-4514

Email: aivchenkopllc@gmail.com

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmittal is a confidential communication or may otherwise be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this transmittal in error and that any review, dissemination, distribution or copying of this transmittal is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify this office, and immediately delete this message and all its attachments, if any.

---- Original Message -----

From: David Gingras <david@gingraslaw.com> **To:** Andrew lvchenko <aivchenkopllc@gmail.com>

Sent: 11/12/2020 1:25:15 PM

Subject: FW: Activity in Case 2:20-cv-01142-SMB Doe I et al v. Grant et al Order on Motion for

Discovery

Andrew,

I'm sure by now you've received the court's order. I'd like to discuss your thoughts on how we can proceed.

I see a couple of options:

- 1.) We can simply stipulate and agree that all three of the Florida plaintiffs reside in Florida, were arrested in Florida, and their mugshots and arrest info was published online by the arresting law enforcement agency/agencies in Florida (obviously we would only do this if those facts are true). If you would agree to this, that would resolve my need for any further discovery into this issue, and to be clear about what I'm saying if you would agree to that stipulation, I will not require you to disclose the names of the three FL plaintiffs at this time (obviously I still maintain our objection to them proceeding anonymously, but we can leave that issue for another day).
- 2.) If you aren't willing to stipulate to the points mentioned above, then I will need you to disclose the names of the three FL plaintiffs so I can verify the facts relating to them. I'm happy to serve you with an interrogatory asking for that info, but I'd prefer to simply proceed informally since it's faster. In this instance, if you agree to disclose their names, Defendants will agree NOT to publish them anywhere (beyond whatever publication has already occurred) nor will I put them into any public pleadings at this time. I know you have a negative opinion about both me and my clients, but the simple fact is that I really just want to make sure the court has the info and facts it needs to address the jurisdictional arguments. I am not looking to harass anyone.

If neither of these points work for you, then I will probably proceed by noticing the depositions of the three FL plaintiffs, but that honestly feels excessive.

In any event, please let me know your position ASAP.

David Gingras, Esq.
Gingras Law Office, PLLC
David@GingrasLaw.com
https://twitter.com/DavidSGingras

nups://twitter.com/pavid5Gingras

http://gingraslaw.com Tel.: (480) 264-1400 Fax: (480) 248-3196

*Licensed in Arizona and California



From: azddb_responses@azd.uscourts.gov <azddb_responses@azd.uscourts.gov>

Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2020 1:15 PM

To: azddb nefs@azd.uscourts.gov

Subject: Activity in Case 2:20-cv-01142-SMB Doe I et al v. Grant et al Order on Motion for Discovery

This is an automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to this e-mail because the mail box is unattended.

NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits attorneys of record and parties in a case (including pro se litigants) to receive one free electronic copy of all documents filed electronically, if receipt is required by law or directed by the filer. PACER access fees apply to all other users. To avoid later charges, download a copy of each document during this first viewing. However, if the referenced document is a transcript, the free copy and 30 page limit do not apply.

U.S. District Court

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was entered on 11/12/2020 at 1:14 PM MST and filed on 11/12/2020

Case Name: Doe I et al v. Grant et al
Case Number: 2:20-cv-01142-SMB

Filer:

Document Number: 28

Docket Text:

ORDER granting [17] Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendants are hereby allowed to take discovery, subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for the sole purpose of determining whether the Florida-resident Plaintiffs identified as John Does 8, 9 and 10 were arrested in Florida or Arizona, and/or whether any other facts exist which would provide grounds for those Plaintiffs to assert claims in Arizona under Arizona substantive law. Signed by Judge Susan M. Brnovich on 11/12/2020. (ESG)

2:20-cv-01142-SMB Notice has been electronically mailed to:

David Scott Gingras david@gingraslaw.com

Andrew Ivchenko aivchenkopllc@gmail.com

2:20-cv-01142-SMB Notice will be sent by other means to those listed below if they are affected by this filing:

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:

Document description: Main Document

Original filename:n/a

Electronic document Stamp:

[STAMP dcecfStamp_ID=1096393563 [Date=11/12/2020] [FileNumber=21331852 -0] [a182ca5aa6a7b0af9c61601eb531a3dde3d7b4a3d40bf9993d02017205d35e107 402b4abca04a06d1aa51e85af35b5cf534992e1269f2cf65826830cb95fd795]]



Virus-free. www.avast.com